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1Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Over the past two decades, the pace and trends of globalization have changed
considerably, characterizing an increasing pattern of integration of national goods and
labor markets into the global market. This new pattern of globalization is explained
by two major events. On the one hand, advances in information and communication
technology, combined with the gradual removal of barriers to trade and capital flows,
have made it possible for production and work processes to lose the locational viability
for a growing number of goods and services. This has enabled firms in advanced countries
to unbundle the production process into a global value added chain by exploiting the
comparative advantage differences across countries. The accession of emerging and
developing countries to the global markets has considerably intensified the trade relations
with advanced economies (cf. Spence, 2011). For example, since the early 1990s, the share
of developing countries’ products in total manufacturing import of advanced economies
has increased by 50 percent, driven largely by China (see Figure 1.1).
On the other hand, political changes as well as institutional and economic reforms have
induced a substantial transformation of countries like Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC)
and the former Eastern European bloc countries, into economies with high accumulation
rates of human capital and advanced technology, and improving business infrastructure.
This has enabled their large economies and labor forces to participate in open market
economies. As depicted in Figure 1.2, the integration of these emerging countries has
led to a marked growth in the effective global labor supply, with most of the increase
taking place after 1990. About half this increase has been attributed to the rise in the
working-age population in East Asia, while South Asia and Central and Eastern Europe
contributed moderately.1
1For detailed discussions regarding trends in and implications of globalization of labor see IMF (2007).
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1.1 Motivation
Figure 1.1: Share of developing countries in advanced countries’ trade
Source: (IMF, 2007, Figure 5.3).
These developments have also led to a sizable increase in migration flows to advanced
countries, accompanied with substantial changes in the skill structure of immigrants.
According to OECD (2007a), today more than 115 million immigrants live in OECD
countries, constituting about 10% of the population. Moreover, the number of highly-
educated immigrants has grown by 70% over the past decade to exceed 31 million in
the OECD area (OECD, 2007a). Particularly, in the course of the two major rounds of
the EU-Enlargement towards Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries2 the
former EU countries have experienced an influx of immigration from these new member
states of the EU. Since the early 2000s, the average annual net-flow of migration in some
large European economies (Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK) has ranged between
130,000 and 400,000 persons.
Figure 1.3 depicts these trends in net-migration flows for some of the main European
destination countries. In 2012, the total net-flow of migration to some major European
destination countries3 reached 1.1 million persons. Thus, migration has become a constant
factor in the economic and social landscape in many advanced countries. Therefore, the
aim of this thesis is to address the labor market implications of these global developments
for the workforce in the advanced countries.
2The first round of EU-Enlargement refers to the accession of eight Central and Eastern European
countries in May 2004: Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungry, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic,
and Slovenia. The second round of EU-Enlargement refers to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to
the EU in January 2011.
3These include Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
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Figure 1.2: Global labor supply
Source: (IMF, 2007, Figure 5.1).
1 National labor forces scaled by export-to-GDP ratios.
2 Western Hemisphere, Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa.
1.2 Perceptions about globalization of the labor
market
At the turn of the 21th century, this soaring global integration of goods and labor markets
has enabled advanced countries to access the large pool of labor supply both through
imports of workers (i.e. immigration) and of goods and services (i.e. offshoring). This
development has received wide attention by policymakers and the media, portraying it
as a threat to millions of workers and jobs in many advanced countries. For clarification,
I proceed with a description of these concerns and perceptions in the advanced countries.
Plotting data from the European Social Survey, Figure 1.4 shows the perception regarding
immigration-induced adverse wage effects. The results suggest that there are, indeed,
some concerns regarding the detrimental wage consequences of immigration among
residents in many European receiving countries. For example, 48 per cent of residents in
France, and about 37 per cent in Austria, Italy, Germany, and the U.K, respectively, agree
with the statement that immigration lowers wages in the receiving countries. Moreover,
controlling for educational background, mainly individuals with low or no qualification
perceive that immigration lowers the wages, and thus are more likely to be in favor of
limiting immigration flows (cf. Scheve and Slaughter, 2001).
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Figure 1.3: Net-flow of migration to major European receiving countries
Source: OECD.Stat, International Migration Database, own calculation.
The debate regarding offshoring received an extraordinary amount of attention in the
US, when the Economic Report of the President was released in early 2004. The peak of
the hysteria was when Gregory Mankiw, serving at that time as chairman of President
Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers, said in a statement: “I think outsourcing is a
growing phenomenon, but it’s something that we should realize is probably a plus for the
economy in the long run. [. . . ] [O]utsourcing is just a new way of doing international
trade” (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006, pp. 1031-1032). This position has been met with a
storm of harsh criticism, and outsourcing became synonymous with job loss in America.4
Most prominently, Blinder (2006) has suspected that offshoring of jobs from rich to
developing countries is “business as usual”, or “another routine expansion of international
trade”, contrary to Mankiw’s claim. He estimates that offshoring service jobs could
potentially cause about 30 to 40 million American jobs to disappear to emerging countries
4The report “The great hollowing-out myth” in The Economist, Feb 14th, 2004, exemplifies the
political issue received by outsourcing in America.
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Figure 1.4: Perception regarding immigration and adverse wage effects
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of answers to the question whether average wages
are generally brought down by immigration for a selected group of EU countries.
Source: European Social Survey, first wave, 2002, own calculation.
like India (Blinder, 2009b), and thus induce a large “quantitative change [that] brings
about a qualitative change” for workers in the U.S. and other advanced economies
(Blinder, 2006, p. 113). A similar prediction has been made by the McKinsey Global
Institute, extrapolating from a study of eight industrial sectors5 that 1.5 million service
jobs were offshored from developed to low-wage countries in 2003, and that this number
will rise to 4.1 million by 2008, as reported in The Economist (June 30, 2005).
Figure 1.5: Perception regarding trade and wage effects
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of answers to the question whether trade with other
countries leads to an increase or decrease in wages (results for “no difference” not shown).
Source: PEW Research Center, Spring2014 Global Attitudes survey, Q28, own calculation.
5These include engineers, finance and accounting professionals, analysts, life science researchers,
doctors, nurses, and generalists.
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Such dramatic forecasts caused widespread alarm in many developed countries. In a
survey by PEW Research Center in 2006, 77 percent of respondents perceived offshoring
of jobs as the major problem hurting American workers compared to other trends, like
immigration, automation, modern communication technology and declining unionization.
More generally, the results of the global attitudes survey highlight the common concern of
people in many advanced countries that free trade will harm the labor market conditions
(Figure 1.5).
Therefore, the most frequently asked questions concerning the public, policy makers,
and researchers, are whether the globalization of labor is adversely affecting wages
and employment in the advanced economies, and through which channels the domestic
economy absorbs and adjusts to the global labor supply shock. Providing clear answers
to these questions is of importance from both an academic and a policy perspective. It
improves our understanding regarding potential adjustment mechanisms in the goods and
labor markets. In addition, it allows providing clear guidance for implementing effective
policy measures to reap the benefits, while minimizing the costs of immigration and
offshoring, and thus helping to bring more objectivity to the emotional and heated public
debates. In that respect the analysis in this thesis provides a systematic decomposition
of various potential adjustment mechanisms through which the labor market and the
economy are affected by immigration and offshoring.
1.3 Facts and hypotheses
In order to address the public concerns, it is useful to get first an idea about how wage
and employment structures have evolved in advanced countries over the past two decades.
Do they contrast the past pattern? What are the characteristics of these trends? And,
related to this question, to what extent are they linked to recent features of globalization
of labor? Indeed, as shown below, the descriptive evidence depicts a contrasting picture
of the recent trends in wages and employment in many advanced countries.
Looking first at immigration, immigrants constitute a substantial proportion of the labor
force in many advanced countries today. As shown in Figure 1.6, the share of foreign
workers in total labor force of major European destination countries has significantly
increased over the past two decades. Moreover, the number of immigrants with tertiary
education attainment has dramatically increased over past two decades, an increase by
70 percent between 2000 and 2010 in OECD countries (Bonfanti and Xenogiani, 2014).
Despite the substantial improvements in the educational attainment of immigrants, their
attachment to the receiving country’s labor market exhibits high entry barriers upon
arrival. These labor market frictions are usually associated with lower labor market
participation and particularly with a high incidence of skill downgrading, referring to a
mismatch between the acquired educational attainment and the required skill level for
an occupation, of immigrants relative to natives. A growing number of empirical studies
has provided evidence regarding the key factors contributing to these detrimental labor
market outcomes such as lack of language proficiency and host country specific skills
(e.g. knowledge about social norms, institutions, etc.), migration status (temporary
versus permanent), imperfect transferability of human capital across countries, as well as
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Figure 1.6: Share of foreign workers in total labor force of receiving country
Notes: 1999-2014 for the Netherlands. Source: Eurostat, own calculation.
labor market discrimination practices (Bonfanti and Xenogiani, 2014).
More precisely, immigrants with tertiary education have on average an over-qualification
rate that is 12 percentage points higher than that of native-born with the same
characteristics in Europe, and 1.5 percentage points higher in the United States
(Damas de Matos and Liebig, 2014). Thus, collecting these facts, i.e. increasing number
of skilled immigrants in conjunction with skill downgrading, one would prematurely argue
that
Hypothesis 1. Immigration-induced increase in skill-downgrading incidence leads to a
displacement effect of low-skilled workers from the labor market.
Understanding the determinants and the interaction between immigration-induced
changes in the skill structure of the receiving country and the labor market outcomes
of low-skilled workers, and particularly how labor market institutions shape the direction
of immigration shock is the core objective of chapter 2. As is argued below, under a
flexible labor market regime medium-skilled immigration generates a complementarity
effect between skill-downgrading and low-skill unemployment.
Turning to the offshoring phenomenon, in many advanced countries, a striking observation
has been witnessed since the early 1990s. The rise in offshoring has been characterized
mostly by imports of skilled rather than unskilled inputs (Figure 1.7). This captures the
widespread consensus that the recent pattern in the globalization process is reflecting a
new stage of international trade, deflecting the international labor market competition
towards jobs and tasks performed mostly by better educated and skilled workforce in the
advanced countries.
A growing number of studies has sought to provide evidence regarding the labor market
impact of offshoring. Figure 1.8 shows that the relative employment of skilled (i.e.
nonproduction) workers compared to unskilled (i.e. production) workers in the U.S.
manufacturing sector has fallen since the early 1990s, a finding that “is strongly suggestive
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Figure 1.7: Pattern of offshoring inputs in advanced countries by skill intensity
Source: (IMF, 2007, Figure 5.6). Notes: Advanced countries include Austria, Canada,
France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
of the offshoring of service activities, whereby the more routine service activities are sent
overseas” (Feenstra, 2008, p.3). To explain this new form of offshoring, it is therefore
necessary to elaborate on changes in the wage structure by studying the characteristics
of occupations in more detail.
Figure 1.8: Relative Employment of Nonproduction/Production Workers in the
U.S. Manufacturing
Source: (Feenstra, 2008, Figure 1.2).
More interestingly, data from the U.S. labor market show that the last four decades
have been characterized by two contrasting periods of wage structure changes. The first
period, 1970s through the late 1980s, was associated with a monotone expansion of wage
inequality in the top and bottom halve of the wage distribution, while the second period,
starting from the early 1990s, shows a non-monotone relationship of wage inequality, i.e.
a simultaneous increase in the wage growth of high and low wages relative to the middle
(see Acemoglu and Autor, 2011, for a thorough survey). These contrasting wage trends
coincide with recent changes in the occupational structure. Figure 1.9 depicts changes in
the share of employment decomposed into three sets of occupations grouped according to
average wage level (low, medium, and high) in each of 16 EU countries and the U.S. during
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Figure 1.9: Changes in employment shares by occupation 1993-2006 in 16 European
countries and the USA
Source: (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011, Figure 11). Notes: Occupations are grouped to three broad
categories: low, medium and high, by wage levels.
the period 1993 through 2006. It is readily evident that the middle wage occupations
have substantially declined in all sample countries, where the most pronounced changes
have occurred in Austria, France and the UK by 14, 12, and 10 percentage points,
respectively (cf. Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Remarkably, this substantial decrease in the
“middle skill” occupations has been offset by a rapid growth in both low and high wage
occupations. This pattern reflects another stylized fact, referred to as the polarization of
the labor market.
The rationale for the polarization of labor market has been put forth by advances in
technology, particularly in information and communication technology (ICT), enabling
many firms to bundle occupational tasks, that exhibit a high content of rule-based,
routine activities, and codify them in computer software (cf. Autor et al., 2003). These
routine tasks are characteristic of many middle skilled occupations, such as bookkeeping,
clerical work, repetitive production, and monitoring jobs (cf. Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).
Simultaneously, these advances in technology and logistic systems have substantially
lowered the cost of offshoring, creating incentives for firms to reorganize the production
and work process by sending electronically these routine, non-interactive tasks abroad
(cf. Blinder, 2009a) – a new development that Snower et al. (2009) call the “Great
Reorganization” era.6
Similar to the discussion in the context of immigration and skill downgrading, this
offshoring-induced displacement effect may have indirect implications for low-skilled
workers. Stated differently, medium-skilled workers, who were initially displaced due to
offshoring, may be reabsorbed by the labor market by reallocation into low-skill-intensive
occupations. Indeed, Autor and Dorn (2013) find empirical evidence from the U.S. that
6Yet, there is no clear consensus among economists regarding which of the two factors (ICT vs
outsourcing) is the important driving force behind the recent polarization wage trends, see Feenstra
(2008) for a discussion.
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polarization of employment was associated with a substantial increase in low-skill service
jobs.
Thus, a natural reaction to increasing offshoring activities of these “good” jobs in the
advanced countries would go along the lines of the following argument
Hypothesis 2. Offshoring induces a reallocation of domestic jobs performed mostly by
medium-skilled workers in the advanced countries, lowering their wages and employment
opportunities. This in turn will raise the competition for low-skill jobs and eventually
lead to a crowding–out of low-skilled workers from the labor market.
As outlined below, chapter 3 is devoted to this argument and elaborates analytically
the determinants of and the interaction between various potential driving forces behind
the labor market impact of offshoring. As discussed below, offshoring induces a cost-
enhancing effect that may raise the real wages of all workers and lead to a decline in the
low-skill unemployment rate.
Despite the concerns associated with these trends, two strands in the literature provide
alternative explanations regarding potential adjustment channels that direct and absorb
the shocks of immigration and offshoring in the receiving economy. One set of studies
has emphasized the role of endogenous technological change (cf. Acemoglu, 1998,
2002b; Acemoglu et al., 2012; Autor et al., 1998; Katz and Murphy, 1992). The idea
behind this adjustment mechanism is that changes in the skill endowment lead to an
endogenous adjustment in skill-complementary technology. The vast empirical studies
have established a wide consensus that the pervasive wage inequality, documented
throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s in the U.S., was primarily driven by a strong
growth in relative labor demand for skilled workers due to skilled-biased technological
changes (SBTC) (cf. Lemieux, 2008). Thus, this view relates the bias in technological
changes to the substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor.
Another set of studies provide a competing interpretation by emphasizing the endogenous
choice of production technologies, e.g. modern versus traditional machines (cf. Beaudry
et al., 2010; Beaudry and Green, 2003; Caselli, 1999). The core argument of this view is
marked by the substitutability between technologies instead of labor, where the adoption
is a costly endogenous process (cf. Caselli, 1999). Thus, faster adoption of technologies,
according to this view, will mitigate the direct implications of increasing competition
caused by a labor supply shock (cf. Beaudry et al., 2010).
Summarizing, the next matter of concern regarding the labor market impact of
immigration can be described by
Hypothesis 3. Changes in the skill structure induced by immigration will affect the
structure of the production technology mode in the economy and thus influence the wage
structure of native workers.
Chapter 4 focuses on this issue and provides an analytical discussion regarding the
determinants of and interaction between different adjustment mechanisms. As elaborated
below, immigration-induced changes in the skill mix of the receiving countries leads to
higher adoption of the complementing production techniques (a technology adoption
effect) that counteracts the direct adverse labor supply effect.
Finally, a large body of empirical literature has addressed the concerns regarding the
10
1 Introduction
extent of substitutability/complementarity between immigrants and natives (see among
many others Borjas, 2003; Bru¨cker et al., 2014; D’Amuri et al., 2010; Manacorda et al.,
2011; Ottaviano and Peri, 2008). Using what Acemoglu and Autor (2011) refer to as
the canonical approach, i.e. the decomposition of labor into skills, nationality and
experience cells and nesting each cell through a Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) aggregate, the common consensus from these studies is that immigrants are
closely substitutes for other immigrant groups, but demonstrate a substantial degree of
imperfect substitutability to natives. The intuitive explanation for these findings follows
from the differential comparative advantages between immigrants and natives. Recent
empirical evidence has documented that immigrants perform mainly occupations that
are characterized by a high content of manual tasks, while natives tend to specialize in
occupations with a high content of communication and complex tasks (cf. Ottaviano et al.,
2013; Peri and Sparber, 2009). Moreover, recent empirical studies show that immigration
induces firms to use intensively factors (labor) that are complement to immigrants (cf.
Dustmann and Glitz, 2012; Gonza´lez and Ortega, 2011). As mentioned above, offshoring
also induces substantial changes in the occupational structure of the domestic labor
market, leading to changes in the production process in the domestic economy.
Summarizing, the following argument describes the concerns regarding the implications
of task reallocation
Hypothesis 4. Immigration and offshoring induce substantial changes in the structure
of tasks and occupations, respectively, and thus lead to adverse labor market outcomes
for native workers due to specialization of firms in production techniques complementing
immigrants and offshoring.
Addressing this issue is the objective of chapter 5, which examines analytically the
distributional implications of changes in the task and occupational structure induced by
immigration and offshoring, respectively, and compares their underlying driving forces
affecting the firm’s decision regarding adoption of production technologies. As will be
outlined below, the analysis reveals that both immigration of medium-skilled workers and
offshoring of medium skill-intensive jobs induce a wage polarization effect, whenever the
initial level of immigrants’ task share and offshoring rate are high.
1.4 Outline of the thesis
These four hypotheses constitute the core objective of this thesis. The remaining chapters
are organized as follows.
Chapter 2: Migration, unemployment, and skill downgrading
To address the concerns described in Hypothesis 1, an integrated general equilibrium
framework is developed that accounts for important features such as low-skill
unemployment and skill downgrading of medium-skilled workers. More precisely, the
economy is described by a two-sector (manufacturing and service) specific factors model
consisting of monopolistic competition and skill heterogeneity. The labor market is
characterized by three skill groups (low, medium and high) where low- and medium-skilled
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labor markets exhibit frictions due to a right-to-manage collective bargaining. Workers
are allocated across the two sectors, where low-skilled and medium-skilled workers are
employed only in the service and manufacturing sector, respectively, while high-skilled
are perfectly mobile between the two sectors.
This chapter contributes to several strands in the literature addressing the wage and
employment effects of immigration (cf. Bru¨cker and Jahn, 2011; D’Amuri et al., 2010),
and indirect adjustment channels absorbing immigration shock such as changes in the
output mix and goods price (cf. Felbermayr and Kohler, 2007) in two important respects.
First, the core focus of the analysis in this chapter is to examine the impact of immigration
on skill downgrading and low-skilled unemployment. Second, particular attention is paid
on the role of the labor market institution, which is captured by two distinct labor market
regimes: a flexible labor market, characterized by an endogenous unemployment benefit
scheme, and a rigid labor market, with an exogenous unemployment benefit scheme.
The analysis reveals two interesting insights. First, immigration-induced increase in the
downgrading rate generates a complementarity effect, leading to a decline in the low-
skilled unemployment rate under the flexible labor market regime. Second, the numerical
simulation of recent trends of skilled workers quantifies the potential welfare effects of
immigration, leading to gains in GDP per capita between 6 and 10 percent.
Chapter 3: Offshoring of medium-skill jobs, polarization, and productivity
effect: Implications for wages and low-skill unemployment
This chapter addresses the concerns captured by Hypothesis 2 by investigating
analytically the impact of offshoring on the wage and employment structure of the
offshoring source country. An integrated theoretical framework is developed that accounts
explicitly for several important features: task-skill heterogeneity (low, medium and high),
endogenous offshoring, and spill-over effects across skill groups due to mobility across
job tasks. Thus, this model integrates several features from the existing theoretical
contributions, incorporating explicit assignment of skills to tasks (cf. Acemoglu and
Autor, 2011) and allowing for an endogenous relocation process of offshoring tasks (cf.
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Ottaviano et al., 2013) into a richer framework that
allows for equilibrium unemployment of low-skilled workers. More precisely, we allow for
two types of labor market frictions. The first is given by a minimum wage scheme, while
in a second step we introduce a more general notion of labor market adjustments by
allowing for endogenous low-skilled labor supply.
The core objective of this chapter is twofold. First, we analyze the impact of offshoring
jobs on changes in the wage structure of domestic workers. In doing so, we show the
distributional effects of different scenarios of offshoring incidence, where the burden of
job cuts is born by different skill groups. In a second step, we analyze the spill-over
effects of offshoring-induced reallocation of medium-skilled workers into low-skill jobs on
low-skill unemployment.
The analysis provides several new insights. First, offshoring of low skill-intensive job tasks
generates distributional effects similar to “skill-biased” technology changes (cf. Acemoglu,
2002b), offshoring of medium skill-intensive tasks leads to wage polarization (capturing
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recent trends), while offshoring of high skill-intensive tasks induces wage effects similar to
“unskilled-biased” technological changes (cf. Goldin and Katz, 2009). Second, we show
that a marginal decline in offshoring costs generates two interacting forces. On the one
hand, there is a displacement effect of domestic workers due to relocation of tasks. There
is, on the other hand, a productivity effect due to cost-efficiency improvements. Due to
endogenous task reallocation across the skill groups, the productivity gains accruing to
workers, who were initially displaced by offshoring, are mitigated. The rationale behind
this result, put forth by the empirical literature, is given by losses in task-specific human
capital and search costs (cf. Hummels et al., 2014). Finally, we show that the spill-over
effect on low-skilled unemployment of medium-skilled workers due to offshoring-induced
bumping down into low skill-intensive tasks is crucially determined by the degree of
substitutability between low and medium skill-intensive tasks.
Chapter 4: Immigration, technology adoption and wage inequality
This chapter addresses the concerns regarding the impact of immigration on changes of
the structure and of the direction of technology (Hypothesis 3). A theoretical model is
developed that for a richer setup of the goods and the labor market. More precisely, the
model economy is characterized by firm heterogeneity, endogenous technology adoption,
monopolistic competition and skill heterogeneity (low, medium, and high). A distinct
range of final goods is produced by one of the three technology modes, where the
technology allocation is defined by two endogenously determined cutoff points. Each
technology mode is complementing one specific skill group – capturing the notation of
capital-skill complementarity (cf. Acemoglu, 1998). The Walrasian nature of the labor
market permits to pay the attention primary to changes in the wage structure of native
workers. Moreover, the economy is characterized by increasing returns to scale, which
is induced by endogenous changes in the mass of monopolists, allowing to capture the
notation of directed technological changes (cf. Acemoglu, 2002b).
The objective of this chapter is to examine how immigration-induced changes in the
skill mix affects the nature of the technology adoption behavior of firms and what are
the consequence of changes in the structure of the production technology for the wage
structure. The analysis reveals two new insights. First, immigration-induced changes in
the wage structure are characterized by two interacting effects: a direct market size effect,
referring to an increase in the skill endowment, and a technology adoption effect, referring
to endogenous changes in the technology cutoff points. The former effect has usually an
adverse wage impact for domestic workers hit by immigration due to higher labor market
competition, while the latter raises the wages of those workers as the economy becomes
more specialized in the complementing technologies. Moreover, the results reveal that
the relative magnitude between these two effects is importantly determined by the degree
of technology adoption, reconciling the empirical evidence (cf. Beaudry et al., 2010),
while the direction of each of two effects depends on the interaction between consumer
preference (final goods demand) and the market power of monopolists (i.e. the substitute
ability between intermediate goods).
13
1.4 Outline of the thesis
Chapter 5: Immigration, offshoring, tasks and technology adoption:
Implications for native wage structure
This chapter addresses the concerns regarding the implications of immigration-induced
changes in the organizational structure for the wage structure of native workers
(Hypothesis 4). In this chapter, the theoretical framework is built on the model developed
in chapter 4, and augments that framework with respect to two important aspects. First,
it allows for internal work organization adjustments, associated with task allocation
between immigrants and natives, where according to the observations immigrants are
allocated to manual-intensive tasks and natives to communication-intensive tasks (cf.
Peri and Sparber, 2009). Second, it introduces offshoring, whereby a fraction of mostly
medium-skill intensive domestic jobs (intermediates), as documented in the literature,
are relocated and produced abroad (cf. Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).
The analysis reveals several new insights. First, immigration and offshoring induced
two interacting effect: an efficiency effect and a labor supply effect. Second, the
relative strength of efficiency effect induced by immigration (through task-reallocation)
and offshoring (through job reallocation) depends crucially on the initial levels of tasks
allocated to immigrants and offshoring rate. At low initial levels the efficiency becomes
the dominating force, leading to higher wages of native workers of the same skill type.
Moreover, the direction of and relative magnitude between the technology adoption
effect and the market size effect are consistent with the discussions in chapter 4.
However, the comparative statics highlight the following interesting results. Whenever
the substitutability between different technology modes becomes extremely easy, such
that the technology adoption effect and the market size effect are balanced, the efficiency
gains due to task-reallocation and cost-savings from offshoring still remain. This result
highlights the crucial departure from recent immigration and offshoring literature (cf.
Acemoglu et al., 2012; Ottaviano et al., 2013).
Thus, these results highlight the important adjustments at the macro level, referring to
technology adoption effect, as well as at the micro level, referring to reallocation of tasks
and jobs.
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2Migration, Unemployment, and Skill Downgrading1
2.1 Introduction
The migration pattern in Europe has significantly changed over the last decades, driven by
the integration of national markets into global markets as well as the soaring demand for
better educated, high-skilled workers due to an intensified international competition. In
general, the overall stock of immigrants with higher educational attainments has increased
significantly. For instance, the East–West immigration patterns in the course of the
enlargement of the EU in the past decades have seen a substantial increase in the supply
of medium-skilled immigrants (i.e., with upper secondary education).2
On the other hand, looking at the labor market outcomes of immigrants, one considerable
friction becomes evident. Immigrants face a substantial risk of job–skill mismatches.
Several recent studies have found that immigrants with higher educational levels,
especially those who moved in the course of the Eastern EU-enlargement, have been
relegated to jobs which require a lower educational/skill attainment – indicating a skill
downgrading in occupations.3 In an empirical cross-country analysis, Brynin and Longhi
1This chapter is based on joint work with Joan Muysken and Thomas Ziesemer, and is published in
Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Muysken et al., 2015). We are grateful to Herbert Bru¨cker, Caglar
O¨zden, Klaus Prettner, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and discussions, to Stella
Capuano for providing data on immigration and education, and to participants at NAKE Research Day
2011 in Utrecht, at 17th SMYE in Mannheim, and at EALE 2012 in Bonn.
2This refers to the entry of eight Central Eastern European countries (CEECs) and two Mediterranean
countries into the EU on May 2004. See Kahanec and Zimmermann (2010) for a survey of recent migration
patterns in the EU and Blanchflower et al. (2007) for recent patterns in the UK.
3See Drinkwater et al. (2009); Dustmann et al. (2013) for recent evidence in the UK. For example,
Dustmann et al. (2013) empirically assess the immigration effect along the wage distribution. Although
the newly arrived immigrants to the UK have on average higher educational attainments, the authors
find that they are located at the lower end of the wage distribution—evidencing a skill downgrading
effect. For cross-country evidence, see OECD (2007b).
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(2009) find that the incidence of skill downgrading is more pronounced among workers
with intermediate skills.
In sum, these observations emphasize on the one hand an immigration-induced shift in
the labor supply of better educated workers over the last decade. On the other hand, the
immigration-driven rise in skill downgrading offers a rationale for potential displacement
effects of the least skilled native workers.4 The objective of this chapter is to revisit
the labor market effects of immigration by assessing the impact of immigration on skill
downgrading and unemployment in a general equilibrium framework.
Intuitively, higher skill downgrading due to the immigration of better educated workers
should induce a substitution effect for the least skilled workers, thus displacing them from
the labor market. However, as we elaborate below, the labor market institutions play
an important role in determining the impact of immigration on low-skilled unemployed
workers. Particularly, under a flexible labor market regime, an immigration-induced
rise in skill downgrading generates a decline in the low-skilled unemployment rate –
indicating a complementarity effect. The reason is that in a flexible labor market regime,
the reservation wage of unemployed workers is usually low and much more responsive to
economic shocks compared to a more rigid labor market.
As a consequence of skill downgrading, immigration of medium-skilled workers can
generate an expansionary effect of low paid service jobs which, in turn, induces a wage
polarization effect, i.e. a decline of medium-skilled wages relative to low- and high-skilled
wages, a similar effect to technology advances. To our knowledge, this is a new insight
which has not been addressed in the literature. Whereas high-skilled migration is widely
accepted and low-skilled migration is mostly reduced by current policies, medium-skilled
migration is discussed very little in politics and academia.
To offer an integrated explanation of the above observations and include the medium-
skilled migration in the analysis, we develop a two-sector (“manufacturing” and
“services”) model with heterogeneous workers.5 We assume that low-skilled workers
are employed in the services sector whereas medium-skilled workers are employed mainly
in the manufacturing sector. Finally, a common and perfectly mobile factor, such as
high-skilled labor, is employed in both sectors. In line with the institutional labor
market setting in many European countries, we assume a standard collective bargaining
approach: a right-to-manage bargaining model. We also assume that medium-skilled
workers who do not find a job in the manufacturing sector have the outside option
to take a low paid job in the services sector, while low-skilled workers, who find no
service jobs, end up in unemployment.6 We capture the nature of flexibility of the labor
4Several recent studies have shown that, in general, attitudes towards immigration are heterogeneous
across native population and depend on the labor market situations, welfare considerations, and non-
economic factors (see, for example, Dustmann et al., 2008; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Facchini and
Mayda, 2008; Mayda, 2006). See also Boeri and Bru¨cker (2005) for a discussion of concerns regarding
“welfare shopping”.
5It is worth mentioning that a more general framework would also consider within sector firm
heterogeneity, which permits to account for within-sector occupation wage gap (cf. Helpman et al., 2014).
Our intention is, however, to address another recently observed phenomenon reflecting wage inequality
between the occupations (or between skill groups), the so called polarization effect, which might partly
be induced by labor supply shocks.
6Notice that in doing so we ignore the importance of individual job search behavior, such as on-the-job
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market by endogenizing the unemployment benefits of displaced low-skilled workers. Our
model enables us to address different adjustment channels, such as shifts in relative labor
demand, considering the “substitution effect” between different input factors, as well as
shifts in the labor supply, taking the “crowding-out” effect under different labor market
regimes into account.
Finally, we examine numerically the general equilibrium effects of an infra-marginal
increase (i.e., a discontinuous jump) in the labor force due to immigration both for
flexible and rigid labor market regimes. In general, our numerical analysis generates
two interesting predictions:
• In a flexible labor market, i.e. with an endogenous unemployment benefit scheme,
immigration of medium-skilled workers generates a complementarity effect, boosting
employment of low-skilled workers, while in a rigid labor market, i.e. with exogenous
unemployment benefits, medium-skill immigration induces a substitution effect,
displacing low-skilled workers.7
• The differences in the welfare effects of various migration patterns are substantial,
where the recent immigration trends of educated workers increase the GDP per
capita between 6 to 10%.
The set up of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the existing and related
literature followed in Section 2.3 by the presentation of the stylized facts on migration
patterns, the relation between low-skilled unemployment and the skill downgrading of
medium-skilled workers, and trends in employment for the major Wester European
destination countries. In Section 2.4 we exposit the theoretical framework with two major
sectors, three skill groups, and a double wage bargaining model determining the wages
of medium- and low-skilled labor. In Section 2.5, we provide a qualitative assessment of
a comparative static analysis for two different labor market regimes. In Section 2.6, we
calibrate the model for two countries (France and Germany) representing different labor
market institutions using the EUKLEMS data set to measure the quantitative importance
of various migration scenarios. Finally, Section 2.7 presents some concluding remarks.
2.2 Literature review
In the growing literature on economic and labor market effects of migration the analysis
in this chapter is related and contributes to various strands in the literature.
2.2.1 Employment and wage effects: the canonical approach
There exists a vast literature examining various channels of immigration-induced
economic and distributional effects on the host country. One strand of the literature
search for medium-skilled workers which reflects the trade-off between being unemployed or staying in
low paid service jobs and searching for job opportunities in the manufacturing sector.
7See also Beladi (1990), who shows that the accumulation of a specific factor can increase the total
employment in an unemployment-plagued economy. However, he neither incorporates manufacturing
price effects nor a heterogeneous labor force.
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focuses on labor market effects through adjustment channels such as changes in wages
and (un)employment through which native workers are potentially directly affected.8
In spite of an overall negligible effect of immigration on wages and employment, the
findings of these studies, using the canonical (multi-nested production technology) model,
emphasize the role of factors such as changes in the skill structure, substitutability
between natives and immigrants, and the elasticity of the capital supply. For example,
the easier the substitutability becomes, the larger the burden is for native workers, while
a perfectly elastic capital supply induces the so-called “immigration surplus” (Borjas,
1995; Dustmann et al., 2008).9 However, these studies assume implicitly that all newly
arrived immigrants are perfectly integrated in the labor market according to their skill
level, i.e., no skill–job mismatch. We address this omission and supplement this strand
of the literature by assessing the impact of immigration on skill downgrading and
unemployment. Furthermore, we elaborate the interaction between these two friction
variables together with sectoral composition effects driven by endogenous manufacturing
prices under different labor market institutional regimes.
2.2.2 Absorption channels of immigrants in the economy
Another strand in the literature emphasizes different (indirect) adjustment mechanisms
such as changes in the output mix (sectoral composition) and manufacturing prices
through which immigrants are absorbed by the host economy.10 The overall conclusion
is that in a small open economy where manufacturing prices are determined by
international markets, immigration flows generate a Rybczynski-type of effect, indicating
the insensitivity of wages to immigration. In particular, the recent empirical evidence,
focusing on local industry-labor markets, highlights that immigration induces a
technology or intensity effect, i.e., an increase in the relative use of the enhanced factor
in the production process, and to some extent a scale effect, i.e., a relative expansion of
output/firms using immigrants (or factors with similar characteristics) more intensively
(Dustmann and Glitz, 2012; Gonza´lez and Ortega, 2011; Lewis, 2003).11 We contribute
to this literature by incorporating simultaneously these different adjustment mechanisms
when examining the impact of immigration on skill downgrading and unemployment
under different benefit scheme regimes.
8Important early contributions are Borjas (1995); Borjas et al. (1996); Card (1990) as well as recent
contributions by Borjas (2003); Ottaviano and Peri (2008, 2012) for the US; recent important studies on
the German labor market are Bru¨cker and Jahn (2011); D’Amuri et al. (2010); Dustmann et al. (2009);
Felbermayr et al. (2010); on the UK labor market Dustmann et al. (2005, 2008); Manacorda et al. (2011);
as well as the cross-country evidence for UK, Germany and Denmark by Bru¨cker et al. (2014).
9The main conclusion of these recent studies is that natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes
and that newly arrived immigrants compete mostly with incumbent immigrants rather than with native
workers with similar characteristics.
10See recent contributions by Cortes (2008); Dustmann and Glitz (2012); Felbermayr and Kohler (2006,
2007); Gonza´lez and Ortega (2011); Lewis (2003).
11Dustmann and Glitz (2012) emphasize further the role of newly created firms, explaining 18 percent
of the overall adjustment to migration-induced labor supply shocks. The authors also find significant
negative wage effects for the non-traded sector.
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2.2.3 Advances in technology and the polarization of the labor
market
A recent development that has received a lot of attention emphasizes substantial changes
in the structure of occupations in many advanced countries. This observation reveals
a significant increase in low paid service and highly-skilled jobs over the last decade
indicating a shift in the labor demand against medium-skill intensive occupations. The
literature examining the driving force behind this phenomenon emphasizes the role of
progress in information and communication technology (ICT), replacing workers by
machines and computers, as the main driving force behind this development.12 We
provide another possible driving force behind this effect. Due to the incidence of skill
downgrading, a labor supply shock induced by immigration of medium-skilled workers
can generate a similar polarization effect. As emphasized by Autor and Dorn (2013),
consumer preferences play an important role in explaining this rise in service jobs. If
consumers favor variety over specialization in consumption, then an unbalanced-biased
technology progress raises the aggregate demand for service output – a phenomenon also
known as the Baumol (1967)’s disease.13
We incorporate this implication in our general equilibrium framework but with two
distinct differences from Autor and Dorn (2013). First, in our framework, the labor
market is characterized by frictions where medium-skilled workers face the risk of
being downgraded into low-paid, service jobs, while low-skilled workers end up in
unemployment. Second, assuming a more general functional form in the service sector, we
show that the rise in the demand for aggregate service output is not necessarily associated
with higher demand for labor in that sector. In fact, it depends on the interaction between
consumer preferences, i.e., the substitutability between different consumption goods, and
production technology, i.e., the substitutability between input factors in the production
process, especially in the service sector.
2.2.4 Transferability of human capital and the assimilation of
immigrants
Our framework is also related to the strand of literature addressing the determinants of
the assimilation process of immigrants in the host country. The empirical findings reveal
that, upon arrival, immigrants on average earn considerably less than comparable natives,
but over time, they catch up with natives (cf. Chiswick, 1978). One of the main reasons
is that the education and work experience obtained abroad are substantially downgraded
in the host country (see, for example, Chiswick and Miller, 2009, 2012; Friedberg, 2000).
We capture the nature of initial skill-downgrading by allowing the average medium-skill
12This phenomenon is also known as the “polarization” phenomenon, implying a relative change against
occupation at the middle range of the skill distribution that can be easily computerized. See Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) for a survey of recent important contributions.
13Generally, the hypothesis claims that unbalanced technical progress in sectors with high TFP growth,
such as manufacturing, will also induce a rise in employment/wages in sectors with low TFP growth,
like services.
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over-qualification rate to vary with immigration.14 Our intention is neither to model
the dynamic assimilation process itself nor to explain its determinants regarding the
individual labor market performance. In fact, we take a different step and pay attention
to the labor market consequences of initial downgrading for other labor force participants.
In so doing, we are able to gain new insights from migration-induced job-skill-mismatch
and the implications for other skill groups in the host country. So far, this channel has
received less attention in the literature and the analysis in this chapter fills this gap.
2.2.5 Brain drain, gain, and waste: The perspective of the
sending countries
In our model migrants were classified as high, medium or low-skilled according to their
position in the production function. Many of them would be classified differently, mostly
more skilled, in their countries of origin. This phenomenon is called brain waste, because
it indicates that migrants could work in higher skilled jobs, if the skills were perfectly
equivalent and transferable. The reasons for this waste are differences in quality of
education - due to low expenditure on tertiary education - and English language (like
those for visa and family re-union targeting more or less the specific scarce qualifications)
(Mattoo, 2008; O¨zden, 2006). Of course the brain waste is largest during times that
immigrants are unemployed. Nevertheless, on average more highly educated migrants
earn more in the country of destination. These earnings feed a flow of remittances to
the countries of origin compensating at least partly for the brain drain that happened
to occur in the first instance (unless emigrants were unemployed before their migration;
Bhagwati and Rodriguez, 1975).
The remittances and the higher success of more educated migrants signals that education
may be highly profitable and prestigious. This may lead to higher enrolments by families
with children, often financially supported by the diaspora, and more public expenditure
on education from the government (Ziesemer, 2012). If this leads to higher education
than without preceding brain drain the literature speaks of a brain gain (Docquier, 2006),
requiring that many stay in the country and are employed without much over-education.
There are now many studies of the brain drain and gain considering a great diversity of
sectors, countries and skills with mixed evidence (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012). One
interesting result from them is that remittances roughly cover the fiscal costs of the brain
drain (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011) although they go to private persons. Finally, some
migrants return and bring back knowledge for improving their countries, especially if they
have been successful.
In countries of origin the success of migration depends also on adequate complementary
education policies (see Docquier and Rapoport, 2012; Garcia Pires, 2009; Ratha et al.,
2011). For the countries of destination, making migration a success in developing
countries depends very much on complementary policy actions. In our model these refer to
the nature of benefit schemes, which determine whether or not medium-skilled migration
reduces low-skilled unemployment and increases GDP and future pensions.
14As the downgrading also happens to occur to non-migrant workers after job loss (Autor et al., 2013),
we do not have to distinguish between downgrading of migrants and non-migrants.
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2.3 Stylized facts
As mentioned above, over the last two decades there has been a substantial improvement
in the educational attainments of immigrants: a shift towards the middle and upper range
of the skill distribution. Table 2.1 highlights this feature for the major Western European
destination countries. It is noticeable that over the last two decades in all countries the
share of the immigrant population with lower educational attainments has considerably
declined.
Table 2.1: Educational attainments of immigrants in selected countries of
destination
Shares in 2010 (in %) Percentage changes
1995–2010
Country Low Medium High Low Medium High
All Immigrants
Austria 37.4 45.9 16.7 −13.2 3.5 33.0
Denmark 49.2 28.8 21.9 −9.9 6.9 13.2
France 80.5 7.5 11.9 −20.1 73.2 89.5
Germany 53.1 30.5 16.4 −17.5 13.1 32.3
Ireland 45.0 21.0 34.0 −42.0 14.8 46.4
Netherlands 63.2 19.5 17.3 −28.8 50.1 48.7
Spain 32.7 46.3 21.0 −41.2 18.3 23.8
Sweden 43.4 36.1 20.5 −27.4 −2.3 62.2
UK 57.1 16.9 26.0 −23.9 −54.9 88.3
Immigrants from New Member States
Austria 24.9 56.1 19.0 −6.1 −3.1 22.0
Denmark 53.7 25.7 20.5 27.1 −22.2 −16.6
France 46.1 20.9 33.0 −38.7 91.2 136.6
Germany 21.7 49.1 29.2 −15.2 3.4 8.4
Ireland 31.9 34.2 34.0 −13.9 45.9 −14.2
Netherlands 44.9 29.4 25.8 −29.0 50.4 49.3
Spain 19.2 54.7 26.1 −41.2 18.3 23.8
Sweden 24.4 38.2 37.5 −29.9 0.9 36.5
UK 51.5 9.2 39.3 −9.8 −45.9 51.4
Source: Bru¨cker et al. (2013).
Note: The educational levels are defined as follows: Low = ISCED 0–2, Medium =
ISCED 3–4, High = ISCED 5–6. The data denotes the shares in immigrant population
above 25 years. The New Member States are EU-10 countries: Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
Moreover, the educational attainments of immigrants from the New Member States
(NMS) joining the European Union in 2004 possess a similar pattern, constituting a
supply shock of better educated workers. Finally, medium-skilled workers make up a
major part of the immigrants and the native labor force in many European, see Bru¨cker
et al. (2014) for a cross-country evidence.
It is documented in OECD (2007b) that the labor market performance of immigrants
across many advanced countries has stronger mismatches than do natives, indicating a
higher incidence of skill downgrading. Empirical studies reveal that a significant and
increasing proportion of low-skilled jobs are nowadays carried out by better educated,
overqualified workers – see Borghans and de Grip (2000) and Hartog (2000) for an
overview of these studies. Recent studies on post EU-enlargement have provided further
evidence. For example, Drinkwater et al. (2009) analyze the performance of Polish
immigrants in the UK labor market and find that the majority of them are employed in
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Figure 2.1: Net replacement rate and regression coefficients of low-skilled
unemployment versus medium-skilled over-qualification rates
Notes: For the estimated coefficient see 2.A.3, Table 2.6. The regression coefficients are presented in
2.A.2, Table 2.5, column 4. The net replacement rate includes social assistance and housing benefits, see
2.A.1 for further details.
low-skilled and low paid jobs despite having relatively high levels of education. Moreover,
Brynin and Longhi (2009) find an excess of skill downgrading at the medium-skilled
level (i.e., with upper secondary schooling) which contributes almost one-half of all
overqualified persons.
These stylized facts suggest that the rise in low-skilled unemployment would not only
be the result of a relative demand shift driven by technology progress, but also the
consequence of a relative supply shift which leads to a crowding out of low-skilled workers,
as has also been observed by Pierrard and Sneessens (2003).
In order to verify the latter notion of crowding out, we have regressed the low-skilled
unemployment rate to the skill downgrading rate of medium-skilled workers, next to
other control variables, for 14 European countries for which data were available – details
are presented in 2.A.2. From these regressions we found that for one group of countries
– Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden – down grading
of medium-skilled workers indeed has a positive impact on low-skilled unemployment.
However, for another group of countries Austria, Germany, Belgium and Finland the
impact of down grading of medium-skilled workers on low-skilled unemployment turns
out to be negative, surprisingly enough.15
We believe that this difference can partly be explained by changes in the labor market
institutions with the objective of making the labor market more flexible, especially for
low-skilled workers OECD (2013). The first group of countries then has an inflexible
labor market which prevents wage adjustments to absorb bumped-down low-skilled
15For Portugal, Spain and the UK the impact was not significantly different from zero.
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workers, resulting in low-skilled unemployment. In the second group of countries wage
adjustments prevent low-skilled unemployment. Taking the net replacement rate (NRR)
as an indicator for flexibility, this is consistent with the observation that the first group
has on average a replacement rate of 67 percent while the second group has an average
replacement rate of 60 percent.16
Moreover, the regression coefficients between low-skilled unemployment and medium-
skilled over-qualification rates (see 2.A.2) show a weak but significantly positive
relationship to the net replacement rates (NRR), which strengthens our perception that
labor market institutions have an impact on the adjustment of low-skilled unemployment
to bumping down – see Figure 2.1.17
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the recent empirical evidence verifies a contraction of
medium skill intensive occupations in many advanced countries—cf. Goos et al. (2011)
for recent evidence in Europe. Interestingly, looking at the disaggregated skill-occupation
level, the share of low- and medium-skilled workers employed in the lowest paying
occupations, mostly services, has substantially increased over the last decades. Table
2.2 exhibits this trend and highlights the skill downgrading of medium-skilled workers.
We summarize these stylized facts as follows.
1. The proportion of highly educated immigrants has substantially increased in many
European countries over the last years, still medium skills constitute the majority
of immigrants labor force.
2. Both low- and medium-skilled employment has strongly risen in low paid service
jobs.
3. There has been a continuous downgrading of medium-skilled labor.
4. The relation between skill downgrading and low-skilled unemployment rates can be
partly explained by changes in labor market institutions, of which the replacement
rate is an indicator.
Based on these stylized facts, we develop in the next section a theoretical framework that
permits a structured analysis of various potential channels through which immigrants
impact on and are absorbed by the host economy.
2.4 Theoretical framework
We consider a model economy described by two sectors (j = {m, s}) that produce
two different consumption products, manufacturing and services. Both sectors use one
common and one specific factor. The common factor is competitively supplied and
perfectly mobile between the two sectors. To get a better idea, we define the common
16The net replacement rate is commonly used as an indicator for both benefit generosity and incentives
to work, see 2.A.1 for further details. There are, of course, many other indicators of flexibility (OECD,
2013). In the case of Denmark, indicators for labor market flexibility are unemployment duration and
job finding procedures rather than wage adjustment; the replacement rate of 75 percent is the highest in
our country sample.
17See 2.A.3 for the corresponding estimation results.
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Table 2.2: Evolution of employment in Europe by educational attainment and
occupation
Country Lowest paid occupations Middling occupations Highest paid occupations
Shares
in 1996
(in %)
Percentage
point change
1996–2011
Shares
in 1996
(in %)
Percentage
point change
1996–2011
Shares
in 1996
(in %)
Percentage
point change
1996–2011
A: low-skilled workers
Austria 33.84 13.29 53.01 -11.08 12.86 -2.21
Belgium 30.93 11.73 53.37 -8.45 14.02 -2.34
Denmark 49.77 4.53 39.80 -9.25 8.53 6.20
France 30.94 14.75 52.83 -16.80 15.12 2.44
Germany 33.00 14.20 48.23 -9.16 15.57 -4.07
Italy 35.13 3.60 56.54 -5.23 7.36 1.80
Netherlands 29.55 15.56 45.88 -7.32 17.87 -3.24
Spain 35.17 15.59 52.57 -11.29 12.09 -4.57
UK 34.67 7.83 42.73 -7.97 21.65 0.11
B: medium-skilled workers
Austria 19.95 6.84 50.61 -10.44 29.09 3.72
Belgium 21.70 9.84 50.24 -7.53 26.55 -1.60
Denmark 26.36 7.07 48.52 -12.49 24.26 5.88
France 19.19 12.64 52.47 -16.44 26.36 4.32
Germany 19.31 7.38 49.77 -6.32 28.97 -0.61
Italy 17.28 7.36 42.98 -5.12 38.72 -2.60
Netherlands 19.14 11.19 33.53 -2.72 43.19 -5.95
Spain 27.32 15.84 43.18 -6.36 28.19 -9.02
UK 19.68 15.27 50.18 -17.57 28.88 3.01
C: high-skilled workers
Austria 4.59 2.73 17.40 -1.11 77.98 -1.78
Belgium 3.75 2.02 18.19 -1.96 77.53 0.01
Denmark 4.60 2.16 9.92 -3.34 84.58 1.75
France 2.50 5.80 11.46 0.19 85.30 -6.05
Germany 5.63 0.71 18.72 -11.75 74.57 11.23
Italy 3.82 2.70 8.77 3.87 87.07 -6.88
Netherlands 4.76 2.44 8.75 -0.19 83.78 -1.44
Spain 9.22 4.10 23.32 -1.48 66.82 -2.44
UK 5.49 7.19 12.93 -1.60 80.70 -5.20
Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
Notes: Employment shares are based on total employment. The occupation classified according
to ‘ISCO 0’ is omitted. Occupations classified according to ‘ISCO 0’ are omitted. Following Goos
et al. (2011), we define the three occupation groups at the one-digit ISCO level as follows: Lowest
paid occupations = ISCO 5 & 9; middling occupations = ISCO 4, 6, 7 & 8; highest paid occupations
= ISCO 1, 2 & 3.
factor as high-skilled labor and denote it by Hj.
18 The sector-specific factors are two
distinct labor inputs: medium-skilled workers (lM) employed in the manufacturing sector
and low-skilled workers (lL) employed in the services sector.
19
18To keep the analysis tractable we do not introduce for the moment physical capital explicitly in our
analysis. However, under the assumption that physical capital moves freely between countries (at least
in the case of advanced countries), including it in the analysis will cause a level effect due to the Le
Chatelier–Samuelson principle (Felbermayr and Kohler, 2007; Neary, 1985). Therefore, the results of the
analysis are not affected in qualitative terms.
19There exists a small but growing strand of literature addressing the importance of task content (e.g.
interactive and communication intensive) in occupations in the context of immigration (cf. Peri and
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Goods are produced in the manufacturing sector by combining Hm and the medium-
skilled labor input lM using the following constant returns to scale (CRS) technology.
Ym = fm(lM , Hm) =
[
α (lM)
σm−1
σm + (1− α) (Hm)
σm−1
σm
] σm
σm−1
. (2.1)
Here, σm ∈ [0, 1] denotes the elasticity of substitution between the input factors, and
α ∈ (0, 1) is a distribution parameter. In the other sector, services are produced by
combining Hs and the low-skilled labor input lL using the technology
Ys = fs(lL, Hs) =
[
β (lL)
σs−1
σs + (1− β) (Hs)
σs−1
σs
] σs
σs−1
, (2.2)
where σs ∈ [0, 1] denotes the elasticity of substitution in the service sector, and β ∈ (0, 1)
is a distribution parameter.
To close the model, we define the domestic demand for both goods as follows. Total
domestic product is defined by a CES technology
X =
(
Y
σx−1
σx
m + Y
σx−1
σx
s
) σx
σx−1
(2.3)
where the gross domestic product X is maximized subject to the budget constraint while
taking the manufacturing and service prices (Pm, Ps) as given. Formally, this can be
written as
max
Ym,Ys
(
Y
σx−1
σx
m + Y
σx−1
σx
s
) σx
σx−1
, s.t. PmYm + PsYs = X,
where σx ∈ [0, 1] denotes the elasticity of substitution in consumption. We take the
price of X as numeraire in the remaining part of the analysis. Consequently, all variables
are defined in real terms and we assume no inflation. The solution to the optimization
problem yields the following domestic demand functions.
Ym = XP
−σx
m (2.4.1)
Ys = XP
−σx
s (2.4.2)
2.4.1 Firm optimization problem
After incurring a fixed cost, a representative firm chooses the optimal demand for inputs
by minimizing its (variable) production cost, taking the factor prices as given. Formally,
Sparber, 2009). See also Autor and Dorn (2013), who define these input factors by a matching process of
workers to occupations, e.g. ‘routine’ and ‘manual’ jobs, intensively used in each sector. Our framework
could, in principle, be extended with respect to discrimination between immigrants and natives using a
CES disaggregate in each skill group, where within skill heterogeneity could be defined by different sets
of tasks that are performed by immigrants and natives and sorting into tasks is endogenous and based on
comparative advantages. Therefore, incorporating this feature in the current framework would require
a completely different type of modeling strategy, such as the “task-based” approach. However, we leave
this feature to future research.
25
2.4.1 Firm optimization problem
the minimized cost function is
C∗j (wi, wH , Yj) = min
li,Hj
{wili + wHHj : fj(·)− Yj ≤ 0} , for i = {L,M}, j = {m, s}
and the corresponding minimized cost functions are
C∗m(wM , wH , Ym) =
[
ασm (wM)
1−σm + (1− α)σm (wH)1−σm
] 1
1−σm Ym (2.5.1)
C∗s (wL, wH , Ys) =
[
βσs (wL)
1−σs + (1− β)σs (wH)1−σs
] 1
1−σs Ys. (2.5.2)
Now, by Shepards’s Lemma, we obtain the optimal factor demands in each sector. In the
manufacturing sector this implies
∂C∗m(·)
∂wM
= ασm
(
cm(·)
wM
)σm
Ym = lM (2.6.1)
∂C∗m(·)
∂wH
= (1− α)σm
(
cm(·)
wH
)σm
Ym = Hm, (2.6.2)
and in the service sector
∂C∗s (·)
∂wL
= βσs
(
cs(·)
wL
)σs
Ys = lL (2.7.1)
∂C∗s (·)
∂wH
= (1− β)σs
(
cs(·)
wH
)σs
Ys = Hs, (2.7.2)
where the unit costs are denoted by cj(·), the term within the square brackets of Eqs.
(2.5).
In the next step, in each sector a representative firm maximizes the flow profit (i.e., net
of fixed costs) with respect to goods price subject to the domestic demand function.20
Formally, this can be written as
max
Pj
{PjYj − C∗j (·, Yj)}, for j = {m, s},
subject respectively to (2.4.1), (2.4.2), (2.5.1), and (2.5.2). The solution yields the
standard mark-up pricing behaviour
Pm =
1
ρ
cm(wM , wH) (2.8.1)
Ps =
1
ρ
cs(wL, wH) (2.8.2)
20The representative firm in each sector is consistent with free entry if fixed costs are sufficiently high
to make the entry of a second firm unprofitable, see Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, Ch. 5.2) for a general
discussion. Our assumption on monopolistic price setting in manufacturing sector is similar to Melitz
type of trade models (cf. Gustafsson and Segerstrom, 2010). For monopolistic price setting in the context
of trade and migration see Iranzo and Peri (2009).
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with ρ = σx−1
σx
∈ [0, 1]. We now turn to the characteristics of the labor market.
2.4.2 Wage setting and labor market frictions
Taking into account the institutions of the European labor market and the empirical
findings on low wage differentials between low- and medium-skilled workers in unionized
firms (Dustmann and Scho¨nberg, 2009), we assume union coverage in the low- and
medium-skilled labor markets. That is, both types of workers are represented by two
different labor unions who bargain their wages. There is, thus, an elastic institutional
wage curve, reflecting the labor supply curve for the two skill groups as well as explaining
the source of labor market frictions. In particular, the wage setting mechanism induces
skill downgrading for some medium-skilled workers. Those workers who do not find a
job in the manufacturing sector have the outside option to take a service job. For the
low-skilled workers who do not find a job in the service sector, the outside option is
unemployment.
It is worth pointing out that with collective bargaining, it is unclear why labor unions,
e.g. representing medium-skilled type of jobs, should be in favor of discrimination
between immigrants and natives with similar educational qualification. In fact, the
possibility of discrimination is one of the main concerns of European labor unions
regarding wage-dumping. Nevertheless, discriminating between immigrants and natives
using the canonical approach and following the empirical evidence, one would expect
an immigration-induced biased impact on the over-qualification rate of medium-skilled
immigrants. Our results would, then, be a weighted average over natives’ and immigrants’
over-qualification rates and wages. This complicates the model too much and therefore we
relegated this to future research. Downgrading of medium-skilled immigrants on arrival
rather than after becoming not hired is captured implicitly by including the downgraded
in the low-skilled endowment.
Following Booth (1995) and Layard et al. (2005), wages are determined by the right-to-
manage bargaining solution, i.e., the negotiating parties only bargain over wages, whereas
the optimal employment decisions are made by the firms.
At optimum, the firm’s net gain is simply the flow of profits (Π), i.e., net of fixed costs.
The net gain for the labor union is simply the net result of the bargained wage and the
outside option. Thus, the objective function of the labor unions in the manufacturing
and service sectors, respectively, is given by
Um = (wM − w¯M)lM
Us = (wL − w¯L)lL
where w¯i,∀i = {L,M} denotes the reference wage which is taken as given by each labor
union.
The medium- and low-skilled wages are the result of the following maximization problem
subject, respectively, to the labor demand equations, (2.6.1) and (3.35)
max
wi
{((wi − w¯i)li)δj Π1−δjj }, for i = {L,M}, j = {m, s},
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where δ denotes the bargaining strength of the labor union. The solution of the wage
bargaining yields the standard wage mark-up behavior21
wi = (1 + λi)w¯i, (2.9)
λi =
δj
(σx − 1)θi + δj(1− θi)(σj − 1) , for i = {L,M}, j = {m, s}. (2.10)
where θi =
wili
wili+wHHj
denotes the cost share of the labor input.
In keeping with the stylized facts, we assume that medium-skilled workers face the risk
of holding a low skill job in the services sector when they cannot find employment in the
manufacturing sector. We define the skill-downgrading rate of medium-skilled workers as
dM = 1− lM
NM
, (2.11)
with NM the total medium-skilled labor force.
The reference wage of a medium-skilled worker (w¯M) then is
w¯M = (1− dM)wM + dMwL. (2.12)
Substituting this expression into (2.9) and rearranging, we obtain the wage curve of
medium-skilled workers (WCM) in the manufacturing sector,
wM = Φ(λm, dM)wL, (2.13)
where Φ(λm, dM) =
(1+λm)dM
1−(1+λm)(1−dM ) > 1 with the following properties:
∂Φ(·)
∂δm
> 0 and
∂Φ(·)
∂dM
< 0. Thus, a higher bargaining power and or level of employment yield stronger
outside options for the union. In addition, any exogenous shock will induce a shift in
(2.13) due to changes in wL, and also induce a change in the shape of the wage curve due
to changes in dM .
In a similar way, the institutional wage curve for the low-skilled workers in the service
sector can be derived. Since the outside option for these workers is unemployment, the
reference wage of a low-skilled worker can be defined as
w¯L = (1− uL)wL + uLBL, (2.14)
where BL denotes the unemployment benefit and uL is the unemployment rate and is
21We refer the reader to 2.C for the derivation.
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defined by 22
uL = 1− lL − dMNM
NL
, (2.15)
where NL denotes the total low-skilled labor force.
Substituting (2.14) into the bargaining solution in the service sector (2.9) and rearranging
yields the institutional wage curve (WCL) of low-skilled workers in the service sector:
wL = Ψ(λs, uL)BL, (2.16)
where Ψ(λs, uL) =
(1+λs)uL
1−(1+λs)(1−uL) > 1 with the following properties:
∂Ψ(·)
∂δs
> 0 and ∂Ψ(·)
∂uL
<
0. Changes in the wage curve (2.16) and thus the labor market outcomes of the low-
skilled workers depend on the characteristics of the unemployment benefits scheme. For
example, under an exogenous unemployment benefits scheme, i.e., keeping the outside
option of low-skilled workers fixed, exogenous shocks induce only changes in the elasticity
of the wage curve (2.16), while under an endogenous benefit scheme, the wage curve will
also shift as in (2.13). In the next section, we elaborate on the labor market implications
for low and medium-skilled workers under these two different benefit schemes.
Finally, let the total endowment of the mobile factor be
NH = Hm +Hs. (2.17)
To sum up, the equilibrium of the model is characterized by fourteen endogenous variables
(X, Ym, Ys, Pm, Ps, dM , uL, lM , lL, Hm, Hs, wM , wL, and wH) defined by Eqs. (2.1)–
(2.4.2), (3.35)–(2.8.2), (2.13), and (2.15)–(5.19).
2.5 The general equilibrium solution
In deriving the general equilibrium effects of exogenous changes in the labor supply
due to immigration, we are particularly interested in the labor market reactions of low
and medium-skilled workers under two different labor market regimes: exogenous vs.
endogenous unemployment benefits.23
22The collective bargaining agreements are, in almost all EU countries, made at the industry level, see
Venn (2009, Table 1) for an overview. Generally, a collective agreement between the labor union and
the employers’ association in one sector applies also to other firms in the same sector. However, it is less
likely that cross-repercussions or the collective agreement in one sector would be recognized by other
parties in other sectors. Thus, we assume that during the bargaining process, the labor union in the
service sector does not take into account the crowding-out effect when negotiating over the low-skilled
wage.
23Also note that when computing the general equilibrium effect, we take the cost shares as given at
the initial steady state, which is consistent with assuming a Cobb–Douglas production technology.
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2.5.1 Changes in the steady state
We pursue the standard approach by computing the changes from the initial equilibrium
by means of a log-linearization (Jones, 1965), i.e., xˆ = ln
(
x+dx
x
) ∼= dxx .
We commence as follows. Take the total differential of the log-difference of the labor
demand functions (2.6.2) and (2.6.1), (2.7.2) and (3.35), to obtain
lˆM − Hˆm = −σm(wˆH − wˆM), (2.18.1)
lˆL − Hˆs = −σs(wˆH − wˆL). (2.18.2)
Taking the total domestic expenditure as given24, i.e., Xˆ = 0, then from the optimal
demand conditions (2.4.1) and (2.4.2), log-linearization yields
Yˆm = −σxPˆm, (2.18.3)
Yˆs = −σxPˆs. (2.18.4)
From the price-setting equations, (2.8.1) and (2.8.2), we obtain
Pˆm = θM wˆM + (1− θM)wˆH , (2.18.5)
Pˆs = θLwˆL + (1− θL)wˆH . (2.18.6)
Next, let the share of low-skilled workers in the total employment of low skill service
jobs be sL =
(1−uL)NL
lL
, and define the share of the mobile factor in the total employment
working in the goods sector as h = Hm
NH
, then log-linearizing the labor market equilibrium
conditions (2.11), (2.15), and the market clearing condition for the mobile factor (5.19),
we obtain
lˆM = (NˆM − d¯M dˆM), (2.18.7)
lˆL = sL(NˆL − u¯LuˆL) + (1− sL)(NˆM + dˆM), (2.18.8)
NˆH = hHˆm + (1− h)Hˆs. (2.18.9)
Thus, changes in low-skilled employment are weighted at the initial shares sL.
Similarly, log-linearization of the wage curves (2.13) and (2.16) yields
wˆM = εM dˆM + wˆL, (2.18.10)
wˆL = εLuˆL + BˆL, (2.18.11)
where εM = −∂Φ(·)∂dM
dM
Φ(·) and εL = −∂Ψ(·)∂uL
uL
Ψ(·) denote the wage curve elasticities.
24A rationale for this assumption could be that it is the result of macroeconomic policies seeking to
keep a balanced national account, see Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) for a similar argument.
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Finally, log-linearizing the production functions (2.1) and (2.2) yields
Yˆm = θM lˆM + (1− θM)Hˆm (2.18.12)
Yˆs = θLlˆL + (1− θL)Hˆs. (2.18.13)
The general equilibrium effects are described by a system of thirteen equations, Eqs.
(2.18.1)–(2.18.13), in the thirteen endogenous variables Yˆm, Yˆs, Pˆm, Pˆs, Hˆm, Hˆs, lˆM , lˆL,
dˆM , uˆL, wˆH , wˆM , wˆL.
2.5.2 Comparative statics with exogenous benefits
Since we are interested in changes in the two friction variables, medium skill downgrading
and low-skilled unemployment rates, the system derived above can be reduced and solved
for dˆM and uˆL. Moreover, to highlight the complementarity and substitution effects under
the two different institutional settings, we focus first on the increase in medium-skilled
endowments and its impact on the labor market friction variables. Thus, for the moment
NˆL = NˆH = 0. Also notice that the assumption of exogenous unemployment benefits
implies BˆL = 0. In the next section we relax this assumption.
We commence with the consumption goods market clearing condition. From (2.18.3),
(2.18.5), and (2.18.12), we obtain
θM lˆM + (1− θM)Hˆm = −σx(θM wˆM + (1− θM)wˆH). (2.18.3′)
Similarly, combining (2.18.4), (2.18.6), and (2.18.13), we get
θLlˆL + (1− θL)Hˆs = −σx(θLwˆL + (1− θL)wˆH). (2.18.4′)
Next, we solve (2.18.1) and (2.18.2) w.r.t. the mobile factor and use the results in (2.18.3′)
and (2.18.4′), respectively. After further rearrangement, we obtain
lˆM = wˆH(1− θM)(σm − σx)− wˆMΩm, (2.18.3′′)
lˆL = wˆH(1− θL)(σs − σx)− wˆLΩs. (2.18.4′′)
Here Ωj = (θiσj + (1 − θi)σx) > 0 for j = {m, s}, i = {L,M} is also interpreted in
the literature as the generalized elasticity of substitution capturing both the elasticity in
consumption and production (Jones, 1965).
Utilizing now the labor market conditions (2.18.7) and (2.18.8) in (2.18.3′′) and (2.18.4′′),
respectively, yields
(NˆM − d¯M dˆM) = wˆH(1− θM)(σm − σx)− wˆMΩm (2.18.3′′′)
−sLu¯LuˆL + (1− sL)(NˆM + dˆM) = wˆH(1− θL)(σs − σx)− wˆLΩs. (2.18.4′′′)
To eliminate the wage rates wˆM and wˆL, we utilize (2.18.10) and (2.18.11) in (2.18.3
′′′)
and (2.18.4′′′). Then, we rearrange to obtain
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NˆM − d¯M dˆM = wˆH(1− θM )(σm − σx)− (εM dˆM + εLuˆL)Ωm
−sLu¯LuˆL + (1− sL)(NˆM + dˆM ) = wˆH(1− θL)(σs − σx)− εLuˆLΩs.
Rearranging these two equations further, we derive two equations as a function of the
variables of interest25
dˆM =
NˆM
µM
− Ωmε˜L
µM
uˆL − (1− θM )(σm − σx)
µM
wˆH (2.19.1)
uˆL =
(1− sL)
µL
(NˆM + dˆM )− (1− θL)(σs − σx)
µL
wˆH , (2.19.2)
where µM = (d¯M + Ωmε˜m) > 0 and µL = (sLu¯L + Ωsε˜L) > 0 with ε˜i ≡ −εi > 0 for
i = {L,M}.
Now using (2.19.1) in (2.19.2) and performing some manipulations, we obtain
uˆL
NˆM
=
Γ
Υ
− Λ
Υ
wˆH
NˆM
, (2.20)
where Γ = µMµL+Ωmε˜L(1−sL)
µMµL
> 0, Υ = (1−sL)(1+µM )
µMµL
> 0 and Λ =
(1−θM )(1−sL)(σm−σx)+(1−θL)(σs−σx)µL
µMµL
≶ 0.26 The first term on the right-hand side denotes the
first-order effect of an immigration-induced increase in the medium-skilled endowment.
It is readily seen that this effect is positive, indicating a substitution effect of low-skilled
workers due to the inflow medium-skilled workers.
The second term shows the feedback effect from factor price adjustments of the mobile
factor. It is intuitively clear that the increase in medium-skilled endowments raises
unambiguously the marginal productivity of the mobile factor, inducing an increase in
wH , i.e.,
wˆH
NˆM
> 0. However, the magnitude of the substitutability in consumption relative
to that in production will determine the labor market outcomes of low- and medium-
skilled workers.
Now substitute (2.20) back into (2.19.1) and rearrange to obtain
dˆM
NˆM
=
(
1
µM
− ηΓ
Υ
)
+
(
ηΛ
Υ
− χ
)
wˆH
NˆM
, (2.21)
where η = Ωmε˜M
µM
and χ = (1−θM )(σm−σx)
µM
. Recalling the definitions of Γ and Υ below
25It is important to notice that the equations in (2.19) contain a third endogenous variable, wˆH .
Therefore, the system will be closed after utilizing the equilibrium labor market condition for the mobile
factor, (2.18.9). However, changes in the factor price of the mobile factor are feedback effects and thus
of second order. To keep the results readable, we focus on the direct effect and provide the intuition
behind changes in wH .
26The ambiguity of Λ is the result of two forces: substitutability in consumption versus substitutability
in production. To make this more obvious, consider the following special case where both sectors use
Cobb–Douglas technology, i.e., σm = σs = 1, while in consumption the assumption still holds that
σx > 1. It can then be easily shown that the numerator becomes unambiguously negative and simplifies
to −[(σx − 1)((1− θM )(1− sL) + (1− θL)µL)].
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(2.20), the right-hand side of (2.21) can be further manipulated to obtain(
1
µM
− ηΓ
Υ
)
=
sLu¯L + ε˜L(Ωs − Ωm)
µMΥ
.
This expression gives the direct effect of a supply shock of medium-skilled labor on the
downgrading rate. The following proposition summarizes the main results.
Proposition 2.1 (Substitution effect under exogenous benefit). If the labor market of
low- and medium-skilled workers has frictions, such that the medium-skilled workers’
outside option is the low paid manual service job and low-skilled workers end up
in unemployment, then under exogenous unemployment benefits, the immigration of
medium-skilled workers will induce a substitution effect for the low-skilled workers. The
reallocation of the mobile factor as well as the labor market outcomes for the medium-
skilled workers depend crucially on the interaction between consumer preferences and
the two production technologies. The stronger the substitutability is in the service sector
(Ωs > Ωm), the more the medium-skilled workers are downgraded into the service sector.
Intuitively, the mechanism of the adjustment process works as follows. The increase in
the medium-skilled labor supply induces a higher downgrading threat and thus lowers
the outside option of the medium-skilled labor union. The magnitude of the downward
adjustment of wages for the medium-skilled depends on two forces: The elasticity of the
medium-skilled wage curve as well as the substitutability in manufacturing production
(σm). An elastic wage curve together with low substitutability in the manufacturing sector
imply an increase in the skill downgrading rate due to lower downward wage adjustment.
From Eq. (2.15) it is then immediately evident that the unemployment risk for the
low-skilled workers rises. To counteract this effect, the low-skilled labor union agrees to
downward wage adjustment. However, as in the manufacturing sector, wage adjustment
depends on the substitutability between low-skilled workers and the mobile factor in the
service sector (σs) too. The interaction between these forces depends finally on consumer
preferences, i.e., the substitutability between service and manufacturing goods captured
by σx. Since both goods prices are endogenous, changes in the factor prices lead to
changes in the goods prices, inducing shifts in the demands for the goods. More precisely,
medium-skilled immigration increases the marginal productivity of high-skilled workers
and with it their wages. Thus, the sector that more intensively utilizes the high-skilled
labor input experiences a relative increase in the production cost and thus in the relative
goods price. Consequently, that sector experiences an unfavorable goods demand effect.
To get a better intuition, recall the special case where σs = σm = 1, i.e., Cobb–Douglas
production technology, while the assumption regarding consumers preferences still holds,
i.e., σx > 1. This simplifies the first expression on the right-hand side in (2.21) to
sLu¯L + ε˜L[(σxθL + (1− θL)σs)− (σxθM + (1− θM )σm)]
µMΥ
=
sLu¯L + ε˜L(θL − θM )(σx − 1)
µMΥ
.
Now, consider the case θM > θL. This implies that the service sector uses the mobile
factor more intensively. The inflow of medium-skilled immigrants increases the marginal
productivity of high-skilled workers. Thus, the relative price of service goods increases,
indicating a favorable shift in consumption for the manufacturing goods. This leads
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to a relative strong expansion of the manufacturing sector. This shift in consumption
is also accompanied by a reallocation of the high-skilled workers (mobile factor) into
the manufacturing sector. However, as discussed in the numerical part, for plausible
parameter values sLu¯L
ε˜L(σx−1) > (θM − θL), and hence ddM >> 0. For all other cases, e.g. for
sufficiently high σx or ε˜L, the first-order effect may become negative, i.e. ddM < 0.
Summing up, the special case highlights the role of changes in the production
cost structure under endogenous goods prices and when consumers prefer variety in
consumption. Generally, the driving force is captured by the interaction between
generalized elasticities indicating the substitutability in consumption and in production.27
Moreover, the immigration of medium-skilled workers displaces some of the low-skilled
workers due to the relatively higher labor market rigidity denoted by the exogenous
unemployment benefits.
2.5.3 Comparative statics with endogenous benefits
We now relax the assumption of a fixed benefit, and define instead the unemployment
benefit as the proportion of the weighted average of the medium- and low-skilled wage
rates.28 In doing so, the outside option of low-skilled workers becomes endogenous
and linked to the medium-skilled wage rate. Therefore, changes in the medium-skilled
wage directly affect the low-skilled labor market. As we show below, this definition of
endogeneity generates a source of labor market flexibility for low-skilled workers.29
Formally, we define the unemployment benefit as follows:
BL = ξ(κwM + (1− κ)wL),
where ξ, κ ∈ (0, 1) could be interpreted as the replacement rate and the weighting
parameter, respectively. Then, log-linearizing BL yields
BˆL = φM wˆM + (1− φM)wˆL, (2.22)
where 0 < φM =
ξκwM
BL
< 1.
Substituting (2.22) into (2.18.11) and rearranging yields
wˆL =
εL
φM
uˆL + wˆM . (2.18.11
′)
Comparing (2.18.11′) with (2.18.11), two differences become readily evident. First, the
coefficient of uˆL is now multiplied by 1/φM . We interpret the parameter φM as the labor
market policy parameter. That is, lowering φM , e.g., due to a decline in the replacement
rate ξ, induces an increase in the elasticity of the wage curve, making the low-skilled
labor market more flexible. Indeed, as shown by the stylized facts, the group of countries
27Readers familiar with Autor and Dorn (2013) will recognize the main difference from our approach,
as those authors assume no substitutability in the service sector.
28Weiss and Garloff (2009) show that in most European countries the level of benefits, unlike that in
Anglo-Saxon countries, adjusts on a yearly basis and is closely tied to per capita income. Also Dustmann
and Scho¨nberg (2009) show for Germany that the wage differential between low- and medium-skilled
workers in unionized firms is lower than for non-unionized firms.
29We provide in 2.C a formal discussion of the equilibrium properties of the two wage curves.
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with flexible labor markets denote on average about 7% percentage points a lower net
replacement rate compared to the second group with rigid labor markets. The second
difference is in the fact that now the low-skilled wage curve is affected by changes in the
wages for the medium-skilled. More precisely, a decline in medium-skilled wages induces a
downward shift in the low-skilled wage curve. This interdependency creates an additional
source of flexibility.
Similar to the fixed benefit regime, we solve the system for the two friction variables in
order to obtain a similar structure as in Eqs. (2.19). We commence by solving (2.18.3′′′)
and (2.18.4′′′) for wˆM and wˆL, respectively, to obtain
wˆM =
1
Ωm
(
wˆH(1− θM)(σm − σx)− (NˆM − d¯M dˆM)
)
wˆL =
1
Ωs
(
wˆH(1− θL)(σs − σx) + u¯LsLuˆL − (NˆM + dˆM)
)
.
Subtracting the two equations yields
wˆM − wˆL = 1
Ωm
(
wˆH(1− θM )(σm − σx)− (NˆM − d¯M dˆM )
)
− 1
Ωs
(
wˆH(1− θL)(σs − σx) + u¯LsLuˆL − (NˆM + dˆM )
)
. (2.23)
Furthermore, from (2.18.10) and (2.18.11′) we get
wˆM − wˆL = −ε˜M dˆM (2.18.10′)
wˆM − wˆL = ε˜L
φM
uˆL. (2.18.11
′′)
Substituting (2.18.10′) for (wˆM − wˆL) in (2.18.11′′) and (2.23), and rearranging, yields
the following system of two equations,
dˆM = −
(
ε˜M +
d¯M
Ωm
+
(1− sL)
Ωs
)−1
× (2.24)[(
1− sL
Ωs
− 1
Ωm
)
NˆM +
(
(1− θM )(σm − σx)
Ωm
− (1− θL)(σs − σx)
Ωs
)
wˆH − u¯LsL
Ωs
uˆL
]
uˆL = − ε˜M
ε˜L
φM dˆM . (2.25)
Before proceeding, it might helpful to consider first the behavior of Eq. (2.25). The effect
of an increase in skill downgrading on the low-skilled unemployment rate is mitigated by
lowering φM . As already mentioned above, this is the result of a stronger responsiveness
of the low-skilled wage curve to changes in the unemployment rate under endogenous
unemployment benefits. However, to drive the full effect, we need to solve (2.24)
and (2.25) for the two variables dˆM and uˆL. In doing so, define for convenience the
following expressions: υ =
(
ε˜M +
d¯M
Ωm
+ (1−sL)
Ωs
)
> 0, ∆ =
(
1−sL
Ωs
− 1
Ωm
)
Q 0, and
Σ =
(
(1−θM )(σm−σx)
Ωm
− (1−θL)(σs−σx)
Ωs
)
=
(
σm
Ωm
− σs
Ωs
)
Q 0.
Then, we combine (2.24) and (2.25), divide by NˆM , and rearrange to obtain
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uˆL
NˆM
=
ε˜MφM
ε˜Lυ
[
∆ + Σ
wˆH
NˆM
− u¯LsL
Ωs
uˆL
NˆM
]
⇒ uˆL
NˆM
=
(
ε˜MφMΩs
ε˜MφM u¯LsL + ε˜LυΩs
)
∆ +
(
ε˜MφMΩsΣ
ε˜MφM u¯LsL + ε˜LυΩs
)
wˆH
NˆM
. (2.26)
Dividing (2.25) by NˆM and utilizing (2.26) yields
dˆM
NˆM
= −
(
ε˜LΩs
ε˜MφM u¯LsL + ε˜LυΩs
)
∆−
(
ε˜LΩsΣ
ε˜MφM u¯LsL + ε˜LυΩs
)
wˆH
NˆM
. (2.27)
Equations (2.26) and (2.27) are the analogs to (2.20) and (2.21) derived previously under
the exogenous benefits regime. Comparing the first terms on the right-hand sides in
(2.26) and in (2.20), one observes that in Eq. (2.20), under exogenous benefits, the sign
of the first term is always positive. However, the direct effect in the case of endogenous
benefits is ambiguous and is determined by the term ∆. To verify the sign of the first
term in (2.26), recall the definition of ∆, and utilize Ωm and Ωs defined earlier in Eqs.
(2.18.3′′) and (2.18.4′′). Then, it follows30
∆ =
(
1− sL
Ωs
− 1
Ωm
)
= − sL
Ωs
− Ωs − Ωm
ΩmΩs
, (2.28)
which determines the sign of the direct effect of medium-skilled immigration on the skill
downgrading rate. The next proposition summarizes the main results.
Proposition 2.2 (Complementarity effect under endogenous benefit). If low- and
medium-skilled labor markets possess frictions where labor supply is defined by an
institutional wage setting curve, then for a stronger substitutability in the service sector,
i.e., Ωs > Ωm, an immigration-induced increase in the medium-skilled endowment raises
the incidence of skill downgrading followed by a reduction in low-skilled unemployment,
implying a complementarity effect. In addition, the more flexible is the low-skilled labor
market (lower φM), the less severe is the adverse effect of higher incidence of skill
downgrading.
The intuition behind the driving force is similar to that of Proposition 2.1, except that
now due to the endogenous unemployment benefits, the low-skilled labor market has
become more flexible as indicated in Eq. (2.18.11′). Put differently, a higher risk of
unemployment due to the migration-induced increase in skill downgrading implies a
stronger downward wage adjustment for the low-skilled workers. Therefore, a relatively
stronger substitutability in the service sector (Ωs > Ωm) induces an increase in the
demand for the low-skilled labor input in the service sector. This contrasts with the
exogenous benefit scheme where the adjustment process was rather rigid. It, therefore,
highlights the importance of labor market institutions.
Thus, we are able to provide a potential rationale behind the role of institutions in
30To see the sign more clearly, it is worthwhile to look again at the special case where σm = σs = 1,
while σx > 1. We then obtain ∆ =
−sL
Ωs
− (σx−1)(θm−θs)ΩsΩm < 0.
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determining the relationship between the low-skilled unemployment rate and the skill
downgrading rate across the European countries, shown in Figure 2.1. That is, low-
skilled workers in countries, like France, that have a rather rigid labor market (high
φM) are more vulnerable in terms of employment outcomes to exogenous shocks like
immigration. Formally, this can be shown as follows. Consider two identical countries, F
and D, differing only in the policy parameter φM . Comparing the direct effect of medium-
skilled immigration on the low-skilled unemployment rate, i.e., keeping the second term
constant, yields
uˆFL
NˆM
∣∣∣∣
wˆH
NˆM
=0
Q uˆ
D
L
NˆM
∣∣∣∣
wˆH
NˆM
=0(
ε˜Mφ
F
MΩs
ε˜MφFM u¯LsL + ε˜LυΩs
)
∆ Q
(
ε˜Mφ
D
MΩs
ε˜MφDM u¯LsL + ε˜LυΩs
)
∆
φFM Q φDM .
In conclusion, the comparative static analysis emphasizes two important findings. First,
following the medium-skilled immigration, the incidence of skill downgrading of medium-
skilled workers together with a endogenous benefits scheme induces an increase in low-
skilled employment in the service sector. This is in line with the stylized facts discussed
earlier, about the pattern of immigration and employment composition in many advanced
countries. Second, the production technology in the service sector is a crucial determinant
explaining the labor market outcomes. This differs from the discussion of Autor and
Dorn (2013), who emphasize only the roles of consumer preferences and of production
technology in the goods sector. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that in the special
case of a Cobb–Douglas production technology, the results are driven by the factor cost
share, i.e. the factor intensity. In the next section we provide a quantitative assessment
and examine the general equilibrium effects of different immigration scenarios.
2.6 Numerical assessment
In this section, we provide a numerical analysis of long-run effects of various migration
scenarios on the labor market and the economy, accounting for flexible and rigid labor
market institutions. Based on our empirical evidence presented in Figure 2.1 (and Table
2.5 in 2.A.2), we consider Germany as the representative of the group of countries
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany) with flexible labor markets, characterized by low
net replacement rates and a negative relationship between low-skilled unemployment
and medium-skilled over-qualification rates, while France is considered to represent the
second group of countries (Denmark, Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
Sweden) with inflexible institutional settings, characterized by high net replacement rates
and a positive correlation between the unemployment and downgrading rates. We use
the EUKLEMS database to calibrate the parameter values for Germany and France.
Furthermore, we take 2004 as the benchmark year. We then use the calibrated parameters
and benchmark values of the variables to simulate the impact of migration on output and
the labor market variables. In doing so, we modify the model by including physical and
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human capital input factors in the production function. Here we consider the special
case of the production function, i.e. a Cobb-Douglas technology, while the assumption
on consumption preferences (σx > 1) holds. Note that, as discussed above, in this case
the results depend on the the cost shares (i.e., factor intensity) in both sectors. In 2.B,
we outline the model as well as the values of the benchmark parameters and variables.
2.6.1 Migration scenarios
Similarly to Felbermayr and Kohler (2007), we simulate migration scenarios for different
skill compositions of migration flows. Table 2.3 gives an overview of our simulation
scenarios. In scenario (I), we assume a proportional increase in all skill levels, which
Table 2.3: Simulation scenarios
Scenario Description
(I) Perfectly balanced immigration
(II) Inflow at tails
(III) Medium- and high-skilled inflow
(IV) High-skilled inflow only
(V) Medium-skilled inflow only
(VI) Low-skilled inflow only
approximately resembles the Dutch immigration scenario, see Muysken and Ziesemer
(2011). In scenario (II), we assume the immigration to be composed of 75% low-skilled
and 25% high-skilled labor. As pointed out by Felbermayr and Kohler (2007), this denotes
the most realistic case for the past in the OECD countries, as it models a bimodality in
migration flows with a bias towards low-skilled migration. We also simulate the model
for the current migration pattern within the EU (scenario (III)), where the majority of
migrants from the new member states (Poland and the Baltic states) are predominantly
young with medium or high levels of skill (Blanchflower et al., 2007).
In doing so, in scenario (III), we use as a benchmark the relative share of high-skilled
foreign labor force in the U.S., which can be seen as a target value, and subtract from
that the values for Germany and France.31 We, then, compute the percentage inflows
so that the overall size of the inflows equals 10% of the total labor force. The resulting
inflow consists in Germany of 55.7% and 44.3% and in France of 45.30% and 54.70% of
medium- and high-skilled immigrants, respectively.32
31As used in the migration literature, see Ziesemer (2011), we take the World Bank data on migration
stocks, which provides information on the educational attainments of immigrants and the total labor
force. However, the Migration Data provides only information from 1975 to 2000, which we use as a
proxy.
32The computation is as follows: the share of high-skilled immigrants in the U.S. labor force is about
10.91% and in the German (France) labor force about 6.48% (5.44%) in 2000, which makes a difference
of 4.43% (5.47%) in case of Germany (France). Therefore, in scenario (III), the high-skilled labor force
has to rise by 44.30% = 4.43% × (N/NH) which gives us a total increase in the medium-skilled labor
force by 8.80% = (10%− 4.43%)× (N/NM ) in Germany.
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We also assess the quantitative impact of each skill group separately in the scenarios
(IV)–(VI). Furthermore, to ensure comparability between the different cases and due to
the fact that just under 10% of the German workforce are foreign born, all scenarios are
specified in such a way that the overall size of the inflow is approximately 10% of the
initial labor force. Finally, we assume full adjustment of the capital stock. Hence, the
results indicate long-run effects. It is also important to notice that the service sector is
slightly more high skill intensive than the manufacturing sector.
2.6.2 Simulation results
We organize the discussion of our findings around the following core numerical results.
Numerical Result 1 : A perfectly balanced inflow of all three skill groups is consistent
with no change in relative wages, unemployment rates, and skill downgrading.
This is a standard, intuitively plausible result, since a proportional increase of the labor
force implies a scale effect due to the full capital adjustments, confirming earlier empirical
results (Dustmann et al., 2008). However, notice that differences in production functions
can cause small differences in the pure scale effect of 10%.
Numerical Result 2 : The welfare effects of unbalanced recent migration patterns
dominate substantially that of past patterns.
The unbalanced migration patterns are represented by scenario (II) and (III). The past
immigration patterns, dominated by low-skilled migration, has lead to a modest increase
of GDP per capita (1 to 1.4 percent), while the recent immigration pattern, dominated
by high-skilled immigrants, raises GDP per capita by a magnitude of 2.4 to 4.4 percent.
Hence, our numerical exercise highlights the quantitative importance of the skill structure
of immigrants.
In addition, scenario (II) illustrates nicely that due to the relative scarcity of medium
skilled workers following this migration pattern, medium-skilled wages increase relatively
to high-skilled wages and low-skilled wages, and the over-qualification rate decreases.
Moreover, the price in manufacturing increases relative to that of services, because low-
skilled immigration increases relative supply of services. This is consistent with our model
above.
Numerical Result 3 : Institutional settings play an important role both in terms of
magnitude and outcomes for low- and medium-skilled workers. Moreover, medium-
skilled immigration causes a wage polarization effect.
First, observe the role of institutional settings in the unbalanced recent immigration
scenario (III), with substantial share of high-skilled immigrants, and the pure high-
skilled immigration scenario (IV). The unemployment rate of low-skilled workers decreases
and the skill downgrading rate increases in both endogenous (Germany) and exogenous
(France) benefit regimes. The rationale behind this similar effect is twofold. In case of
France, with rigid benefits, the complementarity effect is purely demand-driven, where
due to skill downgrading and the relative high intensity of high-skilled workers in the
service sector the influx of high-skilled immigrants causes the relative price of service
goods to decline. This favorable supply and demand shift towards service goods induces
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an expansionary effect for the service sector, and hence increasing the demand for low-
skilled service jobs. These observations are consistent with our model and the empirical
findings on scale and intensity effects driven by immigration (Gonza´lez and Ortega, 2011).
They also confirm our stylized facts about the recent increase in the supply of medium-
and high-skilled immigrants in Table 2.1 and low-skilled intensive jobs in Table 2.2 in
many advanced countries.
In the case of Germany, reflecting a flexible labor market, the complementarity effect
is induced by a mixture of goods demand effect, i.e. a relative decline in service
goods prices, and of endogenous benefit effect, i.e. a decline in the reservation wage
of low-skilled workers. The pure complementarity and substitution effects discussed by
Proposition 2.1 and 2.2 are reconciled by immigration scenario (V), where all migration
consists of medium-skilled persons. Here, due to the nature of wage setting the influx
of medium-skilled workers causes the over-qualification rate to increase. The importance
of institutions is readily seen. While in France, low-skilled workers are considerably
displaced due the inflow of medium-skilled workers, in Germany, the unemployment rate
of low-skilled workers is decreased.
Second, scenario (V) shows the so-called polarization effect, where the medium-skilled
wage declines relative to both high-skilled and low-skilled wages. As a consequence of
this strong wage decline, employment of medium-skilled workers in the manufacturing
sector has risen considerably, while that sector expanded even stronger than the services
sector and prices decreased in manufacturing relative to services – the latter two are
unique events.
A third interesting observation derived from scenario (V) is that this is the only scenario
in which output per capita declines as a consequence of migration. The reason lies in
the low capital accumulation in the services sector compared to the other scenarios,
induced by following four effects: (i) human capital is reallocated from services, where it
has a higher elasticity of production, to manufactures, because of the relative expansion
of manufactures; (ii) substitution of cheap low skilled labor for capital in comparison
with scenario (III); (iii) unemployment is reduced less than in the realistic scenario
(III), leading to relatively less additional low-skilled employment in services; and (iv)
the decreased overall demand together with the strong decline in medium-skilled wages.
Finally, scenarios (IV) and (VI) illustrate the impact of pure high-skilled and pure low-
skilled migration, respectively. These scenarios follow the patterns we have already
discussed above. Table 2.4 reports the results of the numerical exercise.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we present a theoretical model, motivated by our stylized facts, with
two major sectors (manufacturing and services) and heterogeneous labor markets (high-
, medium-, and low- skilled) to analyze the impact of various skill compositions of
immigration. While the impact of migration flows with different skills on the sectoral
decomposition, goods prices, and labor market outcomes for the receiving country has
been analyzed separately, to our knowledge, no paper exists that examines the impact
of immigration in a general equilibrium framework combining low-skilled unemployment
and medium-skilled downgrading incidence under two different institutional settings. At
the same time, the existing literature has paid less attention to the repercussions of
medium-skilled immigration considering simultaneously its implication for low-skilled
workers. Our stylized facts highlight the importance of labor market institutions and
the analytical solution of the model verifies that it is able to reproduce these stylized
facts. We have also quantified the impact of different migration scenarios on the labor
market and GDP. The following outcomes are at the core of our analysis.
First, we elaborate on the impact of institutions on the labor market performance
of low-skilled workers, who are most vulnerable to economic shocks. In particular,
our comparative static analysis reveals that in flexible labor markets, captured by an
endogenous benefit scheme, medium-skilled immigration generates a complementarity
effect, which enhances low-skilled employment, while in more rigid labor markets, it
induces a substitution effect, increasing low-skilled unemployment. The rationale behind
these different outcomes is that the outside option of unemployed low-skilled workers
is more responsive to economic shocks under the flexible regime, mitigating adverse
employment effects.
Based on our empirical evidence, we consider France and Germany as the representatives
of the two groups of countries with different labor market institutions and quantify the
impact of different immigration scenarios. In line with the usual conclusion regarding
the effect of skilled and unskilled immigration, we also find that the immigration of the
high-skilled is beneficial to the receiving economy (increasing GDP per capita between 6%
and 10%). Focusing on medium-skilled immigration, we find new insights that augment
those in the current literature. The results reveal, indeed, that immigration of medium-
skilled workers can generate partly favorable economic outcomes. Under the flexible labor
market regime, medium-skilled immigration improves the labor market conditions for low-
skilled workers, while under the rigid regime it induces a substitution effect, displacing
low-skilled workers. Moreover, even without accounting for dynamic labor market effects,
such as the assimilation process, or the aging effect, medium-skilled immigration can be
beneficial for the host economy. For instance, our simulation analysis of the impact on
GDP per capita of the past (Scenario II) and the recent (Scenario III) migration pattern
shows that in the latter case the welfare effects are considerably higher, a difference of
1.4 to 3%.
Furthermore, the endogenous goods prices resulting from price-setting behavior are an
important economic mechanism in explaining the substitutability between different types
of labor. Our findings reveal that labor migration, irrespective of the skill structure,
may also generate a productivity effect for firms by lowering production costs. This in
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turn explains changes in the skill intensity across sectors. Moreover, the importance
of institutional characteristics as well as the welfare and labor market implications of
medium-skilled immigration give an important insight for designing migration and labor
market policies to satisfy the future labor replacement demand, for instance, due to aging.
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2.A Empirical analysis
2.A.1 Data
For the underlying empirical analysis, we have drawn data from two sources. Information on
unemployment rate and over-qualification are based on the annual labor force survey data and are
drawn from the Eurostat. We follow the commonly used approach in the literature and compute the
medium-skilled over-qualification rate according to ISCO-ISCED mismatch. More precisely, the share of
medium-skilled workers (ISCED 3 and 4), who are employed in occupations according to ISCO 5 and 9,
are defined as over-qualified. Annual data on GDP are taken from OECD Statistics. Finally, we collect
data on the net replacement rate, which includes social assistance and housing benefits, from the OECD
Tax and Benefits statistics, provided in the excel file ”GRR EN”, variable ”NRR incl SA HB (AW)”.33
2.A.2 Estimation of the correlation between over-qualification
and unemployment rates
We estimate the relation between the low-skilled unemployment rate, uL, and the log of medium-
skilled downgrading rate, log(dM ), using the lagged dependent variable, uL(t − 1). We control for
the financial crisis and business cycles by using the lagged growth rate of GDP per capita, gy(t − 1),
because employment tends to follow economic growth with some lag. We control for technical change
by using a time trend, t. We assume heterogeneous coefficients throughout. In order to avoid serial
correlation bias, the first-order autocorrelation, AR(1), is taken into account. The system of equations
can then be written as:
ui(t) = consti + γiui(t− 1) + β1,i log(dM (t)) + β2,igy(t− 1) + β3,it+ vi(t), (2.A.30)
vi(t) = ρvi(t− 1) + i(t), (2.A.31)
where vi,t is the residual, consti denotes the country-specific constant, and i is the country index.
34
In case of endogeneity we would use the lags of the regressors as instruments. A Durbin-Wu-Hausman
(DWH) test suggests that over-qualification is not endogenous, see Wooldridge (2002, Chap. 6). As
the other regressors have lags anyway, we do not use instrumental variable (IV) methods. Since
unemployment rates are likely to be dependent on those of the other countries we expect to have
contemporaneous correlation of the residuals and therefore we use the SUR (seemingly unrelated
regression) method. The results are summarized in the Table 2.5 with p-values in parentheses.
Over-qualification has a significantly negative sign for Belgium, Germany, Finland and Austria. We find
significantly positive signs for Denmark, Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. The
coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are positive and significant with the exception of Belgium
and Sweden. But they are all below unity, indicating the absence of unit roots in the presence of
control variables.35 The GDP growth variable is always negative, but insignificant for Austria, Portugal
33Due to availability of cross-country harmonized data on institutional settings, the net replacement
ratio is used as a proxy.
34Since the replacement rate is rather time invariant over the sample period, it is not possible to use
it as a separate variable in the estimation, but it is subsumed under the country specific constant.
35Performing standard unit root tests for the over-qualification variable provides mixed evidence for
and against unit roots. However, for our small sample, unit root tests have pertinently low power
(Baltagi, 2008, chapter 12), meaning that too often unit roots are suggested. Therefore we prefer to
lean against the unit root hypothesis. For the unemployment rate, lagged variables for all countries have
coefficients below unity, actually between 0.05 and 0.9; in case of unit roots at least some should be at
or above unity and therefore we have at best a near-unit root here. GDP variables are well-known to
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Table 2.5: Correlation between medium-skilled over-qualification and low-skilled
unemployment rates
Country const uL(t− 1) log(dM ) gy(t− 1) t AR(1) Adjusted R2 DWH-Test Obs.
Belgium −0.1660 0.1015 −0.1022 −0.1453 0.0083 0.915 0.5966 1.7021 19
(0.6434) (0.4439) (0.0002) (0.0721) (0.478) (0.000)
Denmark 0.0747 0.7870 0.0368 −0.4648 −0.0005 −0.3881 0.7537 2.3047 19
(0.0078) (0.000) (0.0484) (0.000) (0.1264) (0.0003)
Germany −0.1822 0.8087 −0.1279 −0.0500 0.0014 0.2713 0.7256 1.4126 16
(0.0706) (0.000) (0.034) (0.6374) (0.2205) (0.1498)
Ireland 0.2043 0.7059 0.1031 −0.4766 −0.0017 − 0.9235 1.7527 18
(0.0069) (0 .000) (0.0288) (0.000) (0.0672) −
Greece 0.3007 0.8689 0.1795 −0.2690 −0.0025 −0.4537 0.9681 1.8727 19
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0002) (0.0012)
Spain −0.0662 0.8898 −0.0642 −0.9246 0.00294 − 0.9042 2.0550 20
(0.6838) (0.000) (0.5635) (0.000) (0.3641) −
France 0.4518 0.4835 0.2003 −0.5440 −0.0069 0.1954 0.7160 1.8995 19
(0.000) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.14)
Italy 0.2417 0.6949 0.1082 −0.2634 −0.0022 −0.5632 0.8501 1.2554 18
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.0006)
Netherlands 0.1613 0.6093 0.0703 −0.4437 −0.0021 −0.6262 0.8866 1.8629 15
(0.0011) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.0065) (0.000)
Austria −0.0729 −0.4231 −0.1134 −0.0456 0.00281 0.5782 0.0086 1.6340 17
(0.1884) (0.0035) (0.0001) (0.5477) (0.0047) (0.0001)
Portugal −0.0174 0.9083 −0.0027 −0.1123 0.00218 0.2619 0.9429 2.0453 18
(0.8033) (0.000) (0.9413) (0.2084) (0.1351) (0.1788)
Finland −0.0242 0.8346 −0.0369 −0.2649 0.0009 −0.4350 0.4798 1.6373 16
(0.5765) (0.000) (0.0946) (0.0006) (0.3362) (0.0136)
Sweden 0.6628 0.17947 0.5139 −0.297 0.0045 0.4434 0.9191 1.6718 16
(0.000) 0.2021 (0.000) (0.000) (0.0014) (0.0043)
UK 0.0524 0.4830 0.0186 −0.2401 0.0019 0.5377 0.9078 2.0917 14
(0.3184) (0.0021) (0.5621) (0.000) (0.3178) (0.0005)
Notes: The p-values are in parentheses. Results show the estimation of Eqs. (2.A.30) and (2.A.31).
Total observations: 244. Sample period: 1994-2013. For Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and UK
we use AR(2). For Ireland and Spain AR(1) and AR(2) terms are dropped because of insignificance.
and Germany. There is a significantly positive time trend for Austria and Sweden and a significantly
negative one in Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, and the Netherlands.36 Intercepts are indeed different
across countries and insignificant for Belgium, Spain, Austria, Portugal, Finland, and UK. In terms of
adjusted R-squared, our equation performs badly only for Austria, probably because the labor market
is strongly managed by country-specific institutions. In terms of serial correlation, Germany and Italy
deviate most from the ideal value of two. Taking into account serial correlation has hardly any impact
on the over-qualification results, but more so for the time trend.37
2.A.3 Estimation of the role of institutions on the relationship
between unemployment and downgrading
To estimate the importance of labor market institutions regarding the impact of medium-skilled
downgrading on low-skilled unemployment, we use the estimated coefficients of over-qualification from
have unit roots and their growth rates are stationary.
36When regressing over-qualification on a time trend we find highly significant positive coefficients,
except for Denmark. However, when adding a lagged dependent variable the time trend becomes
insignificant except for five of the countries and the lagged dependent variable has a significantly positive
sign except for Belgium and France.
37It is worth mentioning that a full empirical analysis requires further robustness checks, such as
testing different specifications or alternative estimation approaches (e.g. cross-section panel analysis);
one has to avoid heterogeneity bias then. We deliberately leave a full-fledged empirical analysis to future
research.
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2.A.3 Estimation of the role of institutions on the relationship between unemployment
and downgrading
Table 2.5, column (4), to represent the latter impact. The nature of labor market institutions is captured
by the net replacement rate.38
Table 2.6: Correlation between net replacement rate and the estimated
unemployment-downgrading relationship
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic P-Value
Const. −0.344772 0.152286 −2.263973 0.0470
NRR 0.006321 0.002884 2.191580 0.0532
Notes: R2 and adj. R2 are 0.72583 and −0.020159,
respectively; Observations = 12.
The OLS-results are presented in Table 2.6 and show a significant positive relationship, indicating that
downgrading is positively related to the net replacement rate. The low adjusted R-square stems from
the high coefficients of Sweden (0.5) and France (0.2) in the regressions of Table 2.5. If we take them
out, the adj. R-square would increase to 0.18, and the slope still remains significantly positive.
38We have taken out Greece and Italy because of their extremely low replacement rates (0.23 and 0.25,
respectively) compared to the values between 50 and 75%, which are outliers at the end of the spectrum
and would therefore change the sign.
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2.B Calibration
2.B.1 Cobb–Douglas production technology
The underlying model used for the simulation is the following.39
• Production technology in the manufacturing sector
Ym = K
ν
mH
α
ml
1−α−ν
M (2.B.32)
• Production technology in the service sector
Ys = K
η
sH
β
s l
1−β−η
L (2.B.33)
• Wage curves
wM = Φ(λm, dM )wL (2.B.34)
under endogenous benefit scheme (subscript 1):
wL = Ψ1(λs, uL)wM (2.B.35)
under exogenous benefit scheme (subscript 2):
wL = Ψ2(λs, uL)BL (2.B.36)
where
Φ(·) = 1
1− λ¯m/dM
,
Ψ1(·) = 1
1 + 1−ξξκ − λ¯sξκuL
,
Ψ2(·) = 1
1− λ¯suL
,
λm =
δm
(1− α− ν)(σx − 1) , λ¯m =
λm
1 + λm
λs =
δs
(1− β − η)(σx − 1) , λ¯s =
λs
1 + λs
A rigorous discussion of the properties of the two wage curves and the uniqueness of the wage equilibrium
is provided by 2.C. The rest of the model remains as discussed in the main text.
The capital accumulation follows Kaldor’s facts, where in the long-run the rate of return to capital is
constant as the capital stock adjusts perfectly.
39Notice that this assumption can be seen as the special case of the more generalized CES production
function, i.e., σj → 1, and by defining Hj as a capital input composite produced with a Cobb–Douglas
technology.
47
2.B.2 Benchmark statistics and calibration
2.B.2 Benchmark statistics and calibration
In order to provide a numerical solution of the model, we match the theoretical model with the data for a
certain period. In doing so, we define the values for the production side, such as the input shares, as well as
for the variables and parameters of our labor market, such as unemployment rates and skill downgrading
rates. The parameters are given by (α, β, ν, η, ρ, σx, κ, ξ, δm, δs, λm, λs). The endogenous variables are
(Hm, Hs, lM , lL, uL, dM , wH , wM , wL, sL, h, Ym, Ys, Pm, Ps) with the following exogenous variables
(NH , NM , NL). We compute the values mostly from the EUKLEMS database.
40 We also use when
necessary different sources to obtain the values for the specific labor market parameters and variables.
Table 2.7 provides an overview of the calibrated and benchmark equilibrium values. Note that, in order
to have the best fit of the model with the data, we define the cost shares of the specific input factors
simply as the sum of the cost shares of the low- and medium-skilled workers in each sector. Table 2.8
further summarizes the labor market benchmark values.
Table 2.7: Calibrated and benchmark equilibrium values for the industries
Description Parameter/Variable Values
Germany France
Manuf. value-add (in 1000 Euros)(a) PmYm 583,191 311,627
Service value-add (in 1000 Euros)(a) PsYs 1,393,790 1,142,089
high-skilled labor force (in 1000 persons)(a) NH 3,837 3,668
medium-skilled labor force (in 1000 persons)(a) NM 24,148 15,782
low-skilled labor force (in 1000 persons)(a) NL 10,022 4,622
Total labor force N = NH +NM +NL 38,007 24,071
medium-skilled wage rate(a) wM 30.15 23.65
low-skilled wage rate(a) wL 21.65 20.18
Manufacturing capital cost share(a) ν 0.27 0.31
Manuf. high-skilled cost share(a) α 0.08 0.06
Manuf. medium-skilled cost share(a) 1− α− ν 0.65 0.63
Service capital cost share(a) η 0.38 0.36
Serv. high-skilled cost share(a) β 0.11 0.18
Serv. low-skilled cost share(a) 1− β − η 0.51 0.46
Unemployment rate(b) uL 0.15 0.13
Skill downgrading rate(b) dM 0.255 0.33
Elasticity of Substitution(c) σx =
1
1−ρ 4 4
ρ 0.75 0.75
Net replacement rate(d) ξ 0.58 0.58
(a) EUKLEMS. Own calculation.
(b) Eurostat.
(c) From Abraham et al. (2009).
(d) OECD Tax & Benefits Statistics.
40For an extensive description of the data and the calibration approach, we refer the reader to the
working paper version which will be provided upon request.
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Table 2.8: Labor market benchmark values
Description Parameter/Variable Value
Germany France
Manufacturing high-skilled employment (in 1000)(e) Hm 850 312
Service high-skilled employment (in 1000) Hs = NH −Hm 2,987 3355
h = HmNH 0.22 0.085
medium-skilled employment (in 1000) lM = (1− dM )NM 17,990 10,574
low-skilled employment (in 1000) lL = (1− uL)NL + dMNM 14,676 9,229
l = (1− uL)NL/L 0.58 0.44
high-skilled wage rate(f) wH = αPmYm/Hm 51.82 61.37
Manufacturing trade union bargaining power(g) δm 0.1265 0.0853
λm 0.0774 0.0508
Service trade union bargaining power(h) δs 0.0669 0.0715
λs 0.0481 0.0578
Weighting factor(i) κ 0.50 −
Manufacturing-wage curve Φ(·) 1.39 1.17
Services-wage curve Ψ(·) 0.72 1.72
Elasticity of the manufacturing-wage curve εM =
∂ log Φ(·)
∂ log dM
−0.39 −0.17
Elasticity of services-wage curve εL =
∂ log Ψ(·)
∂ log uL
−0.76 −0.72
(e) Calibration is based on the condition αPmYmHm = wH = β
PsYs
NH−Hm .
(f) Calibration is based on values in Table 2.7.
(g) Calibrated from the manufacturing wage-setting curve (2.B.34).
(h) Calibrated from the services wage-setting curve (2.B.35) and (2.B.36).
(i) Assumption.
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2.C Bargaining solution and unique equilibrium
2.C.1 Bargaining solution
Recall the Nash bargaining problem
max
wi
{((wi − w¯i)li)δj Π1−δjj } (2.C.37)
Take logs and differentiate w.r.t. wi to obtain
δj
1
wi − w¯i + δj
∂li
∂wi
1
li
+ (1− δj)∂Πj
∂wi
1
Πi
= 0 (2.C.38)
Multiplying the first order condition (2.C.38) by wi and rearranging yields
δj
wi
wi − w¯i = −δj
∂li
∂wi
wi
li
− (1− δj)∂Πj
∂wi
wi
Πi
. (2.C.38’)
By the Envelope Theorem,
∂Πj
∂wi
= −li.
Thus, the term
∂Πj
∂wi
wi
Πi
= −wili
Πj
denotes the cost share of labor input in firm’s flow profit. In the general equilibrium context, i.e., taking
account of goods demand effects, this is given by
wili
Πj
= (σx − 1)θi. (2.C.39)
with θi denoting the cost share of labor input.
The first term in the right-hand side of (2.C.38’), ∂li∂wi
wi
li
, denotes the labor demand elasticity. In the
general equilibrium context, this is given
∂li
∂wi
wi
li
= −(σx − σj)θi. (2.C.40)
Utilizing (2.C.39) and (2.C.40) in (2.C.38’) and rearranging, yields the standard wage markup behaviour
derived in the main text.
2.C.2 Unique equilibrium condition under endogenous benefits
We assume that the level of unemployment benefits is tied closely to the average wage. In particular,
BL is defined as a percentage (ξ) of the average of the low- and medium-skilled wages weighted by κ:
41
BL = ξ(κwM + (1− κ)wL). (2.C.41)
41Note that for κ = 0 we obtain the standard definition of unemployment benefits as the constant
“replacement rate”, b/wL = ξ. In this case, however, the linkage between wL and wM disappears and
the services-wage curve will be defined as wL = (1+λs)((1−uL)wL+uLb). Consequently, the equilibrium
unemployment rate, uL, will be constant and depend only on the parameters of the model. This, in turn,
implies that no longer reacts to migration shocks.
50
2 Migration, Unemployment, and Skill Downgrading
Using the definition for BL (2.C.41) in Eq. (2.16) and rearranging, we obtain the wage curve (2.B.35).
Note that if the service labor union loses bargaining power, then the perfect competition outcome with
no unemployment results, i.e., if δs → 0, then λs → 0 and wL → BL. Moreover, from Eq. (2.B.35) it
follows that the higher is the weighting parameter κ, the stronger is the linkage to the medium-skilled
wage, ∂Ψ1∂κ > 0. Thus, we conclude
Proposition 2.3. A stronger linkage between low- and medium-skilled workers due to wage bargaining
and endogenous unemployment benefits induces wage compression at the lower end of the wage
distribution.
This is in line with the cross-firm evidence for Germany where the wage differential between low-
and medium-skilled workers in unionized firms is lower than for non-unionized firms (Dustmann and
Scho¨nberg, 2009).42
Properties of the manufacturing wage curve
The partial features of the manufacturing-wage curve (i.e., taking wL as given), can be demonstrated as
follows. For a better realization, rewrite Eq. (2.B.34) as
wL
wM
= Φ(λm, dM )
−1 ≡ 1− λ¯m
dM (wM )
, (2.C.42)
where λ¯m =
λm
1+λm
and dM (wM ) is given by Eq. (2.11). Now, the LHS and RHS can both be seen as
functions of wM for given values of wL. This is because manufacturing unions take the outside option
(wL) as given when they negotiate. Then, it can be easily verified that the LHS of Eq. (2.C.42) is a
decreasing function of wM but the RHS is increasing for certain values of both oM and wM . These
relations are illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Properties of the manufacturing-wage curve
wM1
1 1
1+λm
relative wage curve: wL/wM
dM
Φ−1(wM )
Φ−1(dM )
d˜M w˜M
Consider first the right panel of Figure 2.2. Then, recalling (2.C.42), we can draw two curves: one
shows the negative relation between the relative wage rate due to changes in wM , the LHS of (2.C.42),
while holding the low-skilled wage fixed; the second curve illustrates the positive relation between the
inverse-wage-mark-up function, Φ−1, and the medium-skilled wage rate wM . This relation follows from
the positive relation between the skill downgrading rate and the medium-skilled wage rate as higher
wages induces a decline in the demand for labor and thus increase the risk of downgrading. Recalling
the medium-skilled labor demand (2.6.1) and the skill downgrading rate (2.11), then, one can compute
the limiting cases
lim
wM→∞
ldM = 0 ⇒ lim
wM→∞
dM = 1 ⇒ lim
wM→∞
Φ−1 =
1
λm
.
42Computing the effects of different values for κ, we find that a stronger linkage between low- and
medium-skilled workers (i.e., κ→ 1), reduces the magnitude of changes in the relation between low- and
medium-skilled wages.
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The intersection between the two curves in the right plane will determine the equilibrium skill
downgrading rate and the medium-skilled wage rate for changes in the low-skilled wage rate. We conclude
Lemma 2.1. Positive wages are ensured iff dM ∈ (d˜M , 1).
Proof. The proof is rather straightforward. Due to the non-negativity assumption of the wage rates, it
follows from Eq. (2.C.42) that
Φ−1 > 0
λ¯m
dM
< 1
dM > d˜M ≡ λm
1 + λm
.
This defines the lower boundary of the skill downgrading rate.
Properties of the services wage curve
Similarly, the partial behaviour of the services-wage curve can be assessed as follows. First, rewrite
(2.B.35) as
wM
wL
= Ψ1(λs, uL)
−1 ≡ 1 + 1− ξ
ξκ
− λ¯s
ξκuL
, (2.C.43)
where λ¯s =
λs
1+λs
. With the same intention describing the manufacturing wage curve, we define both
the LHS and RHS of Eq. (2.C.43) as functions of wL for given values of wM . The argumentation is
analogous to that for the manufacturing-wage curve. Thus, we can define two curves with opposite
relations to changes in wM as shown in the right plane of Figure 2.3, whereas the left plane shows the
relation between Ψ−1 and the unemployment rate uL.
Figure 2.3: Properties of the services-wage curve
wL1
1 + 1−ξξκ 1 +
1−ξ−λ¯s
ξκ
relative wage curve: wM/wL
uL
Ψ−1(wL)Ψ
−1(uL) 1
u˜L w˜L
However, the condition that must be satisfied in this case is summarized by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2. The relation wM > wL is ensured iff uL ∈ (u˜L, 1).
Proof. From Eq. (2.C.43), it follows that
Ψ−1 > 1
λ¯s
uL
< 1− ξ
uL > u˜L ≡ λ¯s
1− ξ .
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This implies that for values of the unemployment rate uL ∈ (0, u˜L] the relation between the low- and
medium-skilled wage rates is violated, i.e., wM ≤ wL. Therefore, to ensure wM > wL, the unemployment
rate must be strictly larger than the lower boundary u˜L.
Now, from these conditions, the unique intersection of the two wage-setting curves can be shown
graphically in the (wM , wL)-plane. By Lemma 2.1 and 2.2, wM > wL > 0. This indicates that in
the (wM , wL)-space the wage relation should always be above the 45 degree line. Starting with WCM ,
one sees from the RHS plane of Figure 2.2 that for large values of the low-skilled wage rate, the medium-
skilled equilibrium wage rises along the Φ−1 curve due to upward shifts of the relative wage curve. Hence,
Figure 2.4: Unique equilibrium
WCL
WCM
1 + λm1 +
1−ξ−λ¯s
ξκ
wL
wM
w∗M
w∗L
45
w˜L
w˜M
a higher wL increases the equilibrium wM and with it the skill downgrading rate, which converges to
1 + λm, the reciprocal of the limit shown in Figure 2.2.
Analogously, the derivation of WCL can be explained by recalling the RHS of Figure 2.3. Now, changes
in wM are associated with moving along the Ψ
−1 curve. However, as explained above, the necessary
condition requires that Ψ−1 > 1 for wL > w˜L. This indicates that in (wM , wL)-space the WCs must
start above the 45 degree line. As described above, a higher wM leads to a higher wL along the Ψ
−1
curve, converging to the limit 1 + 1−ξ−λ¯sξκ . Notice that in the (wM , wL)-plane, the inverse services-wage
curve is drawn. To ensure a unique equilibrium, 1 + 1−ξ−λ¯sξκ > 1 + λm must hold, which leads to the
following lemma.
Lemma 2.3. A unique intersection between the two wage curves is ensured for all
ξ < ξ˜ ≡ 1
1 + λs
1
1 + κλm
.
In Table 2.9, we summarize these conditions and assume that they hold.43
An illustration of the interdependence relation reveals that a productivity improvement in the
manufacturing sector, relative to the service sector, increases the low-skilled wage rate in the service
43In the calibration of the model we show that these conditions do hold for plausible parameter values
consistent with the empirics—see 2.B.
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Table 2.9: Equilibrium Conditions
Parameter/Variable Range Condition
dM ∈ (d˜M , 1) Lemma 2.1
wM > w˜M
uL ∈ (u˜L, 1) Lemma 2.2
wL > w˜L
ξ < ξ˜ Lemma 2.3
sector without any justification by a corresponding productivity increases in the latter. This phenomenon
is also widely recognized as the main cause of the so-called Baumol’s disease—see, for instance, Hartwig
(2011). It also corresponds to the observation that the low wage differentiation in Continental Europe
is attributed to the centralization and coordination of wage formation (Siebert, 1997).
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3Offshoring of Medium-skill Jobs, Polarization, and
Productivity Effect: Implications for Wages and Low-skill
Unemployment1
3.1 Introduction
One key feature of recent globalization trends is the growing phenomenon of international
reorganization of production and work processes, or, put differently, offshoring of jobs,
which has heightened concerns regarding job and wage cuts in many advanced countries
(cf. Bhagwati et al., 2004; Snower et al., 2009).2 While earlier studies have highlighted the
labor market impact of international fragmentation of the value added chain, captured
by the increasing penetration of intermediate goods (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999;
Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990, 2001; Kohler, 2004a,b), recent observations accentuate the
important role of job characteristics and task content of occupations (cf. Blinder, 2009a,c).
To put it in the words of Blinder (2009c, p.54), “. . . this time it’s not the British who are
coming, but the Indians. . . neither by land nor by sea, but electronically”.
More precisely, the recent development in employment and wages depicts a polarizing
1This chapter is based on joint work with Joan Muysken and Thomas Ziesemer, and is published
in IAB-Discussion Paper 7/2015 (Vallizadeh et al., 2015). We are grateful for valuable comments and
discussions to Hartmut Egger, Ingo Geishecker, Francesc Ortega and to participants at the 2nd Interna-
tional IAB/RCEA/ZEW Workshop in Nuremberg, 2014, at the 3rd Joint Workshop of Aarhus University
and IAB in Nuremberg, 2014, and at ESPE 2014 in Braga.
2Blinder (2009a) estimates that 30 million to 40 million jobs in the USA are potentially offshorable,
while job tasks that require face-to-face contact as well as abstract and cognitive skills are protected. See
also the studies by Jensen and Kletzer (2010) and Moncarz et al. (2008) regarding offshorability of service
occupations. For example, Moncarz et al. (2008) identify the offshorability of 160 service occupations,
where the range of occupations includes scientists, mathematicians, radiologists and editors at the high
end of the market as well as those of telephone operators, clerks and typists at the low end.
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trend in many advanced countries, indicating a deflection of global competition towards
the medium-skilled workforce (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).3 The rationale for this new
trend is, on the one hand, advances in information and communication technology (ICT),
as well as declines in trade transaction and transportation costs of goods and services
that have accelerated the integration process of national markets into a global market.
On the other hand, an important factor is rapid growth in major emerging countries, such
as Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC). These countries are characterized by high
accumulation of human-capital and advanced technologies as well as improvements in the
economic and business infrastructure that make them highly competitive in areas such
as information technology services in which the advanced countries have been dominant
(Bhagwati et al., 2004; Snower et al., 2009; Spence, 2011).4 Both developments have
reduced the locational viability of some occupations. That is, jobs that have a high
content of routine, non-interactive, and non-cognitive tasks are most likely at peril. The
rationale is that these routine-intensive job tasks can be easily codified, enabling firms in
many advanced countries to reorganize production and work processes by decomposing
the various stages of production geographically into clusters of tasks and locating each
task cluster in the countries where it is most profitable (Snower et al., 2009). Therefore the
comparative advantage of performing a specific type of job tasks has become important.
In the recent literature on offshoring job tasks, two main forces have received particular
attention, introduced by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) trade-in-tasks approach.5
While allocating jobs abroad (offshoring) induces a direct displacement effect of domestic
workers, leading to lower wages, offshoring activities may generate a productivity effect
similar to technology improvement by lowering a firm’s production cost. This productivity
effect, in turn, will lead to an expansion of output and thus raise employment and
wages. The balance between these two forces will determine the direction of the wage and
employment effect of offshoring (Baumgarten et al., 2013; Becker et al., 2013; Ebenstein
et al., 2014; Harrison and McMillan, 2011; Hummels et al., 2014; Olney, 2012; Ottaviano
et al., 2013; Wright, 2014).
However, there exists another important mechanism that shapes substantially the labor
market outcomes of offshoring: the spillover effects on other skill groups induced by job
tasks mobility of offshoring-induced displaced workers. This channel is omitted in the
existing theoretical literature on offshoring and task allocation. Our first contribution is,
therefore, to assess the two hypotheses regarding polarization and productivity effects in
an integrated general framework that accounts explicitly for several important features:
task-skill heterogeneity, endogenous offshoring, and spillover effects due to mobility across
job tasks. In doing so, we build on recent important contributions that incorporate the
3For recent empirical evidence regarding the polarization effect in the US labor market see Autor and
Dorn (2009, 2013); Autor et al. (2006, 2008, 2003); Firpo et al. (2011); Michaels et al. (2014); and in the
European labor markets Baumgarten et al. (2013); Dustmann et al. (2009); Goos and Manning (2007);
Goos et al. (2009, 2014); Spitz-Oener (2006).
4More specifically, Bhagwati et al. (2004) highlight that the stock of skilled workers in India and
China will reach about 300 million in a few decades. Spence (2011) provides a critical discussion on
globalization and labor market effects for the USA.
5A third channel, as put forward in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), is via the terms-of-trade
effect that may wipe out the productivity effect. However, see Bhagwati et al. (2004) for a discussion
regarding the empirical insignificance of terms-of-trade effects of offshoring.
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explicit assignment of skills to tasks.6 In particular, we provide a theoretical framework
that augments recent contributions by Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008), and Ottaviano et al. (2013) in two ways. First, we allow for endogenous
specialization of different skill groups into a continuum of tasks. The implied matching
between tasks and skills allows for task competition among different skill groups and thus
enables us to jointly investigate changes in the task composition performed by different
skills in the economy due to exogenous offshoring shocks, a feature that is absent in
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Ottaviano et al. (2013).7 Second, and contrary
to Acemoglu and Autor (2011), who consider offshoring exogenously, we analyze the
offshoring decision by domestic firms as an endogenous process, capturing changes at
both the intensive margin, i.e. the range of offshorable tasks, as well as the extensive
margin, i.e. the offshorability of a marginal domestic task.
Thus our theoretical framework accounts for all these different mechanisms, which have
been addressed separately in the previous literature. Particularly, several important
insights can be gained from our approach. First, we show that any offshoring scenario
of domestic job tasks can be described by a non-monotonic, U-shaped task productivity
schedule. This permits us to capture various phases of international competition and to
address their distributional effects for the domestic workforce. As we elaborate below, if
offshoring activities are limited to low-skilled job tasks – depicting globalization trends in
the past (cf. Snower et al., 2009) – then lower offshoring frictions generate a distributional
effect similar to skill -biased technology changes. If, on the other hand, offshoring is
limited to high-skilled job tasks, then easier offshoring induces wage impacts similar to
unskill -biased technology changes.
Second, we capture three main channels characterizing the recent phase of globalization:
i) accumulation of advanced technologies abroad, i.e. a technology effect, ii) accumulation
of human capital abroad, i.e. a endowment effect, and iii) decline in transport barriers,
i.e. a trade cost effect. Although qualitatively they generate similar effects, accounting
explicitly for them permits us to address not only changes in the nature of North–South
trade, i.e. trade in goods and services between “rich” and “poor” countries, where trade
barriers are still substantial, but also the implications of market integration, such as in
the context of the enlargement of the European Union towards Central, Eastern, and
South-Eastern European countries since 2004, where trade costs are effectively null, but
changes in comparative advantages are characterized by a rapid accumulation of advanced
technologies and human capital in these regions.
Another new insight, gained from the general equilibrium analysis, is that the cost-
efficiency effect induced by easier offshoring depends now on the magnitude of the spillover
effects. On the one hand, easier offshoring induces a reallocation of tasks performed by
medium-skilled workers to offshore workers. This external reallocation is the main source
6See Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for an elaborate discussion on the limitation of the standard nested
CES (so-called “canonical”) model compared to the “task-assignment” approach. For the alternative
task-skill-assignment approach, see also Autor and Dorn (2013); Costinot and Vogel (2010); Dupuy
(2012); Sly (2012).
7Notice the important difference to Ottaviano et al. (2013), who assess the task allocation between
immigrant, offshore and native workers, though each factor is homogeneous in terms of skills. Our
framework, instead, could be easily extended to incorporate task competition between immigrants and
natives, e.g. by a CES decomposition of factor labor per task.
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of the productivity effect due to lower offshoring cost. There is, on the other hand, a
offshoring-induced spillover effect on other domestic skill groups, which we refer to as
the domestic reallocation of workers, i.e. from medium-skilled to low- and high-skilled
job tasks. This internal reallocation countervails the cost-efficiency effect induced by the
external reallocation. Moreover, our analysis reveals that the difference between these
two forces depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution between skill groups at the
respective extensive task margins.
The importance of this internal reallocation for the labor market impact of offshoring has
been put forward in several recent empirical studies (Baumgarten et al., 2013; Ebenstein
et al., 2014; Hummels et al., 2014). In a nutshell, the empirical evidence suggests that
switching occupation is costly for offshoring-induced displaced workers. Using matched
worker-firm data from Denmark, Hummels et al. (2014) find that offshoring increases
the skill premium within firms, i.e. the relative wage of skilled workers, and that the
downward wage pressure is more pronounced in occupations that involve routine tasks.
However, by allowing for labor mobility across occupations, they find that the cohort-
average wage loss (i.e. of workers who leave the firm, and those who stay) is exacerbated
for both low- and high-skilled workers. The authors relate the latter outcome to losses
in specific human capital and search cost that considerably hinder the reattachment to
the labor market for the offshoring-induced displaced workers. Ebenstein et al. (2014)
investigate the impact of trade and offshoring on wages for the USA. The empirical
findings show that import penetration and offshoring induce a downward pressure for
workers performing routine intensive occupations, while export activities have a positive
impact. Moreover, the empirical evidence emphasizes that the negative wage effect
becomes substantial once occupation-sector mobility of workers is taken into account,
suggesting the important role of occupation-specific human capital. Using data for
Germany, Baumgarten et al. (2013) find a substantial negative cross-industry wage
pattern due to offshoring in occupations with a high routine task content relative to
interactivity and non-routine content of occupational tasks, for both low-skilled and high-
skilled workers. Our framework contributes also to the empirical literature by providing
structural guidance on the occupational mobility of displaced workers. As we discuss
below, the degree of task substitutability between different skill groups is the critical
parameter that accounts for the magnitude of internal reallocation.
Another particular debate on offshoring is the displacement effect of the least skilled
workers from the labor market. We address this concern by assuming equilibrium
unemployment of low-skilled workers in the economy. To keep the framework tractable, we
allow for two types of labor market friction. The first source is given by a minimum wage
scheme that is set above the market-clearing wage rate and thus leads to unemployment.
In a second step, we allow for endogenous supply of low-skilled labor services. While
the former – reflecting a perfectly elastic labor supply curve – corresponds to the mirror
image of the full employment case, the latter facilitates a more general notion of how the
labor market adjusts to offshoring shocks by allowing an elastic labor supply curve. In
this second step we derive clear conditions under which the offshoring-induced spillover
effects translate into higher low-skilled employment. This is the second contribution to
the literature on offshoring tasks.8
8It is worth mentioning the study by Kohler and Wrona (2011), who introduce equilibrium
unemployment following the search and matching theory and the efficiency wage theory into the
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the task
assignment model. In section 3.3, we describe the production technology and derive the
solution to the firm’s optimization problem. Section 3.4 provides the general equilibrium
solution followed by the comparative statics in section 3.5. The implications of offshoring
and spillover effects on low-skill unemployment are discussed in section 3.6. Finally,
section 3.7 offers concluding remarks.
3.2 Task assignment
In this section, we discuss the main properties of the task-based framework introduced
by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). As will be
seen below, the factor labor loses its static property and is now assigned to a continuum
of tasks based on a Ricardian type of comparative advantage.
Consider an economy where different groups of workers perform a job task. The range
of the existing tasks is defined over a unit interval. More specifically, a task i can be
performed in different modes: by domestic low- (L), medium- (M), and high-skilled (H)
labor, as well as by foreign, offshored workers (O). Formally, the production function for
a task is written as
t(i) = ALaL(i)lL(i) +AMaM(i)lM(i) +AHaH(i)lH(i) +AOaO(i)lO(i)/τ, i ∈ [0, 1], (3.1)
where A denotes the factor-augmenting technology and a(i) indicates the job-task
productivity schedule of the respective labor type. The “iceberg” type offshoring friction
is captured by the parameter τ ≥ 1. The number of low-, medium-, high-skilled and
offshore workers performing a job-task i is denoted by lk(i), k = {L,M,H,O}.
Below we derive the optimal allocation between the three domestic skill groups as well as
the offshore workers. While the single good producer solves simultaneously the optimal
assignment of tasks to different labor groups, we demonstrate this procedure sequentially
to make the optimal decision behavior better understandable.
3.2.1 Allocation of domestic tasks
We assume that, over the unit interval, tasks are ordered according to the skill requirement
in a monotonic way. For example, one can think of this order as manual (e.g. restoring
houses and servicing), routine (e.g. bookkeeping and running a machine), and cognitive
(e.g. research and management activities) tasks.
Assumption 1. (Domestic Task Productivity)
For all i ∈ [0, 1], aL(i)
aM (i)
and aM (i)
aH(i)
are strict monotonically decreasing in i, and by
transitivity property aL(i)
aH(i)
is also strict monotonically decreasing in i.
original task framework of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), characterized by a single sector and
homogeneous factor labor. However, our objective is neither to compare different paradigms of labor
market friction nor to discuss their different adjustment mechanisms. Thus we deliberately avoid any
unnecessary complexity of the model.
59
3.2.1 Allocation of domestic tasks
Since the firm allocates tasks to the group that is the most cost-efficient in performing
those tasks, this assumption allows us to determine the equilibrium allocation of tasks
among the domestic workers. Let the unit cost of producing task i domestically be
ck(i) =
wk
Akak(i)
, k = {L,M,H} where wk denotes the wage costs, and cL(0) < cM(0) <
cH(0). Denoting relative task-productivity by βL(i) =
aL(i)
aM (i)
and βH(i) =
aM (i)
aH(i)
, then, in
equilibrium, it follows
Lemma 3.1 (Domestic Task Allocation). By Assumption 1, there exist task margins
IL, IH , and I˜, respectively, where a representative domestic firm is indifferent between
• Low- and medium-skilled workers
wL
AL
(
βL(IL)
)−1
=
wM
AM
(3.2)
• Medium- and high-skilled workers
wH
AH
βH(IH) =
wM
AM
(3.3)
• Low- and high-skilled workers
wL
AL
(
βL(I˜)
)−1
= βH(I˜)
wH
AH
. (3.4)
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.1.
Thus, by Lemma 3.1, the domestic allocation of tasks to skill groups is characterized by
the two endogenous thresholds, IL and IH . Moreover, Eqs. (3.2) and (3.3) determine
the degree of substitutability between the domestic skill groups. Put differently, the
reallocation of medium-skilled workers to low- and high-skilled intensive job tasks depends
on their comparative advantages in the neighborhood of IL and IH relative to low-skilled
and high-skilled workers, which is characterized by βL(i) and βH(i). More formally,
dIL
d ln(wM/wL)
=
1
εL
(3.2′)
dIH
d ln(wH/wM)
=
1
εH
, (3.3′)
where εL = −∂ lnβL(IL)∂IL > 0 and εH = −
∂ lnβH(IH)
∂IH
> 0 denote the semi-elasticities at
the respective equilibrium extensive margins. Thus, higher values of εL and εH denote a
relative high comparative advantage of medium-skilled workers at the respective task
margin, which in turn implies a low substitutability. As pointed out by Acemoglu
and Autor (2011), this indicates an additional source of substitution effect, i.e. the
substitutability of skills across tasks.
A corollary follows from Lemma 3.1
Corollary 1. For all wL
AL
(
βL(I˜)
)−1
= wH
AH
βH(I˜) >
wM
AM
> max{wL
AL
βL(0)
−1, wH
AH
βH(1)}, it
follows that 0 < IL < I˜ < IH < 1.
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This is a necessary and sufficient condition permitting the existence of all three skill
groups in the economy. The lower boundary indicates that low-skilled workers are the
most efficient ones at the least skill-intensive task i = 0 and high-skilled workers are the
most efficient ones at the most skill-intensive task i = 1. In addition, the upper boundary
ensures that medium-skilled workers have comparative advantages in the middle range
of the task distribution. For example, if wL
AL
βL(I˜)
−1 = wH
AH
βH(I˜) ≤ wMAM , then employment
consists of only low- and high-skilled workers.9 Medium-skilled workers have then no
comparative advantage in performing any task relative to low- and high-skilled workers.
To sum up, by Lemma 3.1 and Corollary 1, the domestic labor force is allocated over
the unit interval as follows: low-skilled workers are employed in the interval i ∈ [0, IL],
medium-skilled in i ∈ (IL, IH), and high-skilled in i ∈ [IH , 1]. We depict the equilibrium
task allocation in Figure 3.1.
3.2.2 Allocation of offshored tasks
As discussed in the introduction, the empirical evidence shows that over recent decades
there has been a strong tendency to reallocate domestic tasks abroad. This process
particularly applies to jobs intensive in routine tasks and concentrated in the middle range
of the skill distribution. This in turn may explain the recent trends in wage polarization in
many advanced countries. Based on this pattern, Acemoglu and Autor (2011) investigate
the distributional effect of offshoring by allowing a sub-range of domestic tasks, which
were previously performed by medium-skilled workers, to be exogenously offshored.
However, this ad-hoc introduction of offshoring neglects to address another important
aspect discussed in the literature: the offshoring-induced productivity effect. In order
to address this effect, we need to account for changes at both extensive and intensive
margins, while Acemoglu and Autor (2011) consider the infra-marginal effect of offshorin,
jumping from zero offshoring to some positive offshoring scenarios. The motivation for
our deviation is that the impact of offshoring on the cost structure will depend on the
level of additionally-offshored tasks (extensive margin) as well as on the size of tasks that
have already been offshored (intensive margin).
We augment the general task-based framework of Acemoglu and Autor (2011) by allowing
domestic firms to choose endogenously the cost-optimal range of tasks to be offshored. As
we discuss below, this in turn requires a non-monotonic comparative advantage schedule
between domestic medium-skilled and offshore workers. More precisely, the relative task-
productivity schedule becomes a U- (or V-)shaped relationship. Moreover, as we discuss
below, any scenario of offshoring can be described by this U-shaped functional form.
Formally, we impose the following assumption
Assumption 2. (Offshoring Task Productivity)
Defining the job-task productivity between medium-skilled and offshore workers by ζ(i) =
aM (i)
aO(i)
, there exists a threshold Iˇ such that for all i ∈ [0, Iˇ), ζ(i) is (strict) monotonically
decreasing, and for all i ∈ (Iˇ , 1], ζ(i) is (strict) monotonically increasing.
9Notice that at strict equality the employer is indifferent between all three skill groups at margin I˜.
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Let the offshoring wage rate be given by wO. Then, a domestic firm engaged in offshoring
chooses the optimal amount of offshore workers, given the wage rate wO, according to
the following unit cost of producing task i abroad: cO(i) = τ
wO
AOaO(i)
. The term τwO
AO
is exogenous to the domestic firm and comprises the aforementioned three channels of
globalization process, a feature that is missing in Acemoglu and Autor (2011). For
example, a decline in wO is associated with skill accumulation abroad, indicating the
endowment effect, an increase in AO denotes advances in foreign technology, the technology
effect, and a decline in τ indicates lower transportation barriers, the trade cost effect.
Summarizing all these exogenous channels by ω ≡ AO
τwO
, lower offshoring friction is now
captured by dω > 0. Although each channel generates a similar qualitative effect,
accounting explicitly for each of them has the following advantages. First, it allows us
to address the implication of various forms of globalization, e.g. North–South vs. East–
West type of trade and offshoring activities. Second, it enables us to provide clear policy
guidance regarding how the source country of offshoring could react to the increasing
global competition on domestic jobs, e.g. if lower offshoring friction is due to dwO < 0,
then one possible response could be to increase the trading costs dτ > 0; if it is due
to dAO > 0, then the source economy could possibly invest more in R &D to increase
its technology frontier on those job tasks (i.e. dAM > 0). The optimal task allocation
between foreign and domestic medium-skilled workers is summarized as follows.
Lemma 3.2. By Assumption 2, there exist two task margins where a firm is indifferent
between the domestic medium-skilled and offshore workers, i.e.
ζ(I1)
ω
=
wM
AM
(3.5)
ζ(I2)
ω
=
wM
AM
. (3.6)
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.2.
Thus, by Lemma 3.2 the effect of offshoring is captured by the two endogenous offshoring
boundaries, I1 and I2. They capture both the extensive margin, i.e. the offshorability of
the marginal domestic task, as well as the intensive margin, i.e. the amount of tasks that
have been already offshored. However, it is useful and sufficient to consider changes to
the length of offshoring interval, i.e.
IO = I2 − I1,
which accounts implicitly for two conditions, (3.5) and (3.6). This has analytical
convenience. Let the semi-elasticities at the two offshoring margins be constant and
defined as ε1 = −∂ ln ζ1(I1)∂I1 > 0 and ε2 =
∂ ln ζ2(I2)
∂I2
> 0. Then, by a simple positive
monotone transformation, we obtain
Lemma 3.3. If Lemma 3.2 holds, then the two no-arbitrage conditions determining the
task reallocation between medium-skilled and offshore workers can be expressed as one
monotonically increasing function in the length of the offshorable task interval
wM
AM
=
βO(IO)
ω
, (3.7)
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with βO(IO) = exp[µIO] and µ =
ε2ε1
ε2+ε1
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.3.
From Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 it follows
Corollary 2. For all ω in the interval AM
wM
βO(0) < ω < {AMwM ζ(IL)),
AM
wM
ζ(IH))}, and
IL < I˘| ∂ ln ζ(·)
∂i
=0
< IH , it follows that IO > 0 and IO ∈ (IL, IH).
Thus Corollary 2 ensures that offshoring activities are permitted, but limited to a sub-
range of medium-skilled job tasks. Put differently, if ω is sufficiently low such that
ω = AM
wM
ζ(IL) (or ω =
AM
wM
ζ(IH)), then there is direct competition between foreign and
domestic low-skilled (or high-skilled) workers.10 Thus, for all four types of workers to
exist in the economy, we assume that both Corollaries 1 and 2 hold. These conditions,
as well as the equilibrium task allocations, are sketched in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Equilibrium task allocation
1
i
wM
AM
wL
AL
βL(i)
−1
wH
AH
βH(i)
IL IH
τ wOAO ζ(i)
I2I1 Iˇ
I˜
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Summarizing the results above, the task production function emerges as
t(i) =

ALaL(i)lL(i) for all i ∈ [0, IL]
AMaM(i)lM(i) for all i ∈ (IL, IH) \ IO
AOaO(i)lO(i)/τ for all i ∈ IO
AHaH(i)lH(i) for all i ∈ [IH , 1].
(3.8)
Equation (3.8), therefore, reveals the new feature of our model. First, the range of
offshorable tasks is determined endogenously. Second, the reallocation of domestic
medium-skilled tasks and the size of the expansion of offshorable tasks is crucially
determined by the relative productivity schedules in the neighborhood of I1 and I2, i.e.
by the parameters ε1 and ε2. Below, we elaborate analytically on these features.
10Notice that such an outcome – as pointed out by Blinder (2009a,c) – might not be unrealistic.
However, the polarization effect would become ambiguous due to the direct competition of offshore
workers with low-skilled (or high-skilled) workers next to medium-skilled workers.
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3.3 Production technology and labor demand
The economy produces a final (consumption) good under perfect competition. The output
is generated by using a labor composite, E, according to the following Cobb–Douglas
technology function
Y = BE1−α, α ∈ (0, 1), (3.9)
where B is a positive parameter that may contain exogenous variables such as total
factor productivity (TFP) and physical capital, and α denotes the standard share of
physical capital. Thus the production function (5.1) has diminishing returns in labor
input.11 We consider Y as the numeraire, i.e. PY = 1. The labor composite input is,
in turn, described by differentiated tasks, over a unit interval, according to the following
Cobb–Douglas technology:12
E = exp
(∫ 1
0
ln(t(i))di
)
. (3.10)
This specification allows us to deliver new insights regarding the offshoring-induced cost-
efficiency effect.
3.3.1 Optimal labor demand
The firm’s optimization problem is as follows. Taking the output price as given, the
representative firm maximizes its profit by choosing the optimal amount of the labor
composite factor. Formally, this is given by
max
E
pi = Y − PEE, s.t. (5.1).
The solution yields the optimal total employment
E = P
− 1
α
E B, (3.11)
where B = ((1 − α)B)1/α and PE denotes the price index of the labor composite, which
will be defined below. The optimal amount of labor input per job task is determined by
means of cost minimization. Formally, we write the optimal programming of the firm as
follows:
C∗E(wL, wM , wH , wO) ≡ min
lL(i),lM (i),lH(i),lO(i)
[
wL
∫ IL
0
lL(i)di+ wM
∫
i∈SM
lM (i)di (3.12)
+wO
∫
i∈IO
lO(i)di+ wH
∫ 1
IH
lH(i)di
]
s.t. (3.8), (3.10),
where the corresponding set of domestic medium-skill-intensive job tasks is denoted by
SM = (IH − IL − IO).
11Notice that when B = 1 and α = 0, equation (5.1) reduces to the one used by Acemoglu and Autor
(2011).
12Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) assume perfect complementarity, i.e. a Leontief production
function. Ottaviano et al. (2013) assume a more general functional form by using a CES production
technology.
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The corresponding minimized cost function of the labor composite is given by:
C∗E(·) = exp
[∫ IL
0
ln
(
wL
ALaL(i)
)
di+
∫
i∈SM
ln
(
wM
AMaM (i)
)
di
+
∫
i∈IO
ln
(
τwO
AOaO(i)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
wH
AHaH(i)
)
di
]
E. (3.13)
Then, by Shepard’s lemma, we obtain the optimal labor demand per task:13
∂C∗E(·)
∂wL
=
(
wL
PE
)−1
E = lL (3.14a)
∂C∗E(·)
∂wM
=
(
wM
PE
)−1
E = lM (3.14b)
∂C∗E(·)
∂wH
=
(
wH
PE
)−1
E = lH (3.14c)
∂C∗E(·)
∂wO
=
(
wO
PE
)−1
E = lO, (3.14d)
where we used the fact that in perfect competitive equilibrium price equals marginal
costs, i.e.
PE = exp
[∫ IL
0
ln
(
wL
ALaL(i)
)
di+
∫
i∈SM
ln
(
wM
AMaM (i)
)
di
+
∫
i∈IO
ln
(
τwO
AOaO(i)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
wH
AHaH(i)
)
di
]
. (3.15)
The price index contains all three exogenous variables leading to changes in the offshoring
friction: foreign technology (AO), foreign wages (wO), offshoring trade cost (τ). Recall
that ω = AO
wOτ
, then it can be shown that the partial effect of easier offshoring (dω > 0)
causes the marginal (average) cost of labor to decrease. That is,
∂PE
∂ω
< 0. (3.15′)
13In Appendix 3.A.1, we derive the minimized cost function C∗(·) and show that at the optimum the
number of workers per task is constant across the respective range of tasks. This is particularly due to
the Cobb–Douglas assumption of the production technology as well as the law of one price within each
skill group. This implies that the marginal productivity within each skill-task group is constant, i.e.
l(i) = l, m(i) = m, and so on. See Firpo et al. (2011) for a critical discussion regarding the assumption
of law of one price.
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3.3.2 Equilibrium marginal cost
The impact of lower offshoring friction refers to what is called the offshoring-induced cost-
efficiency improvement in the literature.14 However, the general equilibrium implications
(i.e. taking into account changes in the task margins) reveal a countervailing effect due to
an internal (domestic) reallocation of workers, which is generally ignored in the literature.
To account for this, Eq. (3.15) needs further manipulation. Utilize the cut-off conditions
(3.2) and (3.3) from Lemma 3.1 to substitute for wL
AL
and wH
AH
, respectively. Analogously,
utilize the no-arbitrage condition (3.7) from Lemma 3.3 to substitute for τwO
AO
. Then, PE
reduces to
PE =
wM
AM
exp
[∫ IL
0
ln
(
βL(IL)
aL(i)
)
di−
∫
i∈SM
ln(aM (i))di
+
∫
i∈IO
ln
(
1
βO(IO)aO(i)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
1
βH(IH)aH(i)
)
di
]
.
Decompose the term
∫
i∈SM ln(aM(i))di to combine it with the terms ln aL(i), ln aO(i),
and ln aH(i). Then, after some rearranging and manipulation, we obtain
PE =
wM
AM
Ω(IL, IH , IO), (3.16)
where15
Ω(·) = exp
[(∫ IL
0
ln
(
βL(IL)
βL(i)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
βH(i)
βH(IH)
)
di
+
∫
i∈IO
ln
(
ζ(i)
βO(IO)
)
di−
∫ 1
0
ln(aM(i))di
)]
(3.17)
denotes the generalized common part of the marginal task cost. Thus this common
part Ω accounts for the general equilibrium effect due to changes in the offshorability
of domestic tasks. Contrary to the original version of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008), where Ω is simply defined as a function of one offshoring margin, easier offshoring
does not necessarily induce a cost-efficiency effect. As we elaborate below, it depends
14It is worth mentioning that this effect is omitted in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) as the price index
PE is set to unity.
15More precisely, after substitution, the term within the square brackets becomes[∫ IL
0
ln
(
βL(IL)
aL(i)
)
di+
∫ IL
0
ln(aM (i))di+
∫ 1
IH
ln(aM (i))di+
∫
i∈IO
ln(aM (i))d−
∫ 1
0
ln(aM (i))di
+
∫
i∈IO
ln
(
1
βO(IO)aO(i)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
1
βH(IH)aH(i)
)
di
]
.
As is readily seen, this expression can be reduced further. For example,∫ IL
0
ln(aM (i))di−
∫ IL
0
ln(aL(i))di =
∫ IL
0
ln(βL(i))di,
and so on. Following these steps, we obtain Eq. (3.17).
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on the interaction between internal reallocation, i.e. medium-skilled workers to low- and
high-skilled job tasks, and external reallocation, i.e. moving domestic jobs abroad.
3.4 General equilibrium solution
The general equilibrium closed solution to the equilibrium task margins is characterized by
the cut-off conditions (3.2), (3.3) and (3.7) derived respectively in Lemma 3.1 and Lemma
3.3, and the optimal labor demand functions, (3.14a)–(3.14d). From these conditions, we
obtain a system of three equations determining simultaneously the implicit solution to
the task margins, as we elaborate in this section.
From the optimal task-skill allocation (3.8) we obtain the labor-market-clearing condition∫ IL
0
lL(i)di = NL,
∫
i∈SM
lM (i)di = NM ,
∫ 1
IH
lH(i)di = NH ,
∫
i∈IO
lO(i)di = nO, (3.18)
where Nk, k ∈ {L,M,H} denotes the total (exogenously given) mass of domestic labor
supply by skill and nO indicates the total (endogenous) mass of offshore employment. The
labor-market-clearing condition (3.18) can be solved for lL, lM , lH and lO. Utilizing the
resulting expressions, respectively, in the demand functions (3.14a)–(3.14d) and solving
for relative medium-skilled wages, we obtain
wL
wM
=
NM
NL
IL
IH − IL − IO (3.19a)
wM
wO
=
nO
NM
IH − IL − IO
IO
(3.19b)
wM
wH
=
NH
NM
IH − IL − IO
1− IH . (3.19c)
It is readily seen from Eqs. (3.19a), (3.19b) and (3.19c) that, ceteris paribus, the
relative (inverse) demand functions are decreasing in the labor supply and increasing
in the respective equilibrium task margins. Note, however, that Eq. (3.19b) contains
on the right-hand side an additional endogenous variable, nO, which is defined by the
FOC (3.14d). Since the offshoring wage rate, wO, is exogenously given for the domestic
firm, any changes in the interval of offshorable tasks IO will affect nO. To adjust for this
effect, substitute for nO from the optimal demand equation (3.14d) and condition (3.18)
to obtain
nO
IO
=
PEE
wO
. (3.14d′)
Furthermore, from (3.11) we get PEE = P
− 1−α
α
E B. Substituting it back into (3.14d′) yields
nO
IO
=
P
− 1−α
α
E B
wO
. (3.14d′′)
However, the price index is a function of task margins, thus endogenous too. To account
for this, utilize the cut-off conditions (3.7) from Lemma 3.3 for wM
AM
in (3.16), and rearrange
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to obtain
PE =
βO(IO)
ω
Ω(IL, IH , IO).
Substituting this for PE in (3.14d
′′), and combining the outcome with (3.19b), we obtain
the relative demand function
wM
wO
=
B(
βO(IO)
ω
Ω(IL, IH , IO)
) 1−α
α
wO
IH − IL − IO
NM
. (3.20)
Combining now the Eqs. in (3.19a) and (3.19c) , respectively, with the no-arbitrage
conditions (3.2) and (3.3) as well as (3.20) with the no-arbitrage condition (3.7), after
rearranging slightly, yields
NLAL
NMAM
=
IL
(IH − IL − IO)βL(IL) (3.21a)
B
NMAM
ω
1
α =
βO(IO)
1
αΩ(·) 1−αα
IH − IL − IO (3.21b)
NMAM
NHAH
=
IH − IL − IO
(1− IH)βH(IH) , (3.21c)
where again ω ≡ AO
τwO
captures exogenous changes in offshorability. We summarize the
equilibrium characteristics in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 (Unique Equilibrium). By Lemmata 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, together with
the Corollaries 1 and 2, the system of equations (3.21a)–(3.21c) determines the unique
equilibrium values for all endogenous task margins {IL, IH , IO} as a function of the
exogenous variables and parameters.
Proof. A rigorous formal discussion is provided in the supplementary mathematical
Appendix 3.B.4.
Notice that the left-hand side of the Eqs. in (3.21) consists only of exogenous variables
and parameters of the model. The right-hand sides denote the medium-skilled labor
demand relative to other type of workers at the equilibrium set of tasks. For example, in
Eq. (3.21a) the right-hand side can be seen as the relative demand for low-skill-intensive
tasks, in (3.21c) the relative demand for high-skill-intensive tasks is denoted, and so on.
Therefore the 3 × 3 system of equations in (3.21) determines the general equilibrium
closed solution of the endogenous task margins.
3.5 Comparative statics
Utilizing the system (3.21a)–(3.21c), we compute in this section the general equilibrium
effects of easier offshoring on the endogenous equilibrium margins. Particularly, as
mentioned earlier, easier offshoring is associated with dω > 0 induced either by i) an
endowment effect, lower foreign wage costs (dwO < 0) due to accumulation of human
capital abroad; ii) a technology effect, advances in technology (dAO > 0), e.g. owing
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to utilization of more advanced machines abroad; and/or iii) a trade cost effect, lower
offshoring cost (dτ < 0), e.g. because of abolition of transportation barriers.
Therefore, next to trade cost, we explicitly account for two additional channels of
increasing globalization of the production process. This feature is missing from both
the original framework of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and the generalized one
of Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
3.5.1 Increasing offshorability and task reallocation
Taking logs in the equations derived in (3.21) and rearranging, we obtain
− ln
(
NLAL
NMAM
)
+ ln IL − ln (IH − IL − IO)− lnβL(IL) =0 (3.22a)
− ln
( B
AMNM
)
− ln (IH − IL − IO) + 1
α
lnβO(IO) +
1− α
α
ln Ω(·) = 1
α
lnω (3.22b)
− ln
(
NMAM
NHAH
)
+ ln (IH − IL − IO)− lnβH(IH)− ln(1− IH) = 0. (3.22c)
Now we can compute the impact of easier offshoring on the task margins. We summarize
the main results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 (Easier Offshoring of Medium-Skilled Tasks & Changes in Task
Margins). Qualitatively, easier offshoring (dω > 0), due to advances in offshoring-biased
technology (dAO > 0), or lower offshoring cost (dτ < 0), or a decline in foreign wage
costs (dwO < 0), induces an expansion of the offshorable task range and a contraction of
low- and high-skill-intensive tasks ranges
dIL
dω
< 0,
dIO
dω
> 0,
dIH
dω
> 0, and
∣∣∣∣dIOdω
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣dIHdω
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣dILdω
∣∣∣∣ .
The asymmetry in the domestic reallocation of medium-skilled workers is determined by
the comparative advantage schedules∣∣∣∣d ln ILdω
∣∣∣∣ Q ∣∣∣∣d ln IHdω
∣∣∣∣ , ⇒ ∣∣∣∣1 + εH(1−H)1− IH
∣∣∣∣ Q ∣∣∣∣1 + εLILIL
∣∣∣∣ .
Proof. A full analytical proof is provided in Appendix 3.D.1.
The intuition can be explained in the following way. Easier offshoring increases the cost
advantage for domestic firms to reallocate domestic job tasks abroad. This effect displaces
the marginal medium-skilled workers performing job tasks in the neighborhood of IO. The
Walrasian nature of the labor market implies a downward wage adjustment of medium
skilled workers. This in turn indicates that the no-arbitrage conditions in Lemma 3.1 are
off equilibrium, which are reassured by a reallocation of displaced medium-skilled workers
to low-skill- (i.e. lower IL) and high-skill- (i.e. higher IH) intensive job tasks.
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Thus, Proposition 3.2 highlights what Costinot and Vogel (2010) call a task upgrading
at the high-skill-extensive margin, i.e. more medium-skilled workers produce former
high-skilled tasks, and a task downgrading at the low-skill-extensive margin, i.e. more
medium-skilled workers produce former low-skilled tasks.16 Again, the magnitude of the
skill down- and upgrading is determined by substitutability of medium-skilled workers
at the equilibrium task margins IL and IH . Thus a relative low substitutability at
the high-skill-intensive job tasks (higher values of εH) implies that medium-skilled
workers are disproportionately allocated into low-skill-intensive job tasks. The empirical
literature has highlighted a gradual increase in skill downgrading in many advanced
countries. Particularly, medium-skilled workers are more likely to be downgraded into
jobs (occupations) that require lower educational attainment (Brynin and Longhi, 2009).
In the following section we deviate from the perfect competitive labor market assumption
and investigate the potential crowding-out effect of low-skilled workers induced by
offshoring.
3.5.2 Offshoring and distributional effects
As discussed in the introduction, in many advanced countries the recent evidence
highlights a polarizing wage trend, i.e. a relative decline of medium-skilled wages
compared to low- and high-skilled wages. This is in sharp contrast to wage developments
in the past, where the burden of globalization regarding wage and employment cuts was
mainly borne by low-skilled workers. Particularly, the evolution of earnings inequality
followed a monotonic increase between the skill groups (for a neat survey of the literature,
see Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). In this section, we address the distributional effect
by conducting sequentially the comparative statics for different scenarios of global
competition and show that offshoring generates income effects similar to factor-biased
technology (cf. Acemoglu, 2002b).17 We summarize the main results in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.3 (Offshoring and Income Distribution). If offshoring activities are
limited to low-skilled-intensive job tasks (indicating globalization trends in the past), then
lower offshoring friction induces a distributional impact similar to skill-biased technology
change, i.e.
d
(
wL/wM
)
dω
< 0 and
d
(
wM/wH
)
dω
< 0. If offshoring is permitted to medium-
skilled job tasks (indicating recent globalization trends), then easier offshoring leads to a
wage polarization effect, i.e.
d
(
wL/wM
)
dω
> 0 and
d
(
wM/wH
)
dω
< 0. If offshoring activities are
limited to high-skill-intensive job tasks (indicating potential future globalization trends),
then a marginal decline in offshoring friction lowers the wage gap between skill groups
similar to unskilled-biased technology changes, i.e
d
(
wL/wM
)
dω
> 0 and
d
(
wM/wH
)
dω
> 0.
16Notice, however, that (easier) offshoring in our framework differs from Costinot and Vogel (2010,
section VI.B.). Their results affirm a pervasive rise in wages of more skilled workers, i.e. an increase
in inequality, induced by an implicit increase in the size of the relatively skill scarce foreign economy.
In contrast, we follow up on the recent empirical findings on the offshoring-induced polarization effect,
i.e. a decline in wages of medium-skilled workers relative to low- and high-skilled, and highlight different
channels that may lead to easier offshoring.
17Notice that these different scenarios of globalization are motivated by wage trends at different time
periods, discussed in the literature, and thus are used synonymously.
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Below we provide a graphical assessment of the distributional impact of each of the
offshoring scenarios.
Polarization Effect
Given the results of the comparative statics for changes in the equilibrium task margins,
we proceed now with the assessment of the distributional effect of offshoring of medium-
skilled job tasks. In doing so, we need to recall the no-arbitrage conditions: Eq. (3.2):
wL
wM
= AL
AM
βL(IL) , and Eq. (3.3):
wM
wH
= AM
AH
βH(IH); together with the labor demand
functions for medium-skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers Eq. (3.19a): DLM ≡
wL
wM
= NM
NL
IL
I˙−IL , and relative to high-skilled workers, Eq. (3.19c): DMH ≡
wM
wH
= NH
NM
IH−Iˆ
1−IH ,
where I˙ ≡ IH − IO and Iˆ ≡ IL + IO. Thus, for given IH and IO, DLM is increasing in
IL, while higher (lower) values of IO (IL) induce a leftward shift of DLM . The relative
labor demand curve between medium- and high-skilled workers DMH is increasing in IH
for given values IL and IO, while higher values of both IO and IH lead to a rightward
shift of DMH .
Figure 3.2: Offshoring medium-skilled job tasks and wage polarization
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AM
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wL
wM
, wM
wH
IL IH
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Eq. (3)
Iˆ I˙
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Iˆ ′ I˙ ′
a
b b′a′
DLM
Moreover, it is readily seen that, for all exogenous shocks, but labor-biased technology
(Aj), changes in the relative medium-skilled wage compared to low- and high-skilled wages
is a movement along the task productivity schedule, βL(·) and βH(·). To fix ideas, we
illustrate the four conditions in Figure 3.2. Notice that the marginal decline in offshoring
friction is captured by a decline in I˙ and an increase in Iˆ, implying a shift in the relative
labor demand curves. From Proposition 3.2, the task margin IL will decline, while IH
increases. This will lead to a slight backward shift in the relative labor demand curves.
Eventually, the economy will reach the points a′ and b′, denoting the new equilibrium task
margins. Notice that the internal reallocation of workers mitigates the wage polarization
effect. The magnitude of this countervailing effect will have important implications for
changes in the level of wages, which we elaborate next.
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Skill-Biased Effect
We now turn to the case where offshoring is permitted to low-skill-intensive job tasks.
A formal discussion of this scenario is provided in Appendix 3.C. Notice again that any
changes in relative wages between the skill groups due to exogenous changes in offshoring
friction is a movement along the relative task productivity schedules, βL(IL) and βH(IH).
The only difference compared to the previous case is that the relative labor demand
conditions have changed. Now a (sub)range of low-skill-intensive job tasks is offshored,
denoted by the equilibrium task margin I˜O. Thus any changes in offshoring friction
will directly shift the relative demand curve between low- and medium-skilled workers
(denoted by D˜LM) to the right. This induces changes in the task margin IL, which in turn
lead to a right-ward shift in the relative labor demand between medium- and high-skilled
workers (denoted by D˜MH). As a consequence, the task margin IH increases. We derive
the relevant conditions in Appendix 3.C and Figure 3.3 provides a graphical illustration
of them.
Figure 3.3: Offshoring low-skilled job tasks and skill-biased wage effect
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The intuitive mechanism behind the distributional effect of offshorability of low-skilled
job tasks can be explained in the following way. Compared to medium-skilled workers,
a decline in the offshoring friction (dω > 0) increases the comparative advantages of
offshore workers relative to low-skilled workers. Thus more low-skilled job tasks will be
reallocated abroad that were previously performed by low-skilled workers. This implies
higher values of the task margin I˜O. Due to the Walrasian nature of the labor markets, the
currently offshoring-induced unemployed low-skilled workers must be reemployed, leading
to higher competition for available jobs and consequently to a decline of the low-skilled
wage rate. This, in turn, raises the comparative advantages of low-skilled workers relative
to medium-skilled workers.
Consequently, a proportion of medium-skill-intensive job tasks will be now allocated to
low-skilled workers that were previously performed by medium-skilled workers (i.e. an
increase in IL). This effect is captured by a downward shift of the relative demand curve
between low- and medium-skilled workers (D˜LM). Following similar logic, the relative
demand curve between medium- and high-skilled workers will shift to the right. These
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adjustments are depicted in Figure 3.3, where the economy converges eventually to the
new equilibrium points a′ and b′. As is readily seen, the skill premium, i.e. the relative
wage between low- and medium-skilled as well as between medium- and high-skilled
workers, increases monotonically. This outcome confirms the wage trends in the past
due to international competition that were mainly borne by domestic unskilled workers
and is in sharp contrast to recent polarizing wage trends in many advanced countries.
Thus recent trends highlight the significant shift in the international competition for the
domestic workforce.
Unskilled-biased Effect
As discussed in the introduction, many occupations that require a high level of skill for
cognitive and complex tasks (think of computer programming, statistical analysis) may
be at peril in future due to potential international competition (Bhagwati et al., 2004;
Blinder, 2009b). We provide a intuitive discussion of the distributional impact of this
possible future scenario and illustrate graphically the adjustment mechanism.
In this scenario offshoring occurs at the higher end of skill-task distribution, such that
a proportion of domestic high-skill-intensive job tasks is only allocated abroad, denoted
by IˆO. As in the previous case, the two no-arbitrage conditions (3.2) and (3.3) derived
in Lemma 3.1 still hold. Thus the adjustment due to marginal changes in the offshoring
friction occurs along the relative labor demand functions, which is depicted now by DˆLM
and DˆMH . Intuitively, the mechanism works similarly to the previous cases. A lower
offshoring friction leads to an expansion of offshore job tasks. The now displaced high-
skilled workers are induced to compete for a lower range of job tasks available in the labor
market, leading to a decline in their wages.
Figure 3.4: Offshoring high-skilled job-tasks and unskill-biased wage effects
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From the no-arbitrage condition (3.3) it follows that IH declines. This is illustrated in
Figure 3.4 by a leftward shift in the relative labor demand curve between high- and
medium-skilled workers DˆMH . Consequently the competition between medium-skilled
workers increases, which pushes their wages down. From no-arbitrage condition (3.2)
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it can be verified that IL declines. This is depicted by a leftward shift of the relative
demand curve DˆMH in Figure 3.4. The labor market converges eventually to the new
equilibrium points a′ and b′, which indicates an increase of relative wages of workers with
an inferior skill level. In the next section, we turn back to the polarization case and
derive the condition under which the real wage of all domestic workers increases due to
the cost-efficiency effect.
3.5.3 Offshoring-induced cost-efficiency effect
As argued earlier, offshoring may generate a cost-efficiency effect similar to advances of
technology. The rationale for this is that domestic firms engaged in offshoring benefit
from easier offshoring at the extensive margin: more tasks can be moved abroad, as well
as at the intensive margin: tasks that have already been offshored now become cheaper
to import – a feature that is omitted in Acemoglu and Autor (2011). Therefore domestic
firms experience a reduction in their average production cost, which in turn may lead to
beneficial outcomes for the domestic workers.
As will become evident below, the offshoring-induced cost effects depend now on the
interaction between the external reallocation and the internal, domestic reallocation of
tasks. These two forces will affect the cost of composite labor PE, which in turn might
benefit all workers, even those who have been displaced directly. This new channel is in
contrast to the task-based approaches discussed by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008),
where every type of domestic worker is performing a distinct range of tasks and offshoring
is characterized by one extensive margin, splitting task produced at home and abroad
along this range. It also differs from the approach by Acemoglu and Autor (2011), where
the cost index of composite labor (PE) is held constant.
To derive the effects of easier offshoring on the domestic real wage, we combine the
domestic labor demand functions, (3.14a), (3.14b) and (3.14c), with the labor-market-
clearing condition (3.18) to obtain the inverse labor demand functions
wL =
IL
NL
PEE (3.23)
wM =
IH − IL − IO
NM
PEE (3.24)
wH =
1− IH
NH
PEE. (3.25)
Interestingly, the inverse labor demand conditions, (3.23), (3.24) and (3.25), imply that
the cost share of each skill group is now denoted by the endogenous equilibrium range
of tasks performed by the respective skill group. Moreover, the endogenous cost shares
indicate the additional source of substitutability between skill groups across the tasks.
Thus this new property can be seen as a generalization of the standard Cobb–Douglas
function.18
18However, notice the difference compared to Acemoglu and Autor (2011), where the task margins
denote the expenditure share of each type of tasks in terms of the value of total output.
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Next, utilizing the optimal demand condition for E, Eq. (3.11), yields
wL =
IL
NL
P
− 1−α
α
E B
wM =
IH − IL − IO
NM
P
− 1−α
α
E B
wH =
1− IH
NH
P
− 1−α
α
E B.
Recall now the definition of PE from Eq. (3.16) and, together with the no-arbitrage
conditions (3.2) and (3.3) defined in Lemma 3.1, we obtain, after some rearranging
wL =
(
IL
NL
)α
(βL(IL)
−1Ω(·))−(1−α)A1−αL Bα (3.26)
wM =
(
IH−IL−IO
NM
)α
(Ω(·))−(1−α) A1−αM Bα (3.27)
wH =
(
1−IH
NH
)α
(βH(IH)Ω(·))−(1−α)A1−αH Bα. (3.28)
These equations denote the generalized optimal demand for the domestic workforce that
accounts for all endogenous equilibrium task margins. It is immediately evident that,
given the properties of the task productivity schedules, βL(·) and βH(·), a decline in Ω(·)
will induce a positive demand effect for labor in the economy, thus increasing the wage
level of all skills. We denote this effect as the cost-efficiency effect. Computing changes
in Ω(·), we obtain (see Appendix 3.A.2 for the formal derivation)
d ln Ω(·)
dω
=
(
(1− IH)εH dIH
dω
− εLILdIL
dω
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
R>0
−
(
IOµ
dIO
dω
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E>0
. (3.29)
Changes due to internal reallocation, i.e. relocating medium-skilled workers towards low-
and high-skill-intensive jobs is denoted byR and changes due to the external reallocation,
i.e. moving domestic medium-skill-intensive tasks abroad, is denoted by E . Notice that
by the results of the comparative statics in Proposition 3.2, both the internal R and the
external E allocation effects are positive.
Therefore, for the marginal production cost of composite labor (Ω) to decrease in the
course of easier offshoring, the necessary condition requires E > R. As shown in Appendix
3.A.2, for the following sufficient low substitutability between medium-skilled and offshore
workers, the external reallocation effect will be dominating, i.e.
µ >
1− (IH − IL)
IO(IH − IL − IO) . (3.30)
However, this condition is not sufficient to ensure an increase in the real wage. The
sufficient condition can be derived by straightforwardly differentiating the demand
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functions, (3.26), (3.27) and (3.28), which yields
d lnwL
dω
=
(
α
IL
− (1− α)εL
)
dIL
dω
− (1− α)d ln Ω
dω
(3.31a)
d lnwM
dω
= − αdIL
IH − IL − IO −
αdIO
IH − IL − IO +
αdIH
IH − IL − IO − (1− α)
d ln Ω
dω
(3.31b)
d lnwH
dω
=
(
(1− α)εH − α
1− IH
)
dIH
dω
− (1− α)d ln Ω
dω
. (3.31c)
Now using Eq.(3.29) to substitute for d ln Ω
dω
in (3.31b) and rearranging the terms, we
obtain
d lnwL
dω
=
(
α
IL
− (1− α)εL
)
dIL
dω
− (1− α)d ln Ω
dω
(3.31a′)
d lnwM
dω
=
(
(1− α)ILεL − α
IH − IL − IO
)
dIL
dω
+
(
(1− α)IOµ− α
IH − IL − IO
)
dIO
dω
+
(
α
IH − IL − IO − (1− α)(1− IH)εH
)
dIH
dω
(3.31b′)
d lnwH
dω
=
(
(1− α)εH − α
1− IH
)
dIH
dω
− (1− α)d ln Ω
dω
(3.31c′)
Notice that defining the sign of Eq. (3.31b′) determines also the relationship between
internal (i.e. E) and external (i.e. R) task reallocation. The converse is obviously not
true. Therefore, in (3.31a′) and (3.31c′) we need to elaborate the sign of the first term
on the right hand side. We summarize the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4 (Offshoring-induced Cost-efficiency Effect). Given the impact of easier
offshoring of medium-skilled tasks on the task reallocation derived in Proposition 3.2, an
offshoring-induced cost-efficiency improvement raises the real wage of all domestic worker
for the following jointly sufficient conditions:
1. α
1−α
1
IL(IH−IL−IO) > εL >
α
(1−α)IL
2. α
1−α
1
(1−IH)(IH−IL−IO) > εH >
α
1−α
1
(1−IH)
3. µ > α
1−α
1
IO(IH−IL−IO) .
Proof. The lower boundary in part 3, as well as the upper limits in parts 1 and 2, follow
straightforwardly from (3.31b′). The lower limits in parts 1 and 2 are, respectively,
derived from (3.31a′) and (3.31c′).
The intuition behind the jointly sufficient conditions in Proposition 3.4 is the following.
Higher values of εL (εH) imply a higher comparative advantage of low-skilled (high-skilled)
workers in the neighborhood of IL (IH) relative to medium-skilled workers. Now recall
Eq. (3.2′) and Eq. (3.3′) to see the implications. It is readily evident that the size of the
parameters εL and εH importantly determines the magnitude of the change of the task
margins IL and IH for a one percentage change in relative wages, respectively. This effect
is, as put forward in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), the additional source of substitutability
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between skill groups across tasks, next to the elasticity of substitution of unity arising
from the Cobb–Douglas functional form.
The important implication of this additional substitution effect of skills across tasks can
be inferred from the following special case. Take the limit εL → 0 (indicating perfect
substitutability between low- and medium-skilled workers at IL), then from Eq. (3.31a
′)
it can be easily inferred that the first term reduces to α
IL
dIL
dω
, which by Proposition 3.2
is unambiguously negative. This is the offshoring-induced labor supply effect as the
displaced workers have to be reabsorbed by the labor market. Hence, Proposition 3.4
highlights that the cost-efficiency effect due to easier offshoring will raise the real wage
of all skill groups as the overall labor demand increases more than offshoring-induced
increase in labor supply if the comparative advantages of low-skilled and high-skilled
workers are sufficiently preserved.
3.6 Equilibrium unemployment
So far we have assumed full employment and analyzed the pure distributional effect of
offshoring. However, another concern raised in the public debate on offshoring is the
displacement effect of workers, leading to unemployment. In this section, we generalize
the framework by allowing for equilibrium unemployment. In doing so, we assume that
only low-skilled workers face the risk of unemployment. Intuitively and in line with
our discussion in the introduction, easier offshoring may indirectly displace low-skilled
workers from the labor market due to increasing competition with the offshoring-induced
unemployed medium-skilled workers. In the literature, this potential displacement effect
is referred to as the crowding-out effect; see Muysken et al. (2015) for a discussion.
We assume two alternative types of labor market friction, without altering the structure
of the model. An intuitive source of friction is a minimum wage regime, which is set above
the market equilibrium wage rate. Consequently, a proportion of low-skilled workers ends
up unemployed. Alternatively, frictions can arise when we allow for endogenous supply
of low-skill labor services. In this case the low-skilled wage is set as a mark-up over the
unemployment benefits, where the mark-up depends negatively on unemployment rate.
While the former is the mirror image of the full-employment case, characterized by a
perfect elastic labor supply curve, the latter allows for an elastic labor supply curve and
thus includes the standard approach of labor supply.
3.6.1 Minimum wage regime
Let the institutional minimum wage be W¯ . We assume that the minimum wage is set
sufficiently low such that it is still attractive for domestic firms to employ low-skilled
workers, but is sufficiently high such that a proportion of low-skilled workers ends up
unemployed. Let uL denote the low-skilled unemployment rate. Formally, we impose the
following assumption on the minimum wage scheme.
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Assumption 3. (Minimum wage setting)
wL < W¯ <
wMAL
AM
βL(0),
where wL and wM are the equilibrium values resulting from the model analyzed in the
previous section.
Given the level of minimum wage, the representative firm will then reallocate the job
tasks between low- and medium-skilled workers such that the no-arbitrage condition
(3.2) holds again, though at a lower equilibrium threshold. Moreover, from the general
equilibrium perspective, our analysis implies that all other task margins will readjust
too. The intuition is the following. A higher minimum wage scheme increases the relative
comparative advantage of medium-skilled workers compared to low-skilled workers. Thus,
from condition (3.2), the task margin IL must decline. This in turn implies that the range
of tasks allocated to medium-skilled workers will increase, and from relative medium-
skill labor demand conditions (3.19a)–(3.19c), medium skill wages will increase too.
Consequently, the range of tasks performed by high-skilled (1− IH) and offshore workers
IO must increase to satisfy again the no-arbitrage conditions (3.3) and (3.7).
In addition, compared to the full-employment case, now only a fraction of low-skilled
workers can be hired, i.e. nL = (1 − uL)NL, and the resource constraint becomes
l = nL
IL
. This implies that the adjustment channel in the low-skill labor market is
through employment instead of wages. Thus the relative demand condition for low-
skilled workers defined in (3.19a) has to account for the endogenous adjustment in low-
skilled employment. In order to investigate the impact of offshoring on the low-skilled
unemployment rate, it is necessary to examine first the impact of offshoring on task
allocation under the minimum wage scheme. We proceed with the derivation of the new
equilibrium conditions, while, for the sake of illustration, we use the same expression for
the equilibrium task margins as in the frictionless labor market scenario.
Recall the first-order condition (3.14a), where now the marginal productivity of low-skilled
workers equals the minimum wage scheme, and utilize the low-skilled labor constraint to
obtain
nL
IL
=
P
− 1−α
α
E B
W¯
, (3.32)
which is equivalent to the full-employment case, except that now the level of employment,
nL, is endogenous while the level of wage is fixed. Next, notice that the no-arbitrage
condition (3.2) is defined now as
W¯
wM
=
AL
AM
βL(IL). (3.33)
Using this observation together with Eq. (3.16), we obtain
PE =
W¯
AL
βL(IL)
−1Ω(·). (3.34)
Substituting Eq. (3.34) for PE in Eq. (3.32), we obtain the generalized low-skilled labor
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demand equation under a minimum wage scheme
nL
IL
=
(
W¯
AL
βL(IL)
−1Ω(·)
)− 1−α
α B
W¯
. (3.35)
Utilizing this expression in the relative demand equation (3.19a), together with the new
no-arbitrage condition (3.33), we obtain the modified implicit condition that accounts for
the minimum wage scheme and the endogenous low-skilled employment
B
AMNM
(
AL
W¯
)1/α
=
βL(IL)
−1/αΩ(·) 1−αα
IH − IL − IO . (3.36)
This is equivalent to Eq. (3.21a) in the frictionless labor market scenario. Utilizing Eq.
(3.36) together with Eqs. (3.21b) and (3.21c), we obtain the modified implicit 3 × 3
system of equations for the endogenous task margins.
Taking logs and rearranging slightly yields
− 1
α
ln (βL(IL)) +
1− α
α
ln (Ω(IH , IL, IO))− ln (IH − IL − IO)− ln
( B
AMNM
)
− 1
α
ln
(
AL
W¯
)
= 0
1
α
ln (βO(IO)) +
1− α
α
ln (Ω(IH , IL, IO))− ln (IH − IL − IO)− ln
( B
AMNM
)
− 1
α
ln (ω) = 0 (3.37)
ln (IH − IL − IO)− ln (1− IH)− ln (βH(IH))− ln
(
AMNM
AHNH
)
= 0.
By straightforward differentiation of the system (3.37), one can compute the impact of an
increase in the minimum wage scheme as well as easier offshoring on the equilibrium task
margins. We summarize the main results in the following proposition and refer readers
to the Appendix 3.D.2 and 3.D.3 for a formal proof.
Proposition 3.5 (Minimum Wage, Offshoring Medium-skilled Tasks, and Task Margins).
If offshoring medium-skilled tasks is permitted and the low-skill labor market is
characterized by a minimum wage scheme, then a rise in the minimum wage scheme
will lead to a contraction of low-skill-intensive jobs tasks, i.e. dIL
dW¯
< 0, and an expansion
of high-skill-intensive and offshorable job tasks, i.e. dIH
dW¯
< 0 and dIO
dW¯
> 0, respectively.
Easier offshoring generates similar skill-task reallocation as in Proposition 3.2.
Given these results, we can now assess the impact of easier offshoring in the low-skilled
unemployment rate. In doing so, recall the low-skilled labor demand condition (3.35).
Rearranging and taking logs, we obtain
lnnL = ln(IL) +
1− α
α
ln(βL(IL))− 1− α
α
ln(Ω(·))− 1
α
ln W¯ +
1− α
α
lnAL + lnB.
Now total differentiating w.r.t. offshoring friction (dω > 0) yields
d lnnL
dω
=
(
1
IL
− (1− α)
α
εL
)
dIL
dω
− (1− α)
α
d ln Ω
dω
.
The following proposition summarizes the main results regarding the impact of offshoring
on low-skilled unemployment rate.
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3.6.2 Endogenous labor supply
Proposition 3.6 (Minimum Wage, Offshoring Medium-Skilled Tasks, and Low-Skilled
Unemployment). If a fraction of low-skilled workers is unemployed due to a minimum
wage scheme, then easier offshoring of medium-skilled tasks will lead to a decline in the
low-skilled unemployment rate if and only if Proposition 3.4 holds.
The intuition is similar to the one discussed in Proposition 3.4. The difference is that
now, with a minimum wage scheme, the low-skill labor market adjustment occurs via
employment.
3.6.2 Endogenous labor supply
A more general approach to addressing labor market frictions is to allow workers to
supply endogenously labor services, implying an elastic labor supply curve. This feature
has important implications for labor market outcomes. In doing so, we follow the
standard approach in the literature and assume that the low-skilled wage is a mark-
up on unemployment benefits that depends negatively on the unemployment rate. This
mark-up can be explained in many ways, such as the standard individual leisure–work
choice, wage bargaining (Layard et al., 2005), search and matching theory a` la Pissarides
(2000) and efficiency wages a` la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Imposing such a negative
relationship between the mark-up and unemployment induces an elastic labor supply
curve. This way, we provide a more general analysis of labor market effects of offshoring
compared to the minimum wage case.19
Let the endogenous low-skilled wage curve be defined by
wL = f(uL)bL, (3.38)
where f(uL) denotes the mark-up over unemployment benefits, bL, and has the following
properties: f(uL) > 1 and
∂f(uL)
∂uL
< 0. Moreover, we define the elasticity of the wage
curve in absolute value w.r.t. uL as δ˜ ≡ −d ln f(uL)d lnuL > 0.
In this case, both the low-skilled wage and employment will adjust to exogenous shocks.
Thus, compared to full employment and minimum wage cases, the low-skilled labor
demand functions (3.26) and (3.35) become
wL =
(
IL
(1− uL)NL
)α(
βL(IL)
Ω(·)
)1−α
(ALB)α , (3.39)
where we utilized nL = (1− uL)NL. This implies that the relative demand between low-
and medium-skilled workers in Eq. (3.21a) has to account for the endogenous changes in
low-skilled employment. Formally, we write this condition by
NLAL
NMAM
=
1
1− uL
IL
(IH − IL − IO)βL(IL) . (3.40)
19It is worth mentioning the important implications of applying different equilibrium unemployment
paradigms regarding the adjustment mechanism of the labor market to exogenous shocks. However, our
objective is not to explain the efficiency of various adjustment mechanisms, and thus we deliberately
leave this to future research. For an application of search-matching and efficiency wage theories to the
original task-based approach of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), see Kohler and Wrona (2011).
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The model is closed by the adjusted market-clearing condition in the low-skilled labor
market, i.e. from Eqs. (3.39) and (3.38)
f(uL)bL =
(
IL
(1− uL)NL
)α(
βL(IL)
Ω(·)
)1−α
A1−αL Bα. (3.41)
Thus the new system of equations consists of Eqs. (3.21b), (3.21c), (3.40) and (3.41).
Taking logs and rearranging slightly, we obtain
ln
(
ALNL
AMNM
)
= − ln(1− uL) + ln IL − ln(IH − IL − IO)− lnβL(IL)
ln
( B
AMNM
)
+
1
α
lnω =
1
α
lnβO(IO) +
1− α
α
ln Ω(·)− ln(IH − IL − IO)
(3.42)
ln
(
AMNM
AHNH
)
= − ln(1− IH) + ln(IH − IL − IO)− lnβH(IH)
α ln
( B
NL
)
− ln bL + (1− α) lnAL = α ln(1− uL) + ln f(uL) + (1− α) (ln Ω(·)− lnβL(IL))
−α ln IL.
This is the generalized 4× 4 implicit system of equations that accounts for endogenous
supply of labor services. Notice also that the left-hand side consists of all exogenous
variables, while the right-hand side accounts for the four endogenous variables IL, IO, IH
and uL.
Now the marginal impact of offshoring on task margins and the low-skilled unemployment
rate can be computed by straightforward differentiation of (3.42) w.r.t. ω and the
endogenous variables. We summarize the main results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.7 (Offshoring Medium-skilled Tasks, Labor Supply, and Low-skilled
Unemployment). If the low-skilled labor market is characterized by an endogenous wage
curve, where a fraction uL of low-skilled workers are unemployed, then offshoring of
medium-skill job tasks unambiguously reduces the low-skilled unemployment rate for
sufficiently low substitutability between medium- and high-skilled workers at task margin
IH and between medium- and low-skilled workers at task margin IL, i.e.
εH >
α
(1− α)IH(1− IH) , εL >
1
(1− α)IL(IH − IL) .
Moreover, by the sufficient conditions in Proposition 3.4, real wages of all skill groups
rise.
Proof. See Appendix 3.D.4.
Thus Proposition 3.7 highlights again the importance of comparative advantages in
performing job tasks, which determine the magnitude of spillover effects induced by
offshoring. Recall the interpretation of the parameters εL and εH , capturing the
substitutability of skill groups at the respective equilibrium task margin. The spillover
of medium-skilled workers induced by offshoring is dominated by an overall rise in total
employment if both high-skilled and low-skilled workers have sufficiently high comparative
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advantages in performing tasks in the neighborhood of IH and IL, respectively. Moreover,
notice that the lower boundaries in Proposition 3.7 dominate those in Proposition 3.4,
but they are not binding since all derived boundaries are not necessary conditions.20 The
intuition behind the real wage effect is equivalent to the one provided in Proposition 3.4.
In addition, it is important to notice the difference from the minimum wage case, where
now higher comparative advantages of low- and high-skilled workers are required due
to endogenous labor supply. Intuitively, the low-skilled labor market will adjust to the
spillover effect as follows. The bumping down of medium-skilled workers (lower IL)
will displace some of low-skilled workers, who were previously performing those tasks in
the neighborhood of IL. The increase in the unemployment rate will in turn lead to a
downward wage adjustment due to a lower mark-up (captured by a flatter wage curve),
mitigating the relative rise in comparative advantage of medium-skilled workers.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have analyzed the general equilibrium effects of easier offshoring on task
allocation within the domestic economy as well as in the foreign economy. We augment the
current literature analyzing the implications of increasing international competition vis-
a`-vis the domestic labor force with respect to the following features. First, by introducing
endogenous offshoring, we have augmented the framework of Acemoglu and Autor (2011),
where offshoring is exogenously given. Second, we allow for a heterogeneous labor market,
characterized by low-, medium- and high-skilled workers, where the allocation of each skill
group to job tasks is based on a Ricardian type of comparative advantages along a unit
interval. In doing so, we augment the seminal task-based approach of Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008), where each group of labor is producing a distinct, completely
independent range of tasks. In this way, we are able to address two contradictory
hypotheses regarding the distributional impact of offshoring for domestic workers: a
wage polarization effect and a cost-efficiency effect. Finally, we allow for equilibrium
unemployment of low-skilled workers. In doing so, we are able to capture important
externalities in the labor market, such as the bumping down of medium-skilled workers
inducing a crowding-out effect of low-skilled workers.
The general equilibrium analysis provides several new insights, on which the existing
theoretical literature has been silent. First, we show that any scenario of offshoring
domestic job tasks can be described by a U-shaped relative productivity schedule between
domestic and offshore workers. This allows us to address different stages of globalization,
where the burden in terms of wage and employment cuts was borne by different skill
groups, e.g. the trends in the past affected mainly low-skilled workers, while recent
trends show increasing competition for medium-skilled workers, and potential future
developments towards high-skilled workers. Moreover, our analysis reveals that offshoring
of low-skill-intensive job tasks generates distributional effects similar to skill -biased
technology changes – consistent with observations in the past, see Acemoglu (2002b),
20As discussed in the supplementary mathematical Appendix 3.D.4, it can be verified that for
sufficiently low substitutability between medium-skilled and offshore workers (i.e. high values of µ),
the low-skilled unemployment rate might still decline, even if Proposition 3.7 is violated.
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offshoring medium-skill-intensive domestic job tasks induces a wage polarization effect
(reflecting recent trends), while offshoring of high-skill-intensive domestic job tasks
generates an income distribution effect similar to unskilled -biased technology changes
(Goldin and Katz, 2009).
Second, we derive clear conditions that characterize the offshoring-induced cost-efficiency
effect. We show that the cost-efficiency effect induced by offshoring domestic job
tasks, what we refer to as the external reallocation, is countervailed by an internal
reallocation of tasks to domestic workers. More precisely, the internal reallocation refers
to reallocation of offshoring-induced displaced medium-skilled workers to low-skill- and
high-skill-intensive job tasks. The balance between the two forces depends importantly
on the substitutability between medium- and low-skilled workers and between high- and
medium-skilled workers at the respective equilibrium task margins. More precisely, for
sufficient low substitutability, the internal reallocation effect is dominated by the external
one. In this case, all domestic skill groups benefit in terms of higher real wages. The
importance of this internal reallocation has been put forward in the recent empirical
literature (cf. Baumgarten et al., 2013; Hummels et al., 2014).
Finally, we elaborate the implications of the bumping-down effect of medium-skilled
workers induced by easier offshoring for the low-skilled unemployment rate. Our analysis
reveals that if the substitutability between medium- and low-skilled workers at the
equilibrium task margin is sufficiently low (i.e. low-skilled workers have sufficiently higher
comparative advantages in performing the domestic job tasks), then the crowding-out
effect is offset by the offshoring-induced cost-efficiency effect, boosting the low-skilled
labor market.
83
Appendix
Appendix
3.A Derivation of equilibrium conditions
3.A.1 Firm optimization problem
Optimal labor demand
Utilizing (3.8) in (3.10), then the Lagrangian to the cost-minimizing problem (3.12) is read as follows:
L =
[
wL
∫ IL
0
lL(i)di+ wM
∫
i∈SM
lM (i)di+ wO
∫
i∈IO
lO(i)di+ wH
∫ 1
IH
lH(i)di
]
+λ
[
E − exp
[∫ IL
0
ln(ALaL(i)lL(i))di+
∫
i∈SM
ln(AMaM (i)lM (i))di
+
∫
i∈IO
ln(AOaO(i)lO(i)/τ)di+
∫ 1
IH
ln(AHaH(i)lH(i))di
]]
,
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. The first-order conditions w.r.t. lk(i), k = {L,M,H,O}, and E
are, respectively, given:
∂L
∂lL(i)
= wL − λ E
lL(i)
= 0, ⇒ lL(i) = lL(i′) = lL, ∀ i ∈ [0, IL] (3.A.43)
∂L
∂lM (i)
= wM − λ E
lM (i)
= 0, ⇒ lM (i) = lM (i′) = lM , ∀ i ∈ SM (3.A.44)
∂L
∂lH(i)
= wH − λ E
lH(i)
= 0, ⇒ lH(i) = lH(i′) = lH , ∀ i ∈ [IH , 1] (3.A.45)
∂L
∂lO(i)
= wO − λ E
lO(i)
= 0, ⇒ lO(i) = lO(i′) = lO, ∀ i ∈ IO. (3.A.46)
The first-order conditions (3.A.43)–(3.A.46) indicate that the marginal productivity of workers across
the respective range of tasks is equal and thus the required number of workers per task does not vary
across the respective range of tasks. Utilizing these conditions in the constraint (3.10) and rearranging,
we obtain
λ = exp
[∫ IL
0
ln
(
wL
ALaL(i)
)
di+
∫
i∈SM
ln
(
wM
AMaM (i)
)
di (3.A.47)
+
∫
i∈IO
ln
(
τwO
AOaO(i)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
wH
AHaH(i)
)
di
]
.
By the envelope theorem, the marginal (average) cost of the labor composite is denoted by the shadow
price, i.e. ∂L∂E = λ. Thus, under perfect competition, the marginal cost equals the cost index of composite
labor mentioned in the text, i.e. PE = λ.
3.A.2 Cost-efficiency effect
Recall Eq. (3.17) and take logs to obtain
ln Ω(·) =
[(∫ IL
0
ln
(
βL(i)
βL(IL)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
βH(i)
βH(IH)
)
di+
∫
i∈IO
ln
(
ζ(i)
βO(IO)
)
di−
∫ 1
0
ln(aM (i))di
)]
.
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Next, recall the definition of the semi-elasticities of the comparative advantage schedules
εL = −∂ lnβL(IL)
∂IL
> 0, εH = −∂ lnβH(IH)
∂IH
> 0,
∂ lnβO(IO)
∂IO
= µ > 0.
Total differentiation w.r.t. the endogenous margins yields
d ln Ω(·) = lnβL(IL)dIL + IL β
′
L(IL)
βL(IL)
dIL − lnβL(IL)dIL − lnβH(IH)dIH − (1− IH)β
′
H(IH)
βH(IH)
dIH
+ lnβH(IH)dIH +
(
ln ζ(I2)dI2 − ln ζ(I1)dI1 − lnβO(IO)dIO
)
− IO β
′
O(IO)
βO(IO)
dIO.
Then, taking into account that the term within the brackets is, by the positive monotone transformation,
discussed in Appendix 3.B.3, null, utilizing the definitions of semi-elasticity, and manipulating further,
the total differentiation reduces to
d ln Ω(·) = −ILεLdIL + (1− IH)εHdIH − IOµdIO. (3.A.48)
Moreover, using the comparative static results derived in Appendix 3.D.1, we can compute the overall sign
of d ln Ω(·). Utilizing Eqs. (3.D.83) and (3.D.85), the internal reallocation effect, R = (1− IH)εH dIHdω −
ILεL
dIL
dω , can be written as
R =
[
(1− IH)2εH(1 + εLIL) + I2LεL(1 + (1− IH)εH)
]
αωIL(1− IH)(IH − IL − IO)∆
=
(1− IH)2εH + I2LεL + (1− IH)ILεHεL(1− (IH − IL))
αωIL(1− IH)(IH − IL − IO)∆ . (3.A.49)
Next, utilizing Eq. (3.D.83), the external reallocation effect, E = IOµdIOdω , can be written as
E =
IOµ
[
1− IO + εH(1− IH)[IH − IO + εLIL(IH − IL − IO)] + εLIL(1− IL − IO)
]
αωIL(1− IH)(IH − IL − IO)∆
. (3.A.50)
Now from Eqs. (3.A.49) and (3.A.50), we can derive the sufficient condition that determines the sign of
d ln Ω(·)
dω = R− E ≶ 0.
(1− IH)2εH + I2LεL + (1− IH)ILεHεL(1− (IH − IL))
≶
IOµ
[
1− IO + εH(1− IH)(IH − IO) + εH(1− IH)εLIL(IH − IL − IO) + εLIL(1− IL − IO)
]
.
It can be verified that for a sufficiently low substitutability (i.e. high values of µ) between medium-skilled
and offshore workers the marginal cost of composite labor unambiguously declines, i.e. d ln Ω(·)dω < 0.
Formally, the sufficient condition follows from the magnitude between the third term on the right hand
side and the third term on the left hand side, which yields
µ >
1− (IH − IL)
IO(IH − IL − IO) . (3.A.51)
Notice that if the sufficient condition (3.A.51) holds, the first two terms on the left hand side will also
be dominated by the other terms on the right hand side.
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3.B Proofs
3.B.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. We proceed as follows. A task is allocated to a low-skilled worker rather than to a medium-skilled
worker as long as
cL(i) ≤ cM (i)
⇔ wL
ALaL(i)
≤ wM
AMaM (i)
⇔ wL
AL
aM (i)
aL(i)
≤ wM
AM
,
which, by Assumption 1, leads to Eq. (3.2) in Lemma 3.1 with βL(IL) =
aM (IL)
aL(IL)
. Similarly, tasks are
allocated to medium-skilled workers as long as they are more productive relative to high-skilled workers.
That is,
cM (i) ≤ cH(i)
⇔ wM
AMaM (i)
≤ wH
AHaH(i)
⇔ wM
AM
≤ aM (i)
aH(i)
wH
AH
,
which, by Assumption 1, leads to Eq. (3.3) in Lemma 3.1 with βH(IH) =
aM (IH)
aH(IH)
. Finally, with a similar
argument firms allocate tasks between low and high skills according to
cL(i) ≤ cH(i)
⇔ wL
ALaL(i)
≤ wH
AHaH(i)
⇔ wL
AL
aM (i)
aL(i)
≤ aM (i)
aH(i)
wH
AH
,
where, in the third inequality, we multiplied both sides by aM (i). By Assumption 1, we obtain Eq. (3.4)
in Lemma 3.1 with βL(I˜) =
aM (I˜)
aL(I˜)
and βH(I˜) =
aM (I˜)
aH(I˜)
.
3.B.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Similar to the discussion in Lemma 3.1, the allocation decision in Lemma 3.2 is based on cost efficiency.
However, notice that by Assumption 2 there is a non-linear relationship between the unit costs of medium-
skilled and offshore workers. Formally, the allocation problem can be written as
cM (i) Q cO(i)
⇔ wM
AMaM (i)
Q τwO
AOaO(i)
⇔ wM
AM
Q ζ(i)
ω
,
where ∂ζ(i)∂i < 0, ∀ i < Iˇ
∣∣
∂ζ(i)
∂i =0
and ∂ζ(i)∂i > 0, ∀ i > Iˇ
∣∣
∂ζ(i)
∂i =0
. Thus, by the jointly necessary conditions
in Corollary 2 there must exist two cut-off points at which cM (·)− cO(·) = 0. These are defined by (3.5)
86
3 Offshoring of Medium-skill Jobs, Polarization, and Productivity Effect
and (3.6), where
wM
AM
<
ζ(i)
ω
, ∀ i < I1 and i > I2
wM
AM
>
ζ(i)
ω
, ∀ i ∈ (I1, I2).
The boundaries on ω in Corollary 2 defined as follows. The lower boundary follows from
cO(Iˇ) < cM (Iˇ)
⇔ AM
wM
ζ(Iˇ) < ω,
with Iˇ denoting the minimum point of ζ(i), i.e. ∂ζ(i)∂i = 0. In a similar vein, one can derive the
upper boundaries, respectively, at the low- and high-skill-extensive margins, i.e. cO(IL) > cM (IL) and
cO(IH) > cM (IH). Note again that the lower boundaries ensure that offshored job-tasks are a subset of
the overall medium skill-intensive range of tasks, i.e. (I1, I2) ∈ (IL, IH).
3.B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3
To keep the analytical analysis tractable, it is useful to look at changes in the offshoring interval, which
reflect implicitly changes in the extensive offshoring margins, I1 and I2. In fact, all we need to show
is how an endogenous change in the length of offshoring interval affects the domestic job-task margins,
IL and IH . Thus we need to find a condition that satisfies the no-arbitrage condition between medium-
skilled and offshore workers for the length of the offshoring interval (IO), accounting implicitly for the
two endogenous offshoring cut-off points I1 and I2.
First, define w˜M ≡ wMωAM after recalling the two no-arbitrage conditions (3.5) and (3.6)
w˜M = ζ(I1),
w˜M = ζ(I2),
and the definition of the length of offshoring interval
IO = I2 − I1.
Next, recall the semi-elasticities at the two extensive offshoring margins, i.e. ε1 = −∂ ln ζ(I1)∂I1 > 0 and
ε2 =
∂ ln ζ(I2)
∂I2
> 0. Taking the total differentiation, we obtain
d ln w˜M = −ε1dI1,
d ln w˜M = ε2dI2,
dIO = dI2 − dI1.
Utilizing the first two equations in the last one yields
dIO = d ln w˜M
(
1
ε2
+
1
ε1
)
.
It is convenient to define µ = ε2ε1ε2+ε1 > 0, which is increasing in both arguments. Then, after further
manipulation, we obtain
d ln w˜M = µdIO.
This is a simple first-order linear homogeneous ordinary differential equation. Thus, by integration∫
d ln w˜Mdi =
∫
µdIOdi,
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we obtain a unique solution
wM
AM
=
βO(IO)
ω
,
where βO(IO) = exp[µIO].
3.B.4 Proof of Proposition 3.1: Uniqueness of task margins
To verify the uniqueness of the equilibrium task margins, we discuss the equilibrium properties of the
domestic task margins from system (3.21). The proof of the claim regarding uniqueness of offshoring
margins needs further elaboration. We commence with the equilibrium characteristics of the margins IL
and IH .
Uniqueness of domestic task margins
From (3.21a), we can rearrange so that
IH = (I2 − I1) + (1 +ALβL(IL)) IL ≡ IO + FL(IL). (3.21a′)
Analogously, (3.21c) can be rearranged so that
IL = −(I2 − I1) + IH −AHβH(IH)(1− IH) ≡ −IO + FH(IH), (3.21c′)
where AL ≡ AMNMALNL and AH ≡ AMNMAHNH summarize the exogenous labor-augmenting technology and labor
endowment variables. Therefore Eqs. (3.21a′) and (3.21c′) highlight the general equilibrium relation
between IL and IH for any given value of IO ∈ (IL, IH). Hence any changes in the offshoring extensive
margins will shift (3.21a′) and (3.21c′), while changes in IL and IH , captured by Fk(·), k = {L,H},
affect the slope. To verify the single-crossing between Eqs. (3.21a′) and (3.21c′), we need to examine
the properties of the slope of the two curves.
Consider first the properties of Eq. (3.21a′). It can be shown that IH is monotonically increasing in IL.
Recalling the property β′L(IL) > 0, then the first derivative implies
∂FL
∂IL
= 1 +AL[βL(IL) + β′L(IL)IL] > 0,
indicating that the slope of (3.21a′) is larger than unity.
Moreover, it indicates that the increase at the low-skill-intensive task margin is accompanied by a
reduction of high-skill-intensive tasks, i.e. lower (1−IH). Intuitively, this implies that the tasks previously
performed by medium-skilled workers at IL are now produced by low-skilled workers. This induces an
excess of the medium-skilled labor supply due to the Walrasian nature of the labor markets. Thus
medium-skilled wages will decline, so that they become more competitive at the high-skill-extensive task
margin IH . This is then accompanied by increase in IH .
The monotonic relation between IL and IH depends on the properties of the second derivative, which in
turn depends on the functional properties of the productivity schedule βL(·). To examine these properties,
we proceed as follows. Let βL(i) be a homogeneous function of degree 1 ≥ λL > 0, indicating a concave
function. Then, it is generally valid |β′L(i)| > |β
′′
L(i)|. If, on the other hand, βL(i) is homogeneous of
degree λL > 1 (indicating a convex function), then 0 < β
′
L(i) < β
′′
L(i). Thus, for any functional property
of βL(·), the second derivative yields ∂2FL∂I2L = AL(2β
′
L(IL) + β
′′
L(IL)IL) > 0. This indicates that FL
is monotonically increasing in IL. Furthermore, computing the limits of FL over the range defined by
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Corollaries 1 and 2, yields
lim
IL→0
FL = 0 ⇒ lim
IL→0
IH = I2 − I1 = IO
(3.B.52)
lim
IL→I1
FL = I1 +ALβL(I1)I1 ⇒ lim
IL→I1
IH = I2 +ALβL(I1)I1.
Next consider Eq. (3.21c′). Similarly, it can be verified that IL is monotonically increasing in IH , again
for any (fixed) values of IO ∈ (IL, IH). Recall the property β′H(IH) < 0, then formally
∂FH
∂IH
= 1 +AH[βH(IH)− β′H(IH)(1− IH)] > 0,
implying a slope of (3.21c′) larger than unity. In a similar vein, if βH(i) is homogeneous of degree −1 <
λH < 0 (i.e. a concave functional form), then β
′′
H(i) < β
′
H(i) < 0. If βH(i) is a homogeneous function of
degree λH < −1 (indicating a convex functional form), then β′H(i) < 0 < β
′′
H(i). Thus, computing the
second derivative yields ∂
2FH
∂I2H
= AH(2β′H(IH) − β
′′
H(IH)(1 − IH)) < 0. Similarly, computing the limits
of FH over the range defined by Corollaries 1 and 2, we get
lim
IH→I2
FH = I2 −AHβH(I2)(1− I2) ⇒ lim
IH→I2
IL = −(AHβH(I2)(1− I2)− I1)
(3.B.53)
lim
IH→1
FH = 1 ⇒ lim
IH→1
IL = 1− (I2 − I1).
Utilizing the properties of FL and FH derived in (5.30) and (5.31), we can depict Eqs. (3.21a′) and
(3.21c′) in the (IL, IH)-space. The graphical illustration in Figure 3.5 reveals the single crossing between
the two curves for all values within the bounded intervals.
Obviously, if the offshoring range becomes very large such that IO /∈ (IL, IH), then the intersection of the
two curves, given by Eqs. (3.21a′) and (3.21c′), will be off the unit interval. More precisely, an increase
Figure 3.5: Unique equilibrium of low- and high-skilled task margins
IH
IL
1
10
I2 − I1
1− (I2 − I1)
IH
IL Iˇ
Iˇ
Eq. (21a’) Eq. (21c’)
I2I1
I1
I2
I2 +ALβL(I1)I1
−(AHβH(I2)(1− I2)− I1)
in IO = (I2− I1) induces a parallel left-ward shift in the two curves implying unambiguously an increase
in IH and a decline in IL.
21 The fact that there is a parallel shift can be seen by computing the limits of
21Since the two curves have different slopes in absolute values, any parallel shift induces an
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(3.21a′) and (3.21c′) over the unit interval. Formally this is given by limIL→1 IH = 1+(I2−I1)+ALβL(1)
and limIH→0 IH = −((I2−I1)+AHβH(0). Thus it is readily evident that changes in the set of offshorable
tasks lead to a shift in both curves, whereas changes in factor-biased technology or endowments captured
by the terms AL and AH will also affect the slope of both curves. We summarize by the following Lemma
the first sufficient condition.
Lemma 3.4. For any given values of IO ∈ (IL, IH), Eqs. (3.21a′) and (3.21c′) determine the unique
values of IL and IH in the (IL, IH)-space.
Unique solution of offshoring task margins
In order to assess the uniqueness of the offshoring task margins, we need to account explicitly for them.
In doing so, recall the offshoring no-arbitrage conditions (3.5) and (3.6). Combining these conditions
with the equilibrium relative demand conditions, we obtain
B
NMAM
ω
1
α =
ζ1(I1)
1
αΩ(·) 1−αα
IH − IL − (I2 − I1) (3.B.54)
B
NMAM
ω
1
α =
ζ2(I2)
1
αΩ(·) 1−αα
IH − IL − (I2 − I1) . (3.B.55)
The equilibrium properties of the offshoring margins can be assessed as follows. For all IL ∈ (0, I2) and
IH ∈ (I2, 1), Eqs. (3.B.54) and (3.B.55) determine the equilibrium values of I1 and I2. However, notice
that, due to the non-linearity, we derive the implicit solution by means of the Implicit Function Theorem
(IFT).
Consider first Eq. (3.B.54). Rearranging slightly yields
AO(IH − IL − (I2 − I1)) = ζ(I1) 1α (Ω(·))
1−α
α , (3.B.54′)
with AO ≡ BNMAM ω
1
α .
Take logs in (3.B.54′) and define
G(I1, I2) ≡ lnAO + ln(IH − IL − (I2 − I1))− 1
α
ln ζ(I1)− 1− α
α
ln Ω(I1, I2, ·) = 0. (3.B.54′′)
Then, taking for the moment IL and IH as given, by IFT we obtain
dI2
dI1
= −GI1(I1, I2)GI2(I1, I2)
, (3.B.56)
where GI1(I1, I2) and GI2(I1, I2) denote the partial derivatives w.r.t. the extensive margins and are
defined by
∂G(I1, I2)
∂I1
=
1
IH − IL − (I2 − I1) −
1
α
ζI1(I1)
ζ(I1)
− 1− α
α
ΩI1(·)
Ω(·)
∂G(I1, I2)
∂I2
= − 1
IH − IL − (I2 − I1) −
1− α
α
ΩI2(·)
Ω(·) ,
unambiguous change in both margins.
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where22
ΩI1(·)
Ω(·) = −(Iˇ − I1)
ζI1(I1)
ζ(I1)
,
ΩI2(·)
Ω(·) = −(I2 − Iˇ)
ζI2(I2)
ζ(I2)
,
with ζj(j) denoting the partial derivative w.r.t. to j = {I1, I2}. Note also that the IFT requires
GI2(I1, I2) 6= 0. Recalling the definition of the elasticities of the task productivities at the extensive
offshore margins ε˜ζ1 = − ζI1 (I1)ζ(I1) I1 > 0 and εζ2 =
ζI2 (I2)
ζ(I2)
I2 > 0, then utilizing the solutions of the partial
derivatives in (3.B.56), we get
dI2
dI1
= −
 I1IH−IL−(I2−I1) + (1− (1− α)(Iˇ − I1)) ε˜ζ1α
− I2IH−IL−(I2−I1) + (1− α)(I2 − Iˇ)
εζ2
α
I2
I1
 .
Rearranging slightly yields
Iˆ2
Iˆ1
=
(
αI1 +
(
1− (1− α)(Iˇ − I1)
)
(IH − IL − (I2 − I1))ε˜ζ1
αI2 − (1− α)(I2 − Iˇ)(IH − IL − (I2 − I1))εζ2
)
≡ q(I1, I2, ·), (3.B.56′)
where xˆ ≡ dxx denotes the rate of change. Thus, the right hand side of (3.B.56′), q(I1, I2), denotes the
elasticity.
We now turn to the implicit behavior of Eq. (3.B.55). Rearrange this equation to obtain
AO(IH − IL − (I2 − I1)) = ζ(I2) 1α (Ω(·))
1−α
α . (3.B.55′)
Now, following the same steps considered for the derivation of (3.B.56′), we get a second implicit relation
between I2 and I1. Formally, it is given by
dI2
dI1
= −
 − I1(IH−IL−(I2−I1)) + (1− α)(Iˇ − I1) ε˜ζ1α
I2
(IH−IL−(I2−I1)) +
(
1− (1− α)(I2 − Iˇ)
) εζ2
α
I2
I1
 . (3.B.57)
Rearranging slightly, yields
Iˆ2
Iˆ1
=
(
αI1 − (1− α)(Iˇ − I1)(IH − IL − (I2 − I1))ε˜ζ1
αI2 +
(
1− (1− α)(I2 − Iˇ)
)
(IH − IL − (I2 − I1))εζ2
)
≡ z(I1, I2, ·), (3.B.57′)
where the right-hand side, z(I1, I2), denotes the elasticity between I2 and I1.
In order to assess the behavior of the two implicit relations derived in (3.B.56′) and (3.B.57′), we need
to elaborate on the sign of the elasticities. It is evident that the sign of the two elasticities q(·) and z(·)
depends, respectively, on the sign of the denominator and the numerator. That is, from (3.B.56′)
q(·) =
{
> 0 if α1−α
I2
(I2−Iˇ)(IH−IL−(I2−I1)) > εζ2
< 0 if α1−α
I2
(I2−Iˇ)(IH−IL−(I2−I1)) < εζ2 .
(3.B.58)
Similarly, from (3.B.57′)
z(·) =
{
> 0 if α1−α
I1
(Iˇ−I1)(IH−IL−(I2−I1)) > ε˜ζ1
< 0 if α1−α
I1
(Iˇ−I1)(IH−IL−(I2−I1)) < ε˜ζ1 .
(3.B.59)
Thus the magnitude (in absolute values) of the elasticities of the task productivity schedules at the
22The derivative of Ω(·) w.r.t. any task margin can be computed considering the following general
case: if f(x, ·) = exp[g(x) + . . . ], then ∂f(x)/∂x = g′(x)f(x). Here, g(I1) =
∫ Iˇ
I1
ln
(
ζ(i)
ζ(I1)
)
di and
g′(I1) = − ln ζ(I1)− (Iˇ − I1) ζI1 (I1)ζ(I1) + ln ζ(I1) = −(Iˇ − I1)
ζI1 (I1)
ζ(I1)
.
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respective extensive margins determines the implicit relation between I2 and I1. Put differently, it
is obvious that, if q(·) and z(·) have opposite signs, there must be a single crossing in the (I1, I2)-
space, for all IL ∈ (0, I1), IH ∈ (I2, 1). Thus, when both have equal signs it is important to verify
that one of the elasticities is larger (in absolute values). In doing so, define α1 ≡ αI1, α2 ≡ αI2,
αˇ ≡ (1− α)(IH − IL − (I2 − I1)), SM ≡ (IH − IL − (I2 − I1)), then it can be shown that
|q(·)| > |z(·)|∣∣∣∣∣
(
α1 +
(SM − (Iˇ − I1)αˇ)) ε˜ζ1
α2 − (I2 − Iˇ)αˇεζ2
)∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣
(
α1 − (Iˇ − I1)αˇε˜ζ1
α2 +
(SM − αˇ(I2 − Iˇ)) εζ2
)∣∣∣∣∣
[α2 +
(SM − αˇ(I2 − Iˇ)) εζ2 ][α1 + (SM − (Iˇ − I1)αˇ)) ε˜ζ1 ] > (α1 − (Iˇ − I1)αˇε˜ζ1)(α2 − (I2 − Iˇ)αˇεζ2)
SM(α1εζ2 + α2ε˜ζ1) > 0.
The next lemma summarizes the second sufficient condition.23
Lemma 3.5. For any values of IL ∈ (0, I1) and IH ∈ (I2, 1), the sufficient conditions by the Existence
and Uniqueness Theorem (EUT) state that for all values in the intervals I1 ∈ (IL, Iˇ) and I2 ∈ (Iˇ , IH)
(i) a solution exists if q(·) and z(·) are continuous, and (ii) the solution is unique if both ∂q(·)∂I2 and
∂z(·)
∂I2
are also continuous. Then, there exist unique values of I1 and I2 in the (I1, I2)-space.
Thus Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5 establish the sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium values
of the four endogenous margins.
3.C Extension: Alternative offshoring scenarios of
domestic job tasks
3.C.1 Offshoring low-skill-intensive domestic job tasks
This section provides an analytical discussion of different stages of globalization trends. Particularly,
we discuss the distributional effect when offshoring is limited to other skill segments of domestic tasks,
while keeping the structure of the model unchanged. We commence with the special case as in Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), where offshoring activities are limited to low-skill-intensive job tasks. We
refer to this case as globalization trends in the past, where the burden was mainly borne by low-skilled
workers in many advanced countries. We then assess the distributional effects of easier offshoring.
First, notice that domestic skill-task allocations defined by Lemma 3.1 still hold. Then, similar to the
case of offshoring medium-skilled tasks, we impose that the task assignment between low-skilled and
offshore workers will lead to offshoring of a fraction of all low-skilled job tasks in the interval (0, IL).
This implies that domestic firms find it cheaper to install low-skilled workers at the lower and upper
ends of all low-skill-intensive job tasks, while offshoring is cheaper somewhere in the middle. Formally,
the assignment problem is defined by
cO(i) Q cL(i)
or equivalently
τwO
AO
1
aO(i)
Q wL
AL
1
aL(i)
, ∀ i ∈ IL \ I˜O. (3.C.60)
Multiplying both sides of (3.C.60) by aM (i) yields the familiar structure of task productivity schedules,
i.e. βL(i) =
aL(i)
aM (i)
and ζ˜(i) = aM (i)aO(i) , with the functional properties defined by Assumptions 1 and 2 in
the main text. Notice the difference between the task productivity schedule ζ˜(i) (imposed here) and ζ(i)
(used previously). While both have the U-shaped functional form, ζ˜(i) indicates a different location over
23For a general discussion of the Existence and Uniqueness Theorem see Gandolfo (2010, Ch. 23.1.1).
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the unit interval. To fix ideas, consider, for example, the following simple quadratic function
ζ(i) = exp[gM (i− gO)2],
where gM and gO are parameters and measure the task productivity of medium-skilled and offshore
workers respectively. In this example, it can be easily verified that changes in the task productivity of
offshore workers (gO) will induce a horizontal shift of ζ(i), changes in gM affect the slope, while lower
offshoring friction (i.e. higher values of ω ≡ AOτwO ) leads to a vertical shift of ζ(i)/ω. Notice however that
if the comparative advantage of offshore workers is sufficiently low (i.e. gO = 0), there are no domestic
low-skilled workers employed near the origin, and if they have sufficiently high task productivity (i.e.
gO = IL), there are no low-skilled workers employed between the offshoring interval and the task margin
IL. Thus, as derived below, necessary conditions similar to those derived in Corollary 2 are required for
which ζ˜(i) ∈ (0, IL).
The necessary conditions for offshoring activities to be permitted to a sub-range of low-skilled job tasks
are
AL
wL
βL(I˙)ζ˜(I˙) < ω <
AL
wL
βL(IL)ζ˜(IL), and 0 < I˜| ∂ ln ζ˜(·)
∂i =0
< IL, (3.C.61)
implying that the offshoring friction is not too large (i.e. low values of ω = AOτwO ), defined at the tangent
point I˙ between the productivity schedules
∣∣∣∂βL(I˙)
∂I˙
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∂ζ˜(I˙)
∂I˙
∣∣∣, such that offshoring is permitted, nor too
small, avoiding that low-skilled workers lose their comparative advantage in competing with medium-
skilled workers, defined by the equilibrium task margin IL.
24
Then, given Assumptions 1 and 2, and conditions in (3.C.61), it follows from (3.C.60) that there must
exist two cut-off margins, similar to Lemma 3.2, defining the range of offshored low-skilled job tasks, i.e.
I˜O = I˜2 − I˜1.
However, as discussed in the main text, by means of simple positive monotone transformation (see Lemma
3.3), we obtain
β˜O(I˜O)
ω
=
wL
AL
, (3.C.62)
where β˜O(IO) is the positive monotone transformation of comparative advantage schedules ζ˜(·)βL(·) at
the new task margins, I˜1 and I˜2, in terms of the offshoring range I˜O.
Figure 3.6: Offshorability of low-skill-intensive job-tasks and skill-task allocation
1
i
wM
AM
wL
AL
βL(i)
−1
wH
AH
βH(i)
IL IH
τ wOAO ζ˜(i)
I˜O
I˜
0
24It is important to notice that at the tangent point I˙, the domestic firm is indifferent between low-
skilled and offshore workers. Thus, for a positive range of offshoring low-skilled job tasks, I˙O > 0, the
offshoring friction must be sufficiently low.
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Thus the allocation of tasks is as follows: low-skilled workers perform all tasks i ∈ IL \ I˜O and offshore
workers perform all tasks i ∈ I˜O. The task allocations between low- and medium-skilled workers and
between high- and medium-skilled workers still hold as defined in Lemma 3.1, where medium-skilled
workers perform all tasks i ∈ (IL, IH), while high-skilled workers perform all tasks i ∈ [IH , 1]. Figure 3.6
provides a graphical illustration.
3.C.2 General equilibrium solution
Equipped with these conditions, we derive the general equilibrium closed solution as follows. From the
cost-minimized first-order conditions, we obtain three equations denoting the relative medium-skilled
labor demand
wL
wM
=
NM
NL
IL − I˜O
IH − IL (3.C.63)
wO
wM
=
NM
nO
I˜O
IH − IL (3.C.64)
wM
wH
=
NM
NH
IH − IL
1− IH . (3.C.65)
Recall the no-arbitrage conditions (3.2) and (3.3)
wL
wM
=
AL
AM
βL(IL)
(3.C.66)
wM
wH
=
AM
AH
βH(IH).
To examine changes in the relative demand between medium-skilled and offshore workers, the no-
arbitrage condition (3.C.62) has to be adjusted for medium-skill unit costs. Thus, dividing both sides of
Eq. (3.C.62) by wM and using the no-arbitrage condition at IL, Eq. (3.2), we obtain
wO
wM
=
AO
τ
βL(IL)
AM
1
β˜O(I˜O)
. (3.C.67)
Moreover, notice the additional endogenous variable in Eq. (3.C.64): nO, i.e. the employment level of
offshore workers. To account for the endogenous adjustment of offshore employment level, combine the
first-order condition for offshore labor per task with the resource constraint for offshore workers to obtain
nO
I˜O
=
PEE
wO
=
P
− 1−αα
E B
wO
=
B
wO
(
βL(IL)
−1 τwO
AO
β˜O(I˜O)Ω˜(·)
)− 1−αα
, (3.C.68)
where the second equality accounts for the adjustment in total employment E = P
−1/α
E B. In the third
equality we utilized the modified no-arbitrage condition (3.C.67) together with the general equilibrium
solution of the price index PE =
wM
AM
Ω˜(·), where
Ω˜(·) = exp
[∫
i∈I˜O
ln
(
βL(i)ζ˜(i)
β˜O(I˜O)
)
di+
∫ IL
0
ln
(
βL(IL)
βL(i)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
βH(i)
βH(IH)
)
di−
∫ 1
0
ln aM (i)di
]
.
Moreover, the convenient structure of the generalized common part of the marginal cost of factor labor
Ω˜(·) is preserved. To see this, define the semi-elasticities at the offshoring margin µ˜ ≡ ∂ ln β˜O(I˜O)
∂I˜O
> 0.
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Taking the total differentiation w.r.t. the endogenous task margins yields
d ln Ω˜(·) =
(
ln ζ˜(I˜O) + βL(I˜O)− ln β˜O(I˜O)
)
dI˜O − I˜Oµ˜dI˜O
+
(
lnβL(IL)− lnβL(IL)
)
dIL − ILεLdIL
+
(
lnβH(IH)− lnβH(IH)
)
dIH + (1− IH)εHdIH .
By the positive monotone transformation the bracket in the first line is zero. The brackets in the second
and third lines are also zero, yielding
d ln Ω˜(·) = (1− IH)εHdIH − ILεLdIL − I˜Oµ˜dI˜O. (3.C.69)
Thus, similar to the discussion in the main text, the impact on the generalized marginal cost of labor
can be decomposed into three terms. As shown in Eq. (3.C.69), the direct source of the productivity
effect due to offshoring is captured by I˜Oµ˜dI˜O. The first two terms, (1− IH)εHdIH and ILεLdIL, allow
for endogenous reallocation of domestic workers. This is what we refer to as the internal reallocation
effect. Again, notice the contrast to the original task-based approach by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008), where only the former channel is captured. Thus Eq. (3.C.69) can be seen as the generalization
of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) regarding skill heterogeneity.
Next, utilize the previously derived Eqs. (3.C.81), (3.C.67) and (3.C.68) in the relative demand
equations (3.C.63)–(3.C.65). Then, after manipulating, rearranging and taking logs, we obtain the
general equilibrium closed solution for the three endogenous task margins I˜O, IL and IH :
ln
(
ALNL
AMNM
)
= − lnβL(IL) + ln
(
IL − I˜O
)
− ln (IH − IL)
ln
( B
AMNM
)
+
1
α
lnω = − 1
α
(
lnβL(IL)− lnβL(I˜O) (3.C.70)
− ln β˜O(I˜O)
)
− ln (IH − IL) + 1− α
α
ln Ω˜(·)
AMNM
AHNH
= − lnβH(IH) + ln (IH − IL)− ln (1− IH) .
This 3×3 system of equations (3.C.70) can be utilized to compute the implicit solutions for the endogenous
task margins due to any exogenous changes that are captured on the right hand sides.
3.C.3 Comparative statics: Easier offshoring and skill-task
reallocation
Taking the total differentiation of the system (3.C.70) yields

(
εL +
1
IL−I˜O +
1
IH−IL
)
− 1
IL−I˜O −
1
IH−IL(
[1− (1− α)IL] εLα + 1IH−IL
)
[1− (1− α)I˜O] µ˜α
(
1−α
α (1− IH)εH − 1IH−IL
)
1
IH−IL 0
(
εH +
1
IH−IL +
1
1−IH
)

 dILdI˜O
dIH
 =
 01
αω
0
dω.
(3.C.71)
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Computing the determinant of the 3× 3 matrix yields
∆ =
1
α(1− IH)(IL − I˜O)(IH − IL)3[(
1− IL + (1− IH)(IH − IL)εH
)
×(
µ˜(IH − IL)
(
(IL − I˜O)(IH − IL)εL + (IH − I˜O)
)(
1− (1− α)I˜O
)
+(IL − I˜O)
(
(IH − IL)εL (1− (1− α)IL)
))
+
(
1 + (1− IH)εH
)
(IL − I˜O)(IH − IL)α
+(1− IH)(IL − I˜O)
(
(1− α)(IH − IL)
(
(1− IH)εH − µ˜I˜O
)
+ µ˜(IH − IL)
)]
> 0.
It is evident that all terms in the numerator are positive, implying that ∆ is positive too. Given this
result, the implicit solutions for the task margins due to easier offshoring are
dIL
dω
=
1
∆
εH +
1
1−IH +
1
IH−IL
α(IH − IL)ω > 0
dI˜O
dω
=
1
∆
1
α(1− IH)(IL − I˜O)(IH − IL)2ω[(
(1− IH)(IH − IL)εH + (1− IH) + (IH − IL)
)(
(IL − I˜O)(IH − IL)εL + (IL − I˜O) + (IH − IL)
)
+(1− IH)(IL − I˜O)
]
> 0
dIH
dω
=
1
∆
1
α(IH − IL)2ω > 0.
The following proposition summarizes the main results.
Proposition 3.8 (Offshoring low-skilled job-tasks and skill-task reallocation). If offshoring activities
are permitted only to low-skill-intensive job tasks, then there exists an equilibrium threshold I˜O at which
domestic firms allocate offshore workers to all tasks i ∈ I˜O, where 0 < I˜O < IL < IH < 1. Moreover,
easier offshoring (dω > 0) induces an expansion of offshorable job-tasks as well as a job-task upgrading
by low- and medium-skilled workers, i.e.
dI˜O
dω
>
dIL
dω
>
dIH
dω
> 0. (3.C.72)
Given these comparative statics, we can now investigate how offshoring affects both real and relative
wages of domestic workers. We relegate the discussion on relative wages to the main text and focus here
on real wage effects.
3.C.4 Offshoring low-skilled job tasks and productivity effect
To investigate the impact of offshoring low-skilled job tasks on real wages, recall the first-order conditions
defining the optimal labor demand, and utilize the resource constraint conditions and the optimal demand
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condition for total employment, to obtain
wL =
IL − I˜O
NL
PEE =
IL − I˜O
NL
P
− 1−α
α
E B
wM =
IH − IL
NM
PEE =
IH − IL
NM
P
− 1−α
α
E B
wH =
1− IH
NH
PEE =
1− IH
NH
P
− 1−α
α
E B.
Next, combine the no-arbitrage condition (3.C.81) with the cost index of composite labor PE =
wM
AM
Ω˜(·)
to substitute for wMAM in the inverse labor demand function of low- and high-skilled workers, respectively.
Then, after further manipulation, we obtain
wL =
(
IL − I˜O
NL
)α
βL(IL)
1−αΩ˜(·)−(1−α)A1−αL Bα
wM =
(
IH − IL
NM
)α
Ω˜(·)−(1−α)A1−αM Bα
wH =
(
1− IH
NH
)α
βH(IH)
−(1−α)Ω˜(·)−(1−α)A1−αH Bα.
Taking logs and totally differentiating w.r.t. offshoring friction, the wage effect can be decomposed into
the following terms:
d lnwL
dω
=
(
α
IL − I˜O
− (1− α)εL)
)
dIL
dω
+ (1− α)
(
ILεL
dIL
dω
− (1− IH)εH dIH
dω
)
+
(
(1− α)I˜Oµ˜− α
IL − I˜O
)
dI˜O
dω
(3.C.73)
d lnwM
dω
=
(
α
IH − IL − (1− α)(1− IH)εH
)
dIH
dω
+
(
(1− α)ILεL − α
IH − IL
)
dIL
dω
+(1− α)I˜Oµ˜dI˜O
dω
(3.C.74)
d lnwH
dω
=
(
(1− α)IHεH − α
1− IH
)
dIH
dω
+ (1− α)
(
ILεL
dIL
dω
+ I˜Oµ˜
dI˜O
dω
)
. (3.C.75)
The last term, (1−α)I˜Oµ˜, in all three Eqs. (3.C.73)–(3.C.75) captures the aforementioned productivity
effect. Notice that in Eq. (3.C.73) this productivity effect is interacting with the direct displacement effect
of low-skilled workers, α
IL−I˜O . However, comparing our results with that of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008), the important difference becomes evident. Next to the direct offshoring-induced productivity
effect, there are two additional forces: the first and second terms in Eqs. (3.C.73)–(3.C.75) capture the
internal reallocation effect. The extent of this internal reallocation effect depends on the substitutability
between low- and medium-skilled workers as well as between medium- and high-skilled workers, which
are captured by the relative task productivity parameters (semi-elasticities) εL and εH , respectively. The
following proposition summarizes the sufficient conditions.
Proposition 3.9 (Offshoring low-skilled job tasks and productivity effect). Given the impact of easier
offshoring on the task reallocation derived in Proposition 3.8, an offshoring-induced cost-efficiency effect
raises unambiguously the real wage of all skill groups for the sufficient conditions
1. εLIL > εH(1− IH),
2. α1−α
1
IL−I˜O > εL >
α
1−α
1
IL(IH−IL) , for I˜O > IL[1− (IH − IL)]
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3. α1−α
1
(1−IH)(IH−IL) > εH >
α
1−α
1
IH(1−IH)
4. µ˜ > α1−α
1
I˜O(IL−I˜O) .
Proof. The sufficient condition in Part 1. follows from the second term in Eq. (3.C.73) and the
comparative static results dILdω and
dIH
dω in Proposition 3.8. It states that for sufficient low substitutability
between low- and medium-skilled workers compared to substitutability between medium- and high-skilled
workers in the neighborhood of IL and IH , respectively, offshoring-induced internal reallocation of workers
is limited. If this sufficient condition holds, then the second term in Eq. (3.C.73) is unambiguously
positive. In Part 2., the lower boundary of εL is computed from the second term in Eq. (3.C.74), while
the upper boundary follows from the first term in Eq. (3.C.73). Thus these conditions determine the
sufficient range of values of substitutability between low- and medium-skilled workers. Notice however
the qualifying necessary condition in this case that requires a sufficiently large range of offshoring. If this
necessary condition does not hold, than the lower boundary in Part 2. becomes binding, implying that
the first term in Eq. (3.C.73) will have a negative sign. However, it is worth noting that, even in this
case, the real wage of low-skilled workers might increase if the two other positive terms in Eq. (3.C.73)
are sufficiently strong. In Part 3., the lower boundary is computed from the first term in Eq. (3.C.75),
while the upper boundary follows from the first term in Eq. (3.C.74). Finally, in Part 4., the sufficient
condition following from the last term in Eq. (3.C.73) requires a sufficiently low substitutability between
medium-skilled and offshore workers.
For these jointly sufficient conditions, the offshoring-induced labor supply effect on wages, characterized
by the internal reallocation of domestic workers, is dominated by the overall rise in total domestic
employment induced by the cost-efficiency effect due to lower offshoring frictions. This feature extends
the models of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
3.C.5 Offshoring high-skill-intensive domestic job tasks
As put forward in Blinder (2009b), many high-skill-intensive occupations might be affected by offshoring.
Our framework can also be easily extended to account for this possible future development of
globalization. To get an idea, we sketch the main properties followed by a graphical illustration.
In a similar vein, one can derive conditions characterizing the task allocation between offshore and high-
skilled workers. Considering the example of the quadratic function from above, the convenient property
of the U-shaped task productivity schedule can be seen. In this case, the rise in international competition
on domestic high-skill-intensive job-tasks can be described by an improvement in task productivity of
offshore workers. Formally, we state
ζˆ(i) = exp[gM (i− gˆO)2],
where now gˆO > gO > g˜O > 0. Thus the U-shaped curve moves rightwards along the unit interval.
Figure 3.7 provides a graphical illustration.
Similar to the case of offshoring low-skilled job tasks, the task assignment between offshore and high-
skilled workers will lead to unbundling of a fraction of high-skilled job tasks. This implies again that
high-skilled workers are relatively cheaper in producing job tasks in the neighborhoods of IH and 1, while
offshore workers are cheaper somewhere in the middle. Formally, the assignment problem can be written
as
cO(i) Q cH(i),
or equivalently
τwO
AO
1
aO(i)
Q wH
AH
1
aH(i)
, ∀ i ∈ (IH , 1). (3.C.76)
Now, by a simple transformation, i.e. multiplying both sides in Eq. (3.C.76) by aM (i), we obtain
the task productivity schedules, βH(i) =
aM (i)
aH(i)
and ζˆ(i) = aM (i)aO(i) , with the same properties defined by
Assumptions 1 and 2. Again the structure of the model is preserved. Now the necessary conditions for
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Figure 3.7: Offshoring high-skilled job tasks and skill-task allocation
1
i
wM
AM
wL
AL
βL(i)
−1
wH
AH
βH(i)
IL IH
τ wOAO ζˆ(i)
IˆO
I˜
0
offshoring to be permitted to a subrange of high-skilled job tasks are
AH
wH
βH(I¨)
−1ζˆ(I¨) < ω <
AH
wH
βH(IH)
−1ζˆ(IH), and IH < Iˆ| ∂ ln ζˆ(·)
∂i =0
< 1, (3.C.77)
implying that the offshoring friction is not too large (i.e. low values of ω = AOτwO ), defined at the tangent
point I˙ between the productivity schedules
∣∣∣∂βH(I¨)
∂I¨
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∂ζ˜(I¨)
∂I¨
∣∣∣, such that offshoring is permitted, nor too
small, so that high-skilled workers do not lose their comparative advantage in competing with medium-
skilled workers, defined by the task margin IH . Then, given the assumptions and properties in (3.C.77),
it follows from (3.C.76) that there must exist two cut-off margins defining the range of offshored high-
skill-intensive job tasks (IˆO). By means of simple positive monotone transformation, this no-arbitrage
condition is given by
βˆO(IˆO)
ω
=
wH
AH
, (3.C.78)
where βˆO(·) denotes the positive monotone transformation of relative task productivity schedules ζˆ(·)βH(·)
at the new task margins, Iˆ1 and Iˆ2, in terms of the offshoring range IˆO.
Notice again that the no-arbitrage conditions defining the domestic allocation of tasks to skills are
preserved by Lemma 3.1. Thus the allocation of tasks across the different types of labor is as follows:
low-skilled workers perform all tasks i ∈ IL, medium-skilled workers perform all tasks i ∈ (IH − IL),
high-skilled workers perform all tasks i ∈ (1 − IH − IˆO), and offshore workers perform all tasks i ∈ IˆO;
see Figure 3.6 for these equilibrium allocations.
3.C.6 Offshoring and domestic income distribution effect
For the computation of the relative wage effects of offshoring, discussed in the main text, we need to
adjust the relative labor demand between high- and medium-skilled workers for the range of offshoring
IˆO. This follows from the new resource constraint for high-skilled workers and from the cost-minimized
first-order conditions, from which the relative medium-skilled labor demand functions can be derived
wL
wM
=
NM
NL
IL
IH − IL (3.C.79)
wM
wH
=
NM
NH
IH − IL
1− IH − IˆO
. (3.C.80)
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Recall the no-arbitrage conditions (3.2) and (3.3)
wL
wM
=
AL
AM
βL(IL)
(3.C.81)
wM
wH
=
AM
AH
βH(IH).
This set of Eqs. (3.C.79), (3.C.80) and (3.C.81) can be utilized to assess the impact of a marginal decline
of offshoring friction on the relative domestic wages. For an intuitive and graphical discussion we refer
the reader to discussion in section 3.5.2 in the main text.
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4Immigration, Technology Adoption and Wage
Inequality1
4.1 Introduction
In many advanced countries, immigration has substantially increased the foreign-born
population share, accompanied by considerable changes in their skill structure over the
last decades. For example, many European Union member states have experienced a
considerable shift in the skill structure of immigrants from low-towards medium- and
high-skilled attainments (cf. Muysken et al., 2015). Consequently, immigration has a
substantial impact on the skill mix of the workforce in the host country. Concerns
regarding its labor market implication have considerably shaped both the public and
academic discourse. In this paper, I exploit the potential channels by which immigration-
induced changes in the skill structure affect the domestic wage structure. In doing so, I
develop a model that allows for a richer structure of the goods market, characterized by
monopolistic competition, firm heterogeneity, and endogenous technology adoption, next
to skill heterogeneity. As I elaborate below, these features are substantial to improve our
understanding of adjustment mechanism behind the changes in the wage structure.
What does the empirical evidence tell us regarding the relationship between skill mix
changes and potential adjustment mechanisms? One set of studies emphasizes the role
of endogenous technology changes, the so-called directed technical change (cf. Acemoglu,
1998, 2002b). The idea is that an increase in the endowment of skilled workers (including
those by immigration) induces a faster growth of skill-complement technologies, which
in turn leads to a higher skill premium. This feature is captured in this paper through
increasing returns to scale and the endogenous adjustment of the mass of firms to changes
1I am grateful for valuable comments and discussions to Joan Muysken and Thomas Ziesemer. I
would also like to thank participants at TASK III - the 3rd International BIBB/IAB/ZEW conference
2014 in Nuremberg, and at the annual AIEL conference 2015 in Cagliari.
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in the skill mix, indicating changes at the intensive margin. Related to this view, it
has become a widespread consensus that skill-biased technological changes (SBTC), in
particular unskilled labor-saving technological changes, has importantly contributed to
the pervasive wage inequality in the 1980s, especially observed in the US (cf. Lemieux,
2008). The puzzling U-shaped wage trends after 1990 have been attributed to advances in
Figure 4.1: Changes in real male wages in the US by percentile
Source: Lemieux (2008).
information communication technology (ICT), substituting mostly routine-intensive job
tasks that are concentrated in the middle of the skill distribution and easily codifiable (cf.
Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Autor et al., 2003) – also referred to
as the computerization/routinization phenomenon.2 Figure 4.1 depicts these contrasting
trends in the male wage structure that occurred at different time periods for the US.
In this paper, I argue that a supply shock of medium-skilled workers may partly explain
recent polarization trends also, due to a price effect for technology modes that complement
low-skilled and high-skilled workers. I show that the key determinant behind this effect
is the market power of monopolists.
Another set of studies provide a more competing view by highlighting the implications
of changes in the skill endowment on endogenous technology adoption behavior of firms
(Beaudry et al., 2010; Lewis, 2011). For example, Lewis (2011), provides evidence that
the low adoption rate of automation machinery in manufacturing plants between 1988 and
1993 was associated with immigration-induced increase of low-skilled workers. Beaudry
et al. (2010), using U.S. metropolitan area-level panel data, explore empirically the link
between personal computer (PC) adoption and skill attainment. They find a positive
relationship, where areas with an initially high relative supply of skill have experienced an
increase in the skill premium when PC was introduced. However, both studies show that
over time the relation between skill supply and its return dissipates since “investments in
automation induced by immigration reduce the effect immigration has on wages” (Lewis,
2011, p. 1063), and thus balances the initial supply-driven wage effects.
2See Lemieux (2008) for a detailed survey of the literature regarding alternative explanations, such as
changes in wage-setting institutions, regarding the rise in income inequality in many advanced countries.
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This channel denotes the important aspects of firm heterogeneity, explaining the
asymmetry of firms in terms of productivity which has taken the center-stage in the new
trade theory (cf. Melitz, 2003). In this paper, this feature is also captured but instead of a
random selection, firms choose endogenously between various technology modes according
to their comparative advantages (cf. Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Yeaple, 2005). I will
refer to this channel as changes at the extensive margin.
Thus, the objective of this paper is to jointly investigate how changes at the extensive
and intensive margin are determined and how they interact with each other. In doing
so, I develop a model in which a continuum of industries (final goods) is combined to
produce an aggregate consumption good. Each final good, in turn, can be produced by
three different technology modes, where the extent of technology adoption is endogenous
and reflects principles of comparative advantage, as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001);
Yeaple (2005).3 Each technology mode utilizes a distinct composite of intermediate
goods, which are, in turn, produced under monopolistic competition, as in Krugman
(1979). Furthermore, labor is the sole production factor in the intermediate goods market,
implying that the labor market is heterogeneous and consists of three skill groups, each
complement to one specific technology mode. In this setup, the equilibrium technology
adoption is characterized by two endogenous margins, dividing the economy into three
endogenous sets of sectors, each consisting of a continuum of industries.
This model uncovers several novel predictions regarding distributional effects of
immigration-induced changes in the skill structure. First, I show that changes in the
domestic wage structure can be decomposed into two key channels: i) a labor supply
effect, and ii) technology adoption effect. Second, the interaction between these two
channels is importantly determined by the interplay between two additional forces. On
the one hand, it depends on the relation between consumer preferences (i.e. goods demand
elasticity) and the market power of monopolists (i.e. elasticity of substitution between
intermediate goods). On the other hand, it depends on the degree of adoption between
the different technology modes (the extensive margin) which may mitigate the direct labor
supply effect. The key implication of the model is that changes at the extensive margin
(captured by the degree of technology adoption) countervail the direct supply effect. At
the extreme case of easy adoption (i.e. perfect substitutability between technology modes)
the two channels are balanced, so that changes in the wage structure become insensitive
to labor supply shocks, reconciling the empirical evidence regarding the neutral long-run
labor market effects of immigration.
Moreover, considering a more realistic range of parameter values, the analysis provides
additional insights that reconcile the empirical observations regarding labor supply shocks
and changes in the wage structure. For a sufficient degree of imperfect technology
adoption, an immigration-induced increase of high-skilled workers induces changes in
the wage structure similar to a “skill-biased” technical change, leading to a monotonic
increase in the wage gap across the skill groups, whenever the demand elasticity is higher
than the market power of monopolists. This conforms what Acemoglu (2002b) gives as
explanation for why the relative demand for skill-complements goods has outpaced the
3The structure of this model is similar to the Ricardian model with a continuum of goods as in
Dornbusch et al. (1977), except that now the equilibrium margins characterize the specialization pattern
of the domestic industry, instead of between countries.
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skill supply over the last decades. These results uncover a new channel and highlight the
importance of firm heterogeneity and endogenous technology adoption in analyzing labor
market impacts of immigration. Particularly, these features help substantially to gain
new insights regarding the underlying mechanism and the determinants of the adjustment
process to immigration-induced changes in the domestic skill structure.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the existing studies and
relates this to the contributions of this paper. In section 4.3, the setup of the theoretical
framework is presented. The characteristics of the equilibrium are discussed in section
??. The assessment of changes in the optimal technology adoption margins are presented
in section 4.5, followed by the comparative statics of immigration-induced changes in the
skill structure on the domestic wage structure in section 4.6. Finally, concluding remarks
are provided in section 4.7.
4.2 Literature review
There exist by now a vast number of studies that have examined various mechanisms
by which immigration-induced changes in the skill mix affect native workers. Guided
by the canonical nested CES-approach, with various extensions regarding capital-skill
complementarity and labor market frictions, a large body of these studies provide
empirical evidence that highlights the importance of complementarity and substitutability
between immigrants and natives, translating mechanically the impact of immigration on
the skill mix into an impact on wages – through the elasticity of substitution parameters.4
However, it is widely accepted that the effect of immigration on host country’s labor
market goes beyond this convenient mechanical relationship.5 Recent empirical studies,
including Dustmann and Glitz (2012) for Germany, Gonza´lez and Ortega (2011) for Spain
and Lewis (2003) for the US, have found strong evidence that much of the response to
immigration-induced changes in the skill mix occurs within industries (or within firms),
through changes in the skill intensity. They find that wages are relatively insensitive to
labor supply shocks. These findings support the view “that immigration shocks induce
changes in production technology at the industry level” (Gonza´lez and Ortega, 2011, p.
68).
Recent theoretical contributions have emphasized the adjustment channel through
changes in the output mix (Felbermayr and Kohler, 2006, 2007; Iranzo and Peri, 2009;
Muysken et al., 2015). According to these studies, an unbalanced immigration flow
impacts the domestic wage structure through changes in output price, inducing shifts
in the output structure. For instance, Muysken et al. (2015) show that the impact of
labor supply shock on domestic wage structure depends importantly on the interaction
between consumer preferences (i.e. the demand elasticity) and production technology
(i.e. the elasticity of substitution between skill groups).6 In the context of the East-West
4Important contributions, among many others, are Borjas (2003); Borjas et al. (2011); Bru¨cker et al.
(2014); Bru¨cker and Jahn (2011); Card (2009); D’Amuri et al. (2010); Manacorda et al. (2011); Ottaviano
and Peri (2008, 2012); Peri (2011).
5See Lewis (2013) for a thorough survey of the related literature.
6Moreover, they allow for two types of labor market frictions, low-skill unemployment and skill-
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European integration, Iranzo and Peri (2009) discuss the gains from immigration and
trade. They show that overall trade and immigration generate beneficial welfare effects for
both regions, low-skilled workers in the West gain unambiguously in terms of real wages,
while the real wage effect for high-skilled workers depends on the relative magnitude
between the forces described by Muysken et al. (2015), i.e. the interaction between the
elasticity of substitution between intermediates and the goods demand elasticity.
However, these models often rely on the standard assumptions of representative agents
and ex-ante fixed production technologies. This paper augments these studies by using
an alternative and richer structure of the goods market that allows for firm heterogeneity
and endogenous choice of technique (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Yeaple, 2005). The
key implication of this set of models is that it allows to capture a broader impact of
changes in the skill structure on the economy, as both the optimal choice of technology,
the composition and the number of firms using different production techniques depend
on the skill structure. Thus, the response of producers regarding the adoption of various
production techniques to immigration-induced changes in the skill mix “may mediate
immigration’s ultimate labor market impact” (Lewis, 2013, p. 10). As I discuss below,
the change in the domestic wage structure due to immigration-induced shifts in the skill
mix is importantly affected by the degree of technology adoption. This is the novel
contribution of this article.
4.3 Theoretical framework
I consider an economy that is characterized by an aggregated consumption good, which
consists of a continuum of final goods. The final goods market is perfectly competitive,
where final good producers are homogeneous ex ante. Following a widely used approach
in the literature (cf. Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Yeaple,
2005), I allow for ex post heterogeneity by introducing endogenous sorting into different
technology modes based on comparative advantage differences, where firms self-elect
endogenously into the most cost-efficient production techniques.7 The production of
a final good requires the adoption of a distinct technology mode and the utilization of
a complement composite of intermediate goods. Finally, monopolistically competitive
firms produce an intermediate variety by utilizing labor as the sole factor.
To get a better idea, Figure 4.2 illustrates the structure of the framework, which will be
discussed in detail in the next section. It is worth mentioning the crucial differences to
Yeaple (2005): Instead of allocating different skill groups over the continuum interval into
the different technologies, as in Yeaple (2005), intermediate goods producer determine the
technology cut-off points. The latter allows to account for the elasticity of substitutability
between intermediate goods. As discussed below, the direction of the distributional effect
downgrading of medium-skilled workers, and discuss the importance of labor market institutions for
labor market outcomes of low-skilled workers. A shift from a rigid to a flexible unemployment benefit
scheme regime induces a complementarity effect between low-skilled unemployment rate and the skill
downgrading rate of medium-skilled workers, attenuating potential crowding-out effects of low-skilled
workers.
7Notice the difference to the firm heterogeneity a` la Melitz (2003), which allows for ex ante productivity
heterogeneity. According to this view, heterogeneity is characterized by a random draw.
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due to immigration-induced changes in the skill mix is importantly determined by the
size of this elasticity.
Figure 4.2: Structure of model
Consumption aggregate Y
0 zL zH 1
Final good y(z) ϕL(z) ϕM(z) ϕH(z)
Intermediate good x(j)
0 ALxL(j)
lL(j)Factor input l(j)
0 AMxM(j) 0 AHxH(j)
lM(j) lH(j)
XL XM XH
4.3.1 Aggregate consumption good, final goods, and technology
adoption
As in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), the aggregate consumption good Y is produced
by combining a continuum of final goods, y(z), in a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) aggregate over the interval [0, 1]. Each final good variety z can be produced in
different technology modes. More precisely, there exist three different modes: low (ϕL),
medium (ϕM) or high (ϕH). Similar to Yeaple (2005), the productivity schedule of each
technology mode ϕ(z) exhibits the following properties:
Assumption 4 (Technology schedule).
ϕL(0) = ϕM(0) = ϕH(0) = 1,
and
0 <
d lnϕL(z)
dz
<
d lnϕM(z)
dz
<
d lnϕH(z)
dz
, for all z ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, the final goods are ordered so that the higher indexed goods are most
productive with the high-quality technology.
Given the properties of the productivity schedules imposed by Assumption 4, there exist
two thresholds, denoted by zL and zH , which determine the cost-efficient allocation of
the three technology modes in the economy. More precisely, we get that the aggregate
consumption good Y is produced by the following constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) function
Y =
[∫ zL
0
yL(z)
σ−1
σ dz +
∫ zH
zL
yM(z)
σ−1
σ dz +
∫ 1
zH
yH(z)
σ−1
σ dz
] σ
σ−1
, (4.1)
where σ ≥ 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between the final goods. Each final good
is produced by combining a composite of intermediate goods, Xk with the complement
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technology ϕk(z)
y(z) =

ϕL(z)XL for all z ∈ [0, zL],
ϕM(z)XM for all z ∈ (zL, zH),
ϕH(z)XH for all z ∈ [zH , 1].
(4.2)
Then, given the production function (5.1), profit maximization yields the optimal demand
for any final good z,
yk(z) = Y pk(z)
−σ, for k = {L,M,H} (4.3)
From (5.1) and (4.3) the corresponding price index of Y is given by
1 =
[∫ zL
0
pL(z)
1−σdz +
∫ zH
zL
pM(z)
1−σdz +
∫ 1
zH
pH(z)
1−σdz
] 1
1−σ
, (4.4)
where the price of the consumption aggregate is normalized to unity, i.e. PY = 1, so that
all goods and factor prices are in real terms.
The perfectly competitive nature of final goods market implies that every producer
takes its own price, p(z), and the marginal cost of Xk, ζk, as given when optimizing
its production cost. Moreover, in equilibrium any producer utilizing technology mode k
must make zero profits, i.e. pk(z)yk(z) = ζkXk. Using this observation and making use
of Eq. (4.2), then the final goods price can be written as
p(z) =

PLϕL(z)
−1 for all z ∈ [0, zL],
PMϕM(z)
−1 for all z ∈ (zL, zH),
PHϕH(z)
−1 for all z ∈ [zH , 1],
(4.5)
where Pk denotes the effective price index of final goods, i.e. the price per productive
technology k, which will be defined below.
As illustrated in Figure 4.3, the price-technology schedule implies that the price of final
goods adjust to productivity differences. It follows that in equilibrium the cut-off margins
are defined by two cost-efficient conditions, summarized by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 (Efficient Technology Allocation). In equilibrium, the final good price
adjusts endogenously for the productivity differences in technology. For marginal final
goods zL and zH and the price indexes PL, PM and PH of the respective technology mode,
it follows
PL
PM
= ΛL(zL) ≡ ϕL(zL)
ϕM(zL)
, (4.6)
PM
PH
= ΛH(zH) ≡ ϕM(zH)
ϕH(zH)
, (4.7)
and
0 < zL < zH < 1, for
PL
PM
∈
(
ΛL(zH),ΛL(0)
)
and
PM
PH
∈
(
ΛH(1),ΛH(zL)
)
. (4.8)
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.1.
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Figure 4.3: Final goods price and technology productivity schedules
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lnPL
lnPH
zL zH 10
z
− lnϕH(z)
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ln p(z)
In Figure 4.3 the solid kinked curve can be interpreted as the equilibrium price-technology
frontier (PTF).
4.3.2 Intermediate goods market
In contrast to the final goods market, the intermediate goods market is characterized
by monopolistic competition, where each intermediates, in turn, is manufactured by
workers. In addition, each variety has to incur a fixed output, denoted by fk, that
must be produced but can not be sold. As in Yeaple (2005), it is assumed that these
fixed product development outputs are measured in terms of the numeraire good and the
size of this fixed output depends on the technology mode adopted, where fH > fM > fL
is imposed.8
This specification of the fixed costs aims for the sake of tractability of the model.
Alternative specification, such as measuring the fixed costs in terms of factor labor,
would complicate considerably the labor market clearing condition.
The production technology of the composite good Xk is represented by a Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregator over a continuum of varieties, indexed by
j:
Xk =
(
A
ν−1

k
∫ Ak
0
xk(j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
, (4.9)
where x(j) denotes the amount of intermediate variety j ∈ [0, Ak],  ≥ 1 captures the
elasticity of substitution between varieties, and Ak measures the mass of monopolists in
technology mode k. The parameter ν determines the degree of external increasing returns
to scales of the production process. For limiting values of ν = 0, the differentiated good
X is independent of A, cf. Egger et al. (2013). For ν =  − 1, the CES aggregator
8This specification aims for the sake of simplicity of measuring the fixed costs, simplifying substantially
the derivation of the model equilibrium. Particularly, measuring the fixed costs in terms of factor labor
would complicate considerably the labor market clearing condition, see Yeaple (2005) for a discussion.
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becomes becomes linear in A, as in Acemoglu et al. (2012). Here, I impose the special
case where ν = 1, as in Iranzo and Peri (2009). In this case the production technology is
characterized by external increasing returns to scale.9
Each intermediate is produced by a single monopolist which is characterized by a constant
return to scale production technology with labor as the sole input. Given the wage rate
wk in sector k, each monopolists employs lk units of labor, i.e. xk(j) = lk(j).
Demand for intermediate goods
In any technology mode k = {L,M,H}, the optimal amount of intermediates is obtained
by minimizing the cost,
∫ Ak
0
pk(j)xk(j)dj subject to (5.7) which yields the following
inverse demand function for intermediates (see Appendix 4.B.1 for the derivation):
pk(j) = ζkX
1

k xk(j)
− 1
 , ∀ k = {L,M,H}, (4.10)
where pk(j) is the price of each intermediate variety produced with technology mode k.
Combining (4.10) with (5.7) yields the marginal cost of composite intermediate goods
ζk =
(∫ Ak
0
pk(j)
1−dj
) 1
1−
. (4.11)
Intermediate firm behavior
Under the constant elastic demand function (4.10) of degree  > 1 and the linear property
of the production technology, the profit maximizing monopolist sets the price equal to a
markup /(− 1) over the respective marginal cost, i.e.
pk(j) =

− 1wk, (4.12)
where wk denotes the marginal cost of k-type labor.
Having defined the structure of the economy and the optimality conditions, the next
section proceeds with the characteristics of the equilibrium.
4.4 Characteristics of equilibrium
This section discusses the model equilibrium by deriving optimal conditions characterizing
firms behavior, labor market clearing, and the allocation of resources to technology modes.
Moreover, the analysis relies on the standard symmetric equilibrium assumption in the
intermediate goods market, implying that the varieties of the differentiated good Xk
9However, it is worth mentioning that for an empirically plausible value of the elasticity of substitution
 = 2 both limiting cases ν = 1 and ν =  − 1 generate equivalent analytical results (cf. Ottaviano and
Peri, 2012).
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employ the same amount of factor labor lk(j) = lk, are sold at the same price pk(j) = pk
and are produced in equal amount xk(j) = xk, for all k = {L,M,H}.
Let the total amount of labor used by the intermediate-goods firms be denoted by nk,
i.e.
∫ Ak
0
lkd = nk, and the total (exogenously given) endowments of labor (i.e. over the
range of final goods produced with technology mode k) by NL, NM , and NH , i.e.∫
z∈Sk
nkdz = Nk,
where SL = {0, zL}, SM = {zL, zH}, and SH = {zH , 1}, such that
lL =
NL
zLAL
, (4.13)
lM =
NM
(zH − zL)AM , (4.14)
lH =
NH
(1− zH)AH . (4.15)
Recall the assumption that each monopolists bears a fixed product development output
(cf. Yeaple, 2005). This implies that the effective unit labor employed by each
intermediate firm in technology mode k is given by fk + xk, so that the fixed costs are
given by wkfk. Free entry ensures that each differentiated-good firm makes zero profits
so that 1

pkxk = wkfk. Then, the quantity for each variety is defined by
xk = (− 1)fk, ∀ k = {L,M,H}. (4.16)
From Eq. (4.11) it follows that the marginal cost of the differentiated good reduces to
ζk = A
1
1−
k pk. Now, using the monopolistic pricing behavior, Eq. (5.10), yields
ζk =

− 1A
1
1−
k wk, ∀ k = {L,M,H}, (4.17)
Substituting the free entry condition (5.14) into the composite intermediate goods
function, Eq. (5.7), and using Eqs. (4.2) and (4.5) and the resource constraints (5.17),
(5.19), and (5.18), then from the the budget constraint for any final good producer z,
p(z)y(z) = wk
∫ Ak
0
lk(j)dj,
the mass of monopolists in technology mode k can be pinned down to the skill endowment,
fixed costs, the range of final goods, and the degree of substitutability between final goods
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(see Appendix 5.B.1 for details of the formal derivation).
AL =
NL
fLzL
, (4.18)
AM =
NM
fM(zH − zL) , (4.19)
AH =
NH
fH(1− zH) . (4.20)
Before proceeding, it is worth noticing the following properties of the equilibrium measure
of the mass of monopolists. From Eqs. (4.18)–(4.20), it is readily seen that changes in
the endowment of labor induce an increase in the respective the mass monopolists in
the complementary technology mode, given zL and zH . Intuitively, the increase in the
skill endowment of type k employed by monopolists in sector k induces a market size
effect, raising the profitability of producing intermediate goods xk and thus leading to an
increase in the mass of monopolists hiring those type of workers. This effect captures the
idea of aforementioned directed technical change at the intensive margin. However, as
elaborated below, the technology modes margins, zL and zH , will respond endogenously
to skill mix changes, generating a “spill-over” effect for the other technology modes. This
effect captures changes at the extensive margin. The implication of these forces for the
wage structure and their interaction with each other are elaborated below.
Next, utilizing the labor market clearing conditions (5.17), (5.18) and (5.19), the output
per monopolist using technology modes k = {L,M,H} can be written, respectively, as
xL =
nL
AL
=
NL
zLAL
, xM =
nM
AM
=
NM
(zH − zL)AM , xH =
nH
AH
=
NH
(1− zH)AH . (4.21)
Substituting (4.21) into the composite intermediate goods function (5.7) for the respective
technology mode, we obtain
XL = A
1
−1
L
NL
zL
,
XM = A
1
−1
M
NM
zH − zL , (4.22)
XH = A
1
−1
H
NH
1− zH .
Utilizing (5.21) into Eq. (4.2), then the production function of final goods can be rewritten
as
y(z) =

ϕL(z)XL = ϕL(z)A
1
−1
L
NL
zL
, for all z ∈ [0, zL],
ϕM(z)XM = ϕM(z)A
1
−1
M
NM
zH−zL , for all z ∈ (zL, zH),
ϕH(z)XH = ϕH(z)A
1
−1
H
NH
1−zH , for all z ∈ [zH , 1],
(4.23)
Finally, we derive the equilibrium aggregate levels of output and expenditure for each
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technology mode k. Let the total cost using technology k be
PkYk =
∫
z∈Sk
p(z)y(z)dz,
where Yk denotes the aggregate level of output of final goods using technology mode k.
Now, utilizing Eqs. (4.5) and (4.23) in the previously derived equation and manipulating
slightly, yields the aggregate level of output per technology mode k (see Appendix 4.B.3
for the formal derivation)
YL = A
1
−1
L NL,
YM = A
1
−1
M NM , (4.24)
YH = A
1
−1
H NH .
The demand for final goods, Eq.(4.3), indicates that p(z)y(z) = Y p(z)1−σ for all z ∈
[0, 1]. Furthermore, Eqs. (4.5) and (4.2) imply that pL(zL)yL(zL)/Y = p(zL)
1−σ =
pM(zL)yM(zL)/Y and pM(zH)yM(zH)/Y = p(zH)
1−σ = pH(zH)yH(zH)/Y . That is, the
expenditure share on final goods, produced under different technology modes, must be
equal at the equilibrium margins, zL and zH . Utilizing Eqs. (4.5) and (4.23), then yield
PLYL
zL
=
PMYM
zH − zL , and
PMYM
zH − zL =
PHYH
1− zH (4.25)
Finally, we solve for the equilibrium expressions of the margins, zL and zH . Substituting
Eqs. (4.24) for the respective aggregate output YL, YM , and YH in Eqs. (4.25) and using
the equilibrium values of the mass of monopolists, (4.18), (4.19), and (4.20), and taking
ratios, we obtain two equations characterizing as follows
PL
PM
=
(
fL
fM
) 1
(−1)
(
NM
NL
) 
(−1)
(
zL
zH−zL
) 
(−1)
, (4.26)
PM
PH
=
(
fM
fH
) 1
(−1)
(
NH
NM
) 
(−1)
(
zH−zL
1−zH
) 
(−1)
. (4.27)
Thus, Eqs. (5.28) and (5.29) reflect the aggregate relative prices of technology mode
M . Next, combine (5.28) and (5.29) with the efficient allocation of technology modes,
Eqs. (5.3) and (5.4), derived in Lemma 4.1, respectively. Now, taking logs, manipulating
and rearranging slightly, we obtain two implicit functions FL(·) and FH(·) that define
the equilibrium technology margins zL and zH as functions of parameters and exogenous
variables.
FL(zL, zH , fL, fM , NL, NM ) ≡ 1

ln
(
fL
fM
)
+ ln
(
NM
NL
)
− (− 1)

ln ΛL(zL)
− ln
(
zH − zL
zL
)
= 0, (4.28)
FH(zL, zH , fH , fM , NH , NM ) ≡ 1

ln
(
fM
fH
)
+ ln
(
NH
NM
)
− (− 1)

ln ΛH(zH)
− ln
(
1− zH
zH − zL
)
= 0. (4.29)
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This implicit system of equations can be used to compute basic comparative statics of
changes in factor endowment and fixed market entry costs and their implications for
technology adoption.
4.5 Immigration and changes in technology adoption
margins
Consider first the implication of immigration-induced changes in the medium-skill
endowment on the equilibrium technology mode margins, zL and zH . Total differentiation
of the implicit Eqs. (5.30) and (5.31) yields(
∂FL
∂zL
∂FL
∂zH
∂FH
∂zL
∂FH
∂zH
)(
dzL
dzH
)
=
(
− ∂FL
∂NM
− ∂FH
∂NM
)
× dNM ,
⇔
( −1

ε˜L
zL
+ 1
zH−zL +
1
zL
− 1
zH−zL
− 1
zH−zL
−1

ε˜H
zH
+ 1
1−zH +
1
zH−zL
)(
dzL
dzH
)
=
(− 1
NM
1
NM
)
× dNM ,
where ε˜k ≡ −∂Λk(zk)∂zk
zk
Λk(zk)
> 0, for k = {L,H} denotes the elasticity (in absolute value)
of relative efficiency schedules of technology modes k at the equilibrium margin zk. The
inspection of the matrix verifies that the Jacobi has a positive sign, i.e. DJ = ∂FL∂zL
∂FH
∂zH
−
∂FL
∂zH
∂FH
∂zL
> 0, and thus the solution to the above 2× 2 system is unique. Then, applying
Cramer’s rule, we obtain
dzL
dNM
=
DL
DJ = −
1
NM
1
1−zH +
(−1)ε˜H
zH
DJ < 0, (4.30)
and
dzH
dNM
=
DH
DJ =
1
NM
+(−1)ε˜L
zL
DJ > 0. (4.31)
Thus, by implication the overall range of final goods produced with technology mode M
is increased
d(zH − zL)
dNM
> 0.
Figure 4.4 depicts the equilibrium technology margins and the results of the above
comparative statics for any arbitrary comparative advantage schedules, ΛL and ΛH . It
can be easily verified that the relative technology demand condition (5.28) is increasing in
zL from the origin, for given values of zH , while Eq. (5.3) is decreasing in zL from above.
Thus, there is a single crossing, characterizing the equilibrium technology margin zL.
This is denoted by point a in Figure 4.4. Similarly, from the relative technology demand
condition (5.29) and the efficiency condition (5.4) one can show the single crossing between
the two curves, as denoted by point b in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Medium-skill immigration and changes in the equilibrium technology
margins
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Now, changes in the composite factor labor NM (e.g. due to easier offshoring or
immigration of medium-skilled workers) induce simultaneously an upward and downward
shift of the curves Eq. (5.28) and Eq. (5.29), respectively. This leads to a decline and
increase in equilibrium margins zL and zH , respectively. After further adjustments in both
curves – a slight rightward shift in Eq. (5.28) and a leftward shift in Eq. (5.29) – due
to changes in the zL and zH , the new equilibrium approaches eventually to points a
′ and
b′. A similar exercise can be performed to compute the comparative statics for changes
in both fixed costs (fk) and labor endowments NL and NH . The following proposition
summarizes the main results.
Proposition 4.1 (Comparative statics of technology adoption for changes in fixed costs
and labor endowment). Exogenous changes in the skill endowment and in fixed costs will
affect the technology margins zL and zH in the following way:
• Immigration of high-skill workers and H-fixed cost{
dzL
d lnNH
,
dzH
d lnNH
}
< 0,
• Immigration of medium-skilled workers and M-fixed cost
dzL
d lnNM
< 0,
dzH
d lnNM
> 0,
• Immigration of low-skilled workers and L-fixed cost{
dzL
d lnNL
,
dzH
d lnNL
}
> 0.
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Proof. A full analytical derivation is provided in Appendix 4.A.2.
Intuitively, an increase in the factor endowment Nk, results in an expansion of Xk as a
larger factor market allows for more varieties, i.e. the mass of monopolists (Ak) increases.
A larger factor market also implies a higher competition among workers of the same type
and thus by the perfectly competitive nature of the labor markets, induces a decline
in their wages. This, in turn, reduces the marginal cost of the differentiated good (ζk)
and thus the overall price index of final goods (Pk), making the utilization of technology
k more profitable compared to other types of technology, k′ 6= k. Consequently, more
final good producers adopt technology k, and the economy becomes proportionately more
specialized in technology mode k.
4.6 Immigration and distributional effect
Equipped with the comparative statics for technology adoption, the impact of
immigration-induced changes in the skill endowment on the domestic wage structure
can be analyzed. In equilibrium, the intermediate goods demand condition (4.10) and
the monopolistic price-setting condition (5.10) imply

− 1wL = pL = ζLX
1/
L x
−1/
L ,

− 1wM = pM = ζMX
1/
M x
−1/
M ,

− 1wH = pH = ζHX
1/
H x
−1/
H .
To compute the changes in the domestic wage structure, take the ratio between low- and
medium-skilled wages and between medium- and high-skilled wages to obtain
wL
wM
=
ζL
ζM
(
XL
XM
)1/(
xL
xM
)−1/
, (4.32)
wM
wH
=
ζM
ζH
(
XM
XH
)1/(
xM
xH
)−1/
. (4.33)
Recall again that due to the perfectly competitive nature of the final goods market in
equilibrium Pk = ζk for all k = {L,M,H} must hold. Using this observation together
with the equilibrium outcomes (4.21), (5.21), (4.24), (4.25), (5.28), and (5.29) in Eqs.
(4.32) and (4.33), and taking logs, we obtain the following relative wage rate of medium-
skilled workers
ln
(
wL
wM
)
= − σ − 
(− 1)σ ln
(
zL
zH − zL
)
+
σ − 
(− 1)σ (lnNL − lnNM) + lnKL,M ,(4.34)
ln
(
wM
wH
)
= − σ − 
(− 1)σ ln
(
zH − zL
1− zH
)
− σ − 
(− 1)σ (lnNH − lnNM) + lnKH,M ,(4.35)
where KL,M and KH,M capture other constant variables, see Appendix 5.B.3 for the formal
derivation.
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Thus, changes in the domestic wage structure can be decomposed into two key factors: i)
a labor supply effect, lnNL, lnNH , and lnNM ; ii) a technology adoption effect, ln
(
zL
zH−zL
)
and ln
(
zH−zL
1−zH
)
. Moreover, an inspection of Eqs. (4.34) and (4.35) reveals immediately
that the extent of the direct labor supply effect and the technology adoption effect depends
crucially on the relative magnitude between the goods demand elasticity (σ) and the
market power of monopolists (). The intuition behind these two forces is the following.
Immigration induces a market size effect and a price effect.
To get a better idea, consider the immigration of low-skill workers. In this case, firms
employing low-skill workers experience a cost-efficiency enhancing, leading to higher
output (xL) and profits (piL) and thus to an increase in the mass of those monopolists (AL).
This effect is referred to as the direct market size effect. Consequently, the comparative
advantage of adopting technology mode L increases, leading to an increase in the relative
price index of final goods produced with technology modes M and H. This in turn induces
firms in the final goods market to switch to production techniques complementing low-
skill workers, leading to an increase in the cut-off margin zL. This adjustment can be
referred to as the indirect market size effect.
However, this latter effect raises the relative profitability of technology modes M and H
compared to L, and thus counteracting the former direct effect. This can be easily verified
from Eqs. (4.18), (4.19), and (4.20), where AL declines in zL, while AM and to a larger
extent AH rise as the respective range of final goods declines. This effect reflects the price
effect associated with a biased shift in favor of technology modes M and H.10 As these
direct and indirect scale effects work in opposite directions the relative strength between
them is ambiguous, and will importantly depend on the relative magnitude between σ
and , and the degree of technology adoption.
First, the degree of technology adoption, i.e. changes in the cut-off margins zL and zH ,
affects the extent of immigration-induced changes in the wage structure. This magnitude
is captured by the elasticity parameters ε˜L ≡ −d ln ΛL(zL)d ln zL and ε˜H ≡ −
d ln ΛH(zH)
d ln zH
(measured
in absolute terms) in the neighborhood of zL and zH , respectively. Thus, whenever
technology adoption in the neighborhood of zL becomes very easy, indicating very low
values of ε˜L, changes in the relative price indices PL/PM become insensitive to marginal
changes in the margin zL induced by low-skill immigration. In Figure 4.4, this case is
associated with a flatting of the curve Eq. 5.3, where in the limit ε˜L → 0 it becomes a
horizontal line.
Thus, if ε˜L,→ 0, the direct and indirect scale effects will be asymptotically fully
balanced, so that the relative wage between low- and medium-skill stays asymptotically
unchanged. However, the change in the relative wage structure at the upper part of
the skill distribution, i.e. between medium- and high-skill workers, may still exist and
is similarly affected by the degree of technology adoption at the margin zH , captured
by the elasticity parameter ε˜H . These are novel features of the model, reconciling the
aforementioned empirical findings regarding technology adoption and changes in the wage
structure. More importantly, they highlight the underlying determinants behind the
10It is also worth mentioning that the direct and indirect market size effects have a similar interpretation
to the internal and external scale effects mentioned in Ethier (1982), but differ importantly in terms of
their determinants and the context.
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adjustment mechanisms.
Moreover, as discussed below, for positive and finite degrees of technology adoption, i.e.
{ε˜L, ε˜H} > 0, changes in the wage structure are determined by the interaction between
goods demand elasticity and the elasticity of substitution between intermediates. Thus,
for σ > , the goods demand effect will be the dominating force, inducing a favorable
demand shift for goods exhibiting a relative decline in their prices, through variation in
market size effects. Whenever  = σ, both the market size effect and the price effect are
fully balanced and the overall wage structure remains unchanged. I discuss now these
channels and their interaction in more detail.
4.6.1 Low-skill and high-skill immigration and distributional
effect
In this section, I analyze the wage effects of immigration at the tails of the skill
distribution. Although in many advanced countries the past pattern of international
migration was often characterized by this bimodal skill distribution (cf. Felbermayr and
Kohler, 2007), I will separately examine the effects of low-skill and high-skill immigration
in order to provide clear analytical results.11
To compute the impact of low-skill immigration, take the total differentiation of Eqs.
(4.34) and (4.35) with respect to NL to obtain
d ln (wL/wM)
d lnNL
=
σ − 
(− 1)σ [1− ΓL] ,
d ln (wM/wH)
d lnNL
= − σ − 
(− 1)σ∆L.
where ΓL ≡ d ln[zL/(zH−zL)]d lnNL and ∆L ≡
d ln[(zH−zL)/(1−zH)]
d lnNL
denote the relative change in the
range of technology modes due to low-skill immigration and by Proposition 4.1 ΓL > 0
and ∆L < 0.
Similarly, computing the impact of high-skill immigration, we obtain from Eqs. (4.34)
and (4.35)
d ln (wL/wM)
d lnNH
= − σ − 
(− 1)σΓH ,
d ln (wM/wH)
d lnNH
= − σ − 
(− 1)σ [1 + ∆H ] ,
where now ΓH and ∆H denote the relative change in the range of technology modes due
to low-skill immigration, and by Proposition 4.1, ΓH > 0 and ∆H < 0.
It is immediately evident that low-skill and high-skill immigration affects relative wages
11However, each scenarios may be considered to reflect specific moments in the past, e.g. the guest
workers program in many European countries in the 1970s, reflecting low-skill immigration scenario;
or the collapse of Soviet Union early 1990s which lead to an increase of immigration of scientists (e.g.
mathematicians and physicists) to the US, reflecting high-skill immigration scenario.
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between low-skilled and medium-skilled workers and between medium-skilled and high-
skilled workers through the two channels, the labor supply and the technology adoption
effects, respectively. However, the endogenous technology choice will affect the overall
wage structure in the economy. As mentioned earlier, changes in the wage structure is
determined by the interaction between goods demand elasticity and the market power of
monopolists, and the extent final-good producers are able to adopt the skill-complement
technology modes in the neighborhood of zL and zH . The next proposition summarizes
the main results.
Proposition 4.2 (Low-skill and High-skill Immigration and Changes in the Wage
Structure). Immigration of low-skilled and high-skilled workers generates a market size
effect, raising the competition among same skilled workers. It also enhances the
comparative advantage of the technology mode and the mass of intermediate goods
complementing the respective skill. For a sufficient positive and finite degree of technology
adoption, i.e. 0 < {ε˜L, ε˜H} < ∞, immigration has the following impact on the wage
structure
(i) Low-skilled immigration induces a wage effect similar to “unskill-biased”
technical change, i.e. a rise in relative increase in the wage rate of low-skilled
workers compared to medium-skilled workers, and a relative rise in the wage rate of
medium-skill workers compared to high-skilled workers, whenever the goods demand
elasticity is larger than the market power of monopolists (elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods), i.e. σ > ; the converse is true if σ < .
(ii) High-skill immigration leads to a monotonic increase in the skill premium
similar to the impact of “skill-biased” technical change, i.e. a relative increase
in the wage rate of medium-skilled workers compared to low-skilled workers, and
a relative rise in the wage rate of high-skill workers compared to medium-skilled
workers,, whenever the goods demand elasticity is larger than the market power of
monopolists (elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods), i.e. σ > ; the
converse is true if σ < .
Moreover, if in the neighborhood of technology margins zL and zH
(iii) the degree of substitution between technology modes becomes extremely easy, i.e.
{ε˜L, ε˜H} → 0, then the domestic wage structure becomes asymptotically insensitive
to immigration,
(iv) the degree of substitution between technology modes in the neighborhood of margins,
zL and zH , becomes extremely difficult, i.e. {ε˜L, ε˜H} → ∞, then the relative wage
between medium-skilled and high-skilled workers becomes asymptotically insensitive
to low-skill immigration, while the relative wage between low-skilled and medium-
skilled is insensitive to high-skill immigration.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.3.
As discussed above, lower values of ε˜L (ε˜H) indicate that for final good producer it is easy
to substitute (H-) L-technology mode by M -technology mode in the neighborhood of zL
(zH). Recalling Figure 4.4, in the limit of perfect substitutability, i.e. {ε˜L, ε˜H} → 0, Eqs.
(5.3) and (5.4) become horizontal lines, so that any changes in the exogenous variables,
leads to a proportional shift along these horizontal lines. In contrast, higher values of
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ε˜L (ε˜H) imply a low substitutability between (H–) L– and M–technology modes in the
neighborhood of zL (zH). In this case, the curves denoted by Eqs. (5.3) and (5.4) become
vertical lines. Consequently, in the limiting case when technology adoption is extremely
prohibitive, i.e. {ε˜L, ε˜H} → ∞, the relative range of final goods employing technology
mode M stays constant.
These results highlight the rich pattern of interaction between immigration, endogenous
technology choice, and between consumer preferences and monopolist’s market power.
They also underline the importance of general equilibrium implications, e.g. the
“spillover” effects of low-skill immigration for medium-skilled and high-skilled workers
due to the endogenous response of firms to technology choice and changes in the skill
mix. Particularly, the results highlight the important role of endogenous technology
choice, mitigating the direct labor supply driven wage effects, and thus reconciling the
empirical findings discussed in the introduction.
4.6.2 Medium-skill immigration and distributional effect
In this section, I discuss the potential wage effects of medium-skilled migration scenario,
reflecting recent observations in many old member states of the EU which have
experienced a rapid increase in the share of immigrants with medium-skill attainments
in the course of EU enlargement towards Eastern and Central European countries (cf.
Muysken et al., 2015). To compute the comparative statics, utilize Eqs. (4.34) and (4.35)
and differentiate with respect to medium-skilled labor endowment (dNM > 0) to obtain
d ln (wL/wM)
d lnNM
=
σ − 
(− 1)σ [ΓM − 1] ,
d ln (wM/wH)
d lnNM
= − σ − 
(− 1)σ [∆M − 1] ,
where ΓM ≡ d ln[zL/(zH−zL)]d lnNM and ∆M ≡
d ln[(zH−zL)/(1−zH)]
d lnNM
denote the relative change in
the range of technology modes due to medium-skill immigration and by Proposition 4.1
ΓM < 0 and ∆M > 0. The next proposition summarizes the main results.
Proposition 4.3 (Medium-skill Immigration and Wage Polarization). Immigration of
medium-skilled workers generates a market size effect, raising the competition among
same skilled workers, and the comparative advantage of the medium-skill complement
technology mode and the mass of intermediate goods utilizing medium-skilled workers. If
the degree of technology adoption is sufficiently positive and finite, i.e. 0 < {ε˜L, ε˜H} <∞,
then medium-skilled immigration induce unambiguously a
(i) A polarization effect, where medium-skilled wages decline relative to low-skilled and
high-skilled wages, whenever monopolist’s market power is higher than the goods
demand elasticity, i.e. σ < .
(ii) An increase in medium-skilled wages relative to low-skilled and high-skilled wages,
whenever σ > .
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.4.
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The intuition behind the results is similar to the one discussed in Proposition 4.2.
However, Proposition 4.3 denotes an important difference to low-skilled and high-skilled
immigration scenarios. Medium-skill immigration may potentially generate a polarizing
wage effect.
4.7 Conclusion
Immigration has a potential impact on the skill structure of the host economy. The
existing studies have emphasized the important role of endogenous technology changes,
firm heterogeneity, and endogenous choice between different production techniques in
explaining the differential trends in wage inequality in many advanced countries over the
last decades. One set of studies has highlighted the role of skill-capital complementarity
and endogenous technical change, translating changes in the skill mix into changes in
factor intensity and to higher returns for those factors. Another set of studies has
emphasized the role of endogenous choice of production technology. The implication of
this latter channel differs from the former one by indicating that the initial direct supply
effect on wages may dissipates over time as immigration induces higher investments by
firms in production techniques, complements workers who were affected by immigration.
Yet, we are lacking in understanding the determinants of and the interaction between
these two competing arguments. This paper provides a tractable model that allows for
a richer structure of the goods market associated with endogenous technology adoption,
monopolistic competition and technology-skill complementarity. Moreover, the labor
market consists of low-, medium- and high-skilled workers and the production technology
exhibits increasing returns to scale. This latter property allows to capture the implications
of directed technical change regarding changes skill premium due to immigration-induced
changes in the skill mix. In doing so, I investigate jointly the extent and the direction of
potential driving forces in the general equilibrium context.
The theoretical analysis uncovers several new insights. First, immigration-induced
changes in the domestic wage structure can be decomposed into two key channels: i)
a labor supply effect, and ii) a technology adoption effect. Second, the direction of
each of these channels depend on the relative magnitude between consumer preference,
i.e. goods demand elasticity, and the market power of monopolists, i.e. the elasticity
of substitution between intermediates. Third, relative magnitude between these two
channels is characterized by the interaction between a direct and an indirect market size
effect. On the one hand, immigration-induced changes in the skill structure generates a
direct market size effect, associated with higher profitability of producing intermediate
goods and hence an increase in the mass of monopolists employing those type of workers.
On the other hand, immigration also induces an indirect scale effect, associated with
endogenous technology adoption due to immigration-induced changes in the comparative
advantages between different technology modes. This latter scale effect effect induces an
increase in the relative price of competing goods and hence raises the mass of monopolists
in industries sheltered from immigration, indicating a biased price effect for competing
technology modes. More interestingly, the analysis reveals that the extent of the indirect
scale effect depends crucially on the degree of adoption between the different technology
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modes.
The predictions of the comparative statics regarding impact of immigration on the
domestic wage structure reveals the following novel insights. Whenever the consumer
preferences are more elastic compared to the market power of monopolists, the market
size effect will dominate the biased price effect. Moreover, in the case where the adoption
between different technology modes becomes very easy, the domestic wage structure
becomes in sensitive to immigration-induced changes in the skill mix. More interestingly,
in the empirically plausible scenario, where the market power of monopolists is larger
than the goods demand elasticity and the choice between different technology modes is
characterized by a sufficient degree of imperfect substitutability, low-skilled (high-skill)
immigration induces changes in the wage structure similar to a “skill-biased” (“unskill-
biased”) technical change, while medium-skilled immigration induces a polarization of
the domestic wage structure.
These results highlight the important aspect of general equilibrium implications,
capturing a rich set of competing channels. Thus, this framework contributes to
the existing literature by highlighting the key features characterizing immigration-
induced changes in the domestic wage structure, which are consistent with empirical
observations regarding the patterns of wage inequality in many advanced countries over
the last decades. Understanding these adjustment mechanisms has also important policy
implications. It allows to response effectively to immigration shock by directing efficiently
its impact.
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Appendix
4.A Proofs
4.A.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
First, notice again that perfect competition requires, i.e. pik(z) = 0 for all z and k = {L,M,H}. Thus,
considering two firms using the same technology, we must have
pL(z)ϕL(z) = pL(z
′)ϕL(z′), ∀ z, z′ ∈ [0, zL]
pM (z)ϕM (z) = pM (z
′)ϕM (z′), ∀ z, z′ ∈ (zL, zH)
pH(z)ϕH(z) = pH(z
′)ϕH(z′), ∀ z, z′ ∈ [zH , 1]
This implies that the price of each final good, p(z), adjusts to changes in the productivity of the
technology, ϕ(z). Let Pk denote the price index of technology mode k = {L,M,H}, then we can
rewrite the price schedule of each technology mode as follows
pk(z) = Pkϕk(z)
−1. (4.A.36)
From the optimal demand condition for final goods Eq. (4.3), it can be shown that the total production
cost of Y is given by
∫ 1
0
p(z)y(z)d = CY Y , where CY denotes the unit costs, i.e.
CY =
[∫ zL
0
pL(z)
1−σd +
∫ zH
zL
pM (z)
1−σd +
∫ 1
zH
pH(z)
1−σd
] 1
1−σ
.
Now, the optimal choice of cut-off points zL and zH is obtained by minimizing CY w.r.t. zL and zH :
dCY
dzL
=
1
1− σC
σ
Y
(
pL(zL)
1−σ − pM (zL)1−σ
)
= 0, (4.A.37)
dCY
dzH
=
1
1− σC
σ
Y
(
pM (zH)
1−σ − pH(zH)1−σ
)
= 0. (4.A.38)
Using (5.6) for the respective technology mode, we get that dCYdzL = 0 and
dCY
dzH
= 0 if and only if
PL
PM
= ΛL(zL), ΛL(zL) ≡
(
ϕL(zL)
ϕM (zL)
)
,
PM
PH
= ΛH(zH), ΛH(zH) ≡
(
ϕM (zH)
ϕH(zH)
)
.
To prove that 0 < zL < zH < 1, recall from Assumption 4 that
d ln ΛL(z)
dz
<
d ln ΛH(z)
dz
< 0.
Given this property, there must exist a range of values of the relative price indexes such that 0 < zL <
zH < 1. It can be easily verified that if
PL
PM
> ΛL(0), then low-tech technology has no comparative
advantages to be installed for production of any final good z ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, if PMPH < ΛH(1), it is not
cost-efficient to install high-tech technology to produce any final good z ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, in Lemma 4.1, Eq.
(4.8) provides the range of values of PLPM and
PM
PH
that permits the existence of all the three technology
modes. Figure 4.5 depicts the equilibrium technology allocation for arbitrary values of relative price
indexes that satisfy these conditions.
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Figure 4.5: Equilibrium technology allocation
zL zH 10
ln(PL/PM)
ln(PM/PH)
ln ΛL(z)
ln ΛH(z)
4.A.2 Proof of Proposition 4.1
The computation of the comparative statics for the other exogenous changes is similar to the one
conducted for changes in the composite factor labor NM due to exogenous variation in marginal offshoring
cost and immigration of medium-skilled workers. To do so, recall the implicit 2× 2 system of equations,
Eqs. (5.30) and (5.31). Now, differentiating totally this system and applying Cramer’s rule, we obtain
the following results for exogenous variation in:
• High-skill endowment
d ln zL
d lnNH
=
DH
DJ = −
1
zL(zH−zL)
DJ < 0, (4.A.39)
d ln zL
d ln fH
= − d ln zL
d lnNH
> 0 (4.A.40)
and
d ln zH
d lnNH
=
DH
DJ = −
−1

ε˜L
zHzL
+ 1zL(zH−zL)
DJ < 0. (4.A.41)
d ln zH
d ln fH
= − d ln zH
d lnNH
> 0 (4.A.42)
• Low-skill endowment
d ln zL
d lnNL
=
DL
DJ =
−1

ε˜H
zLzH
+ 1−zLzL(1−zH)(zH−zL)
DJ > 0, (4.A.43)
d ln zL
d ln fL
= − d ln zL
d lnNL
< 0 (4.A.44)
and
d ln zH
d lnNL
=
DL
DJ =
1
zH(zH−zL)
DJ > 0. (4.A.45)
d ln zH
d ln fL
= − d ln zH
d lnNL
< 0 (4.A.46)
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where the Jacobi is given by
DJ =
(
− 1

ε˜L
zL
+
1
zL
)(
− 1

ε˜H
zH
+
1− zL
(1− zH)(zH − zL)
)
+
1
zH − zL
(
− 1

ε˜H
zH
+
1
1− zH
)
> 0 (4.A.47)
Moreover, from (4.A.39) and (4.A.41) it can be readily verified that
d ln zH − d ln zL
d lnNH
= − 1DJ
(
− 1

ε˜L
zHzL
)
< 0 (4.A.48)
and similarly from (4.A.43) and (4.A.45)
d ln zH − d ln zL
d lnNL
= − 1DJ
(
− 1

ε˜H
zHzL
+
1
zHzL(1− zH)
)
< 0 (4.A.49)
4.A.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Low-skilled immigration
To obtain explicit solution for the terms ΓL ≡ d ln[zL/(zH−zL)]d lnNL and ∆L ≡
d ln[(zH−zL)/(1−zH)]
d lnNL
, we can
utilize the results of the comparative statics in Eqs. (4.A.43) and (4.A.45) to obtain the following terms
ΓL =
zH
zH − zL
(
d ln zL − d ln zH
d lnNL
)
=
1
DJ
(
− 1

ε˜H
zL(zH − zL) +
1
zL(1− zH)(zH − zL)
)
> 0 (4.A.50)
and
∆L = −
(
zL
zH − zL
d ln zL
d lnNL
− zH(1− zL)
(1− zH)(zH − zL)
d ln zH
d lnNL
)
= − 1DJ
(
zL
zH − zL
(
− 1

ε˜H
zLzH
+
1− zL
zL(1− zH)(zH − zL)
)
− zH(1− zL)
(1− zH)(zH − zL)
1
zH(zH − zL)
)
= − 1DJ
(
− 1

ε˜H
(zH − zL)zH
)
< 0 (4.A.51)
It is immediately evident from Eqs. (4.A.50) and (4.A.51) that the extent of changes in the technology
margins zL and zH depends crucially on the elasticity of technology adoption in the neighborhood of zL
(ε˜L) and zH (ε˜H). We can distinguish between several cases.
If it is extremely difficult for final good producer to replace technology mode M by L in the neighborhood
of zL, then it follows
lim
ε˜L→∞
DJ
∣∣∣
ε˜H>0
= ∞ ⇒ lim
ε˜L→∞
ΓL
∣∣∣
ε˜H>0
= ∆L
∣∣∣
ε˜H>0
= 0,
implying no changes at the extensive margin. In other extreme case, where technology adoption is very
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easy, we obtain
lim
{ε˜H ,ε˜L}→0
DJ = 1
zL(zH − zL)(1− zH)
⇒ lim
{ε˜H ,ε˜L}→0
ΓL = 1
⇒ lim
{ε˜H ,ε˜L}→0
∆L = 0.
This implies that changes in the technology margin zL is proportional to changes in the low-skilled labor
supply and so does the relative range between low-skill and medium-skill technology modes, while the
usage of medium-skill technology mode relative to high-skill technology mode stays constant.
Hence, for an intermediate range of values of the parameters, 0 < {ε˜L, ε˜H} < ∞, i.e. for a sufficient
degree of imperfect substitutability between technology modes,
0 < ΓL < 1, 0 < |∆L| < 1.
High-skilled immigration
To obtain explicit solution for the terms ΓH ≡ d ln[zL/(zH−zL)]d lnNH and ∆H ≡
d ln[(zH−zL)/(1−zH)]
d lnNH
, we can
utilize the results of the comparative statics in Eqs. (4.A.39) and (4.A.41) to obtain the following terms
ΓH =
zH
zH − zL
(
d ln zL − d ln zH
d lnNH
)
=
1
DJ
(
− 1

ε˜L
(zH − zL)zL
)
> 0 (4.A.52)
and
∆H =
(
zH(1− zL)
(1− zH)(zH − zL)
d ln zH
d lnNH
− zL
zH − zL
d ln zL
d lnNH
)
= − 1DJ
(
zH(1− zL)
(1− zH)(zH − zL)
(
− 1

ε˜L
zHzL
+
1
zL(zH − zL)
)
− zL
zH − zL
1
zL(zH − zL)
)
= − 1DJ
(
− 1

ε˜L(1− zL)
(1− zH)(zH − zL)zL +
1
zL(zH − zL)(1− zH)
)
< 0 (4.A.53)
High-skill immigration induces an opposite effect compared to low-skill immigration. Now, it is
immediately evident from Eqs. (4.A.52) and (4.A.53) that the magnitude of changes in the technology
margins zL and zH now depends crucially on the elasticity of technology adoption at the margin zH , ε˜H .
Thus, if it is extremely difficult for final good producer to replace technology mode M by H, it follows
lim
ε˜H→∞
DJ
∣∣∣
ε˜L>0
= ∞ ⇒ lim
ε˜H→∞
ΓH
∣∣∣
ε˜L>0
= ∆H
∣∣∣
ε˜L>0
= 0.
In other extreme case, where technology adoption is very easy, we obtain
lim
{ε˜H ,ε˜L}→0
DJ = 1
zL(zH − zL)(1− zH)
⇒ lim
{ε˜H ,ε˜L}→0
ΓH = 0
⇒ lim
{ε˜H ,ε˜L}→0
∆H = 1.
This implies that changes in the technology margin zH is proportional to changes in the high-skilled
labor supply and so does the relative range between high-skill and medium-skill technology modes, while
the usage of medium-skill technology mode relative to low-skill technology mode stays constant.
Hence, for an intermediate range of values of the parameters, ∞ > {ε˜L, ε˜H} > 0, i.e. for a sufficient
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degree of imperfect substitutability between technology modes,
0 < ΓH < 1, 0 < ∆H < 1.
4.A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.3
To derive the explicit solution for ΓM ≡ d ln[zL/(zH−zL)]d lnNM and ∆M ≡
d ln[(zH−zL)/(1−zH)]
d lnNM
, utilize the results
of the comparative statics in Eqs. (4.30) and (4.31) to obtain the following terms
ΓM = − zH
zH − zL
(
d ln zH − d ln zL
d lnNM
)
= − 1DJ
(
1
zL(zH − zL)(1− zH) +
− 1

ε˜L + ε˜H
(zH − zL)zL
)
< 0 (4.A.54)
and
∆M =
zH(1− zL)
(1− zH)(zH − zL)
d ln zH
d lnNM
− zL
zH − zL
d ln zL
d lnNM
=
1
DJ
(
zH(1− zL)
(1− zH)(zH − zL)
(
1
zHzL
+
− 1

ε˜L
zHzL
)
+
zL
zH − zL
(
1
(1− zH)zL +
(− 1)ε˜H
zHzL
))
=
1
DJ
(
1
(1− zH)(zH − zL)zL +
− 1

(
(1− zL)
(1− zH)(zH − zL)
ε˜L
zL
+
1
zH − zL
ε˜H
zH
))
> 0 (4.A.55)
where the Jacobi is given by Eq. (5.A.89). Now, taking the limits of the elasticities ε˜L and ε˜H , it can
be readily verified
lim
{ε˜L,ε˜H}→0
DJ = 1
(1− zH)(zH − zL)zL ⇒ lim{ε˜L,ε˜H}→0 ΓM = −∆M = −1
lim
{ε˜L,ε˜H}→∞
DJ = ∞ ⇒ lim{ε˜L,ε˜H}→∞ΓM = ∆M = 0
4.B Derivation of equilibrium solutions
4.B.1 Demand for intermediate goods
Any firm in the final goods market chooses the optimal amount of intermediate goods by minimizing the
production cost
Ck =
∫ Ak
0
pk(j)xk(j)dj, ∀ k = {L,M,H}
subject to CES aggregate (5.7). The optimization programming can be defined by the following
Lagrangian:
min
xk(j)
Lk =
∫ Ak
0
pk(j)xk(j)dj − ζk
Xk − [∫ Ak
0
xk(j)
−1

] 
−1
 ,
where ζk denotes the Lagrangian multiplier. From the first-order condition
∂Lk
∂xk(j)
= pk(j)− ζkX1/k xk(j)−1/ = 0, (4.B.56)
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we obtain the optimal inverse demand condition for each intermediate goods produced under technology
mode k. Utilizing (4.B.56) into the constraint, Eq. (5.7), the Lagrangian multiplier denotes the “cost
index” of the composite good
ζk =
[∫ Ak
0
pk(j)
1−dj
] 1
1−
, (4.B.57)
and inserting (4.B.56) back into the cost function yields
Ck = ζkXk. (4.B.58)
4.B.2 Derivation of the mass of monopolists
Notice that the perfectly competitive nature of the final goods market requires zero profits, i.e.
pk(z)yk(z) = ζkXk, ∀ k = {L,M,H}
Moreover, using Eqs. (4.2) and (4.5), it follows that in any competitive equilibrium the price index of
technology mode k must equal its marginal cost, i.e.
Pk = ζk (4.B.59)
Now, utilizing the equilibrium value of ζk from Eq. (4.17), yields
Pk = ζk =

− 1A
1
1−
k wk. (4.B.60)
Then, the total budget constraint of any final good producer z ∈ Sk requires
p(z)y(z) = wknk =
wkNk
Sk ,
where the second equality follows from Eqs. (5.17)–(5.19), for the respective technology mode.
Utilize Eqs. (4.2) and (4.5) in the left hand side of the previous equation and manipulate to obtain
PkA

−1
k xk =
wkNk
Sk .
Next, use the FE condition (5.14), and Eq. (5.B.101) to substitute for xk and Pk in the previous equation,
respectively, so that after some manipulation we obtain
Akfkwk =
wkNk
Sk .
Rearranging and solving w.r.t. Ak yields the equilibrium mass of monopolists in the respective technology
mode.
4.B.3 Derivation of aggregate sectoral output
The derivation of the aggregate sectoral output is illustrated for technology mode complementing low-
skilled workers. The aggregation over the range of all final goods using the other two types of technology
can be derived similarly. Define the total cost using low-skilled technology as
PLYL =
∫ zL
0
p(z)y(z)dz.
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Utilizing Eqs. (4.5) and (4.23) yields
PLYL =
∫ zL
0
p(z)ϕL(z)A
1
−1
L
NL
zL
dz,
=
∫ zL
0
PLA

−1
L
NL
zL
dz.
Manipulating slightly, we get
YL = A
1
−1
L NL.
Following the same steps, we obtain
YM = A
1
−1
M NM ,
YH = A
1
−1
H NH .
4.B.4 Derivation of relative wages
The relative wage between low- and medium-skilled workers (wL/wM ) can be derived as follows. First,
recall the optimal final-goods demand condition (4.3) and take rations with respect to M to obtain
yL(z)/yM (z
′) = (pL(z)/pM (z′))−σ
yM (z
′)/yH(z′′) = (pM (z′)/pH(z′′))−σ
for any z ∈ [0, zL), z′ ∈ (zL, zH), and z′′ ∈ (zH , 1]. It is important to notice that at the cut-off margins zL
and zH the relative demand for final goods is undefined since at those margins the planer is indifferent
between the different technology modes. Now substituting Eqs. (4.5) and (4.23) into the previously
derived equations yields
PL
PM
=
(
zL
zH − zL
) 1
σ
(
YL
YM
)− 1σ
ΛL(z, z
′)
σ−1
σ =
([
AL
AM
] 1
−1 NL
NM
[
zL
zH − zL
]−1)− 1σ
ΛL(z, z
′)
σ−1
σ ,(4.B.61)
PM
PH
=
(
zH − zL
1− zH
) 1
σ
(
YM
YH
)− 1σ
ΛH(z
′, z′′)
σ−1
σ =
([
AM
AH
] 1
−1 NM
NH
[
zH − zL
1− zH
]−1)− 1σ
ΛH(z
′, z′′)
σ−1
σ ,(4.B.62)
where ΛL(z, z
′) ≡ ϕL(z)ϕM (z′) and ΛH(z′, z′′) ≡
ϕM (z
′)
ϕH(z′′)
are constants.
Next, recall the zero profit condition (4.B.59) for the final good producers and take the ratio between
technology mode k = L and k = M and between technology mode k = M and k = H to obtain,
respectively,
ζL
ζM
=
PL
PM
, (4.B.63)
ζM
ζH
=
PM
PH
. (4.B.64)
Substituting Eq. (5.B.105) for PL/PM into Eq. (4.B.63) and inserting the outcome into Eq. (4.32) yields
wL
wM
=
([
AL
AM
] 1
−1 NL
NM
[
zL
zH − zL
]−1)− 1σ (
XL
XM
)1/(
xL
xM
)−1/
.
Notice that due to symmetry assumption it follows from (5.7) Xk = A

−1
k xk. Recall from Eqs. (4.18)
and (4.19) the equilibrium values of AL and AM and utilize them in the previous equation, respectively,
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and manipulating slightly to obtain
wL
wM
=
(
NL
NM
) σ−
(−1)σ
(
zL
zH − zL
)− σ−
(−1)σ
KL,M .
where KL,M ≡
(
fL
fM
)− σ−1
(−1)σ
ΛL(z, z
′)
σ−1
σ . Thus, the relative wage rates between low-skill and medium-
skill workers can be decomposed into the following terms
wL
wM
=
(
zL
zH − zL
)− σ−
(−1)σ
N
σ−
(−1)σ
L (NM )
− σ−
(−1)σ KL,M .
Following similar steps, i.e. (5.B.106) for PM/PH into Eq. (4.B.64) and inserting the outcome into Eq.
(4.33) yields the relative wage rate between medium-skill and high-skill workers derived in the text:
wM
wH
=
(
zH − zL
1− zH
)− σ−
(−1)σ
N
− σ−
(−1)σ
H (NM )
σ−
(−1)σ KH,M ,
where KH,M ≡
(
fM
fH
)− σ−1
(−1)σ
ΛH(z
′, z′′)
σ−1
σ .
135

5Immigration, Offshoring, Tasks and Technology
Adoption: Implications for Native Wage Structure1
5.1 Introduction
Immigration and the relocation of jobs abroad by multinationals, i.e. offshoring of
domestic jobs, are often blamed for adverse labor market outcomes for native workers.
Yet, the empirical findings on the impact of these two aspects of globalization of labor
services on wages and employment of native workers are ambiguous. The literature
provides several explanations for this. On the one hand, there is a labor supply effect,
indicating the direct displacement effect due to increasing labor market competition. On
the other hand, there are several indirect channels which may offset the direct adverse
effect.
Recent studies have emphasized one salient feature associated with a cost-efficiency
enhancing effect of the production process due to reallocation of jobs (tasks) from natives
to immigrants (characterized by high intensity in manual, non-interactive content of tasks,
cf. Peri (2012); Peri and Sparber (2009)) and to offshore workers (characterized by high
intensity in routine, easily codifiable content of tasks, cf. Blinder (2009a); Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)). The rationale behind this efficiency effect is in the spirit of
Ricardian comparative advantage and Smithian specialization forces.2 Another potential
indirect mechanism proposed in the literature is through directed technological changes
(cf. Acemoglu, 2002a) or the adoption of production techniques (cf. Beaudry et al., 2010).
The idea is that immigration-induced increase in some production factors lead firms to
1I am grateful for valuable comments and discussions to Joan Muysken and Thomas Ziesemer. I
would also like to thank participants at ETSG 2015 Paris.
2Since factor labor is sector/firm specific, cost-efficiency gains induced by immigration and offshoring
are associated with factor-augmenting productivity effects. Thus, in what follows the terms productivity
effect and efficiency effect are used interchangeably.
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adopt production technologies that are more efficient and intensive in the use of that
factor (cf. Dustmann and Glitz, 2012; Gauthier-Loiselle and Hunt, 2008; Gonza´lez and
Ortega, 2011; Lewis, 2003).3 Thus, these endogenous adjustments (task-skill reallocation
and choice of production techniques) highlight the efficiency gains induced by either
type of globalization of labor that may paradoxically benefit all workers. This evidence
has elicited the need for an alternative theoretical paradigm that allows for a richer
microfounded model regarding differential specialization patterns between immigrants
and natives, or between jobs produced at home and abroad. This paper provides an
integrated theoretical framework that allows to jointly investigate the distributional
impact of immigration and offshoring, and to analyze the adjustment mechanisms and
their underlying determinants.
Formally, I develop the key features of the general equilibrium model in the following
steps. First, the model economy is considered that features a rich structure of goods
and labor markets, characterized by firm heterogeneity, endogenous technology adoption,
monopolistic competition, skill heterogeneity, and technology-skill complementarity.
Moreover, due to endogenous changes in the mass of monopolists, the specialization
pattern generates increasing returns to scale similar to (a multi-sector version of)
semi-end- ogenous growth models as in Romer (1987).4 Second, the internal work
organization is captured by endogenous task-allocation mechanisms between immigrants
and natives, where consistent with empirical observations tasks are ordered according
to their communication, interpersonal intensity, so that immigrants specialize in low
index tasks, while natives perform the higher indexed tasks. In fact, Ottaviano et al.
(2013) show for the U.S. that immigrants are proportionately more in jobs with high
content of manual tasks, while natives are concentrated in jobs with a high intensity of
communication and complexity content of tasks, see Figure 5.1. In this case, immigration-
induced labor supply shock exhibits a dynamic characteristic, captured by an endogenous
response of natives in more communication intensive tasks. Finally, the framework is
extended to allow for offshoring in terms of fragmentation of domestic jobs (intermediates)
abroad in the spirit of models of international fragmentation of the production process
along the value added chain, or trade in intermediate inputs (cf. Feenstra and Hanson,
1999; Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001; Kohler, 2004a; Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 2010). In this way,
we are able to capture various aspects of recent trends in globalization of labor by
integrating important features of different strands in the literature.
Task allocation and offshoring induce several noteworthy consequences in this
environment. First, immigration and offshoring induce two counteracting scale
externalities. One the one hand, they induce a direct market-size effect by raising
the skill endowment in the intermediate goods sector and the number of intermediate
variety, respectively. This is in turn associated with endogenous changes in the mass
of intermediate firms employing those factors most intensively – capturing the notion
of directed technological change as in Acemoglu (2002b). On the other hand, there
is endogenous technology adoption of complementing production modes – reflecting a
3In a recent study Ghosh et al. (2014) examine the impact of changes in the H-1B cap on the
performance of US firms, and find that relaxing the cap on the H-1B visas raises the average labor
productivity, the size and profits of firms contacting heavily R&D.
4See chapter 4 for elaborate formal discussions regarding the wage effects of immigration and the
implications of endogenous technology adoption under increasing returns to scale.
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Figure 5.1: Immigrants and task specialization
(a) Immigrants and communication intensity
(b) Immigrants and manual intensity
Notes: Communication intensity measures the ability regarding written and oral expression
and understanding; manual intensity measures the ability regarding dexterity, strength, and
coordination. The slope of the regression line (standard error) in Panel (a): −0.14 (0.01),
in Panel (b): 0.087 (0.01). Source: Ottaviano et al. (2013).
technology adoption effect. Thisindirect effect, emerging from the expansion of the range
of final goods, tends to counteract the direct effect by increasing the relative price of
goods produced under the competing technology modes – an effect analog to the notion
of internal and external externalities as in Ethier (1982).
The key feature of this approach is its convenient structure allowing to obtain strong
analytical results and precise conditions to sign the three channels (i) the technology
adoption effect, (ii) the market size effect, and (iii) the efficiency effect as well as
the interaction between them, denoting another novelty of this paper. First, the
direction of each of these channels is determined by the relative strength between
goods demand elasticity and the market power of monopolists. Second, the relative
magnitude between the technology adoption and market size effects depends on the degree
of substitutability between different technology modes. Finally, the relative strength
of efficiency effect induced by immigration (through task-reallocation) and offshoring
(through job reallocation) depends crucially on the initial share of tasks allocated to
immigrants and the initial of offshoring rate. At initial low levels, the productivity effect
becomes unambiguously the dominating force. Thus, offshoring of medium skill-intensive
139
5.2 Related literature
jobs (intermediates) generate similar wage distributional effects to task reallocation
induced by medium-skilled immigration.This analogy, to the best of my knowledge, is
novel.
Furthermore, the comparative statics analysis uncovers several new insights regarding the
potential impact of globalization of labor on native wage structure. In the empirically
more relevant case where the market power of monopolists (i.e. the elasticity of
substitution between intermediates) is larger than the goods demand elasticity, low-
skill immigration induces a wage effect similar to unskill-biased technological change,
associated with a monotonic decline in the skill premium across the skill groups, while
high-skill immigration induces a wage effect similar to skill-augmenting to technological
changes. The wage distributional impact of medium-skill immigration and offshoring has
a non-monotonic feature. More precisely, they induce a hump-shaped wage effect implied
by high efficiency gains whenever the extent of exposure is initially low, while at initial
high levels of exposure changes natives relative wage structure are characterized by a
U-shaped relationship.
Although this paper does not account for other important factors like endogenous
skill supply, labor market frictions, or institutional factors, the results discussed above
highlight the rich pattern of interacting adjustment mechanisms and are consistent with
the broad empirical observations of various points in time registering changes in the wage
structure in many advanced over the last decades. Thus, this framework highlights the
departure from recent immigration and offshoring literature (cf. Acemoglu et al., 2012;
Olney, 2012; Ottaviano et al., 2013), which are discussed below.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the related literature
is reviewed. The basic setup of the theoretical framework together with the elaborating
discussion of task-based approach are presented in section 5.3. The characteristics of
the equilibrium are illustrated in section 5.4, followed by the comparative static analysis
of the impact of immigration on native wage structure in section 5.5. The extension of
the model with respect to offshoring medium skill-intensive jobs and the analysis of its
distributional effect for native workers are elaborated in section 5.6. Finally, concluding
remarks are provided in section 5.7.
5.2 Related literature
There exists a large body of studies that have sought to analyze the labor market
impacts of immigration and offshoring. This paper contributes to different strands in the
literature. First, it is a contribution to a growing but still small literature addressing
jointly wage an employment effects of immigration and offshoring (cf. Olney, 2012;
Ottaviano et al., 2013; Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 2010). The main point of departure to these
studies is the endogenous adoption behavior between different production techniques.
For example, guided by the theoretical task-based approach a` la Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008), Olney (2012) and Ottaviano et al. (2013) analyze empirically the direct
and indirect effects of offshoring and immigration for the United States. Imposing
implicitly perfect substitutability between immigrants and natives, Olney (2012) finds
opposite effects where immigration hurts low-skilled native workers through higher labor
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market competition, while offshoring induces a positive demand effect for the domestic
low-skilled labor, driven by the indirect efficiency improvements in the production process.
Contrary, using the general task-assignment model of Acemoglu and Autor (2011),
Ottaviano et al. (2013) allow immigrants and natives to specialize in different tasks, and
find that immigration and offshoring both generate efficiency effects for native workers.5
Second, this paper is also contributing to the large literature on the theoretical
determinants of offshoring- and technology-induced changes in the wage structure (cf.
Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2012; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Egger
et al., 2013; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008).6 Closely related to this paper is the
study by Acemoglu et al. (2012), who investigate the impact of offshoring on directed
technological changes and skill premium. The results in this paper share similar features
to their analytical findings. For instance, they show that offshoring induces an efficiency
effect, and its magnitude depends on the level of the offshoring rate. The offshoring-
induced changes in the wage structure are the results of endogenous technological changes,
where the direction of this effect is crucially affected by the interaction between goods
demand elasticity and the elasticity of substitution between intermediates. However, the
structure and the underlying determinants of the mechanism analyzed in this paper differ
in three main respects from their approach. First, they consider only a dichotomous
skill distribution and thus neglect addressing recent observations regarding polarizing
wage trends. Second, by accounting for endogenous choice between different production
techniques, the results of the present analysis reveal that a strength of the direct market
size effect, as highlighted by Acemoglu et al. (2012), will eventually vanish as the degree of
technology adoption becomes very high. Finally, differently from Acemoglu et al. (2012),
the framework of the present paper allows to compare the implications of immigration
and offshore for native workers regarding changes in the composition of jobs and tasks.
Third, this paper is also related to the literature examining the role of firm heterogeneity
in conjunction with distributional effects of offshoring. In a two-country model with firm
heterogeneity a` la Melitz (2003), Egger et al. (2013) analyze the welfare and distributional
impacts of offshoring. They show that offshoring generates a non-monotonic income
distribution effect in the share of offshoring firms. The intuition for this relationship is
that at initial high levels of variable offshoring costs, the share of offshoring firms is low,
and a marginal decline in offshoring cost induces an unfavorable shift of domestic labor
from more to low productive firms, inducing a deteriorating welfare effect (in terms of
income per capita). This result highlights the efficiency gains at the intensive margin,
while instead this framework accounts for efficiency gains the the extensive margin.
However, the important departure of the present analysis from their framework is marked
by the assumption of skill heterogeneity. This allows to address the direct and indirect
implications of globalization for various skill groups – a crucial feature that is ignored in
5Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2010) examines the offshoring-induced interaction between productivity and term-
of-trade effects in a two-country model. He shows that higher fragmentation shifts workers to the
research sector. This effect leads, in the short-run, to a decline in the real wages due to a dominating
negative terms-of-trade effect for the offshoring country, while, in the long run, wages rise due to higher
productivity gains in the wake of higher stock of ideas per worker. Moreover, immigration induces a
net gain effect only for immigrants, since they earn now higher wages in the offshoring country, while
offshoring generates benefits for firms in offshoring countries due to lower unit costs.
6Other recent contributions studying the wage effects of offshoring are Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud
(2014); Costinot and Vogel (2010).
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their framework.
Finally, this paper contributes also to the growing literature on the role of task content
of jobs and the determinants of wage polarization. A number of studies has emphasized
the key role of information and communication technology (ICT) behind the recent wage
polarization (cf. Autor and Dorn, 2013; Autor et al., 2006; Michaels et al., 2014). Another
set of studies provide a competing explanation by emphasizing the role of offshoring
domestic jobs as the key determinant behind this trend (cf. Goos and Manning, 2007;
Goos et al., 2014; Vallizadeh et al., 2015). While the empirical evidence is at odds, there
is, however, a widespread consensus that jobs in the middle range of skill distribution
are mostly prone to offshoring or to be substitute by technology – a feature that is
also captured in this framework. Furthermore, recent empirical evidence has highlighted
the differential specialization pattern between immigrants and natives in complementing
tasks, e.g. in manual and communication intensive tasks, respectively (cf. Peri and
Sparber, 2009). In this sense, this paper integrates different strands in the literature
into a unified general equilibrium framework.
5.3 The Model
This section provides the description of the basic environment of the economy,
characterizing the structure the goods market, the production technology, resource
allocation and the adoption of different production technology modes.7 The following
sections, then, elaborate the formal details of the extension with respect to task allocation
between immigrants and natives and to offshoring opportunities.
5.3.1 Basic environment
The economy is described by a continuum of final goods y(z) combined over the
unit interval according to the following CES production function to produce a final
consumption aggregate
Y =
[∫ zL
0
yL(z)
σ−1
σ dz +
∫ zH
zL
yM(z)
σ−1
σ dz +
∫ 1
zH
yH(z)
σ−1
σ dz
] σ
σ−1
, (5.1)
The final goods are indexed z ∈ [0, 1] in increasing order of production technology
productivity, and σ ≥ 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between final good varieties.
Then, by means of profit maximization subject to Eq. (5.1), the demand for any final
good variety z is given by
yk(z) = Y pk(z)
−σ, for k = {L,M,H} (5.2)
where the price of aggregate consumption good is set to unity, i.e. PY = 1.
7In chapter 4, a detailed analytical discussions of this model economy and its equilibrium
characteristics is provided. Thus, in what follows allocation, formal details are deliberately kept implicit
for the stake of convenience, but whenever necessary they are made explicit.
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Final goods market
The final goods market is perfectly competitive and each final good z can be produced
in three different technology modes: low- (ϕL(z)), medium- (ϕM(z)), and high-quality
(ϕH(z)) techniques. The choice of technology mode is based on the Ricardian type
of comparative advantages, where final good firms self-select endogenously into the
most cost-efficient production technique. As discussed in chapter 4, the equilibrium is
characterized by two endogenous final goods margins, zL and zH , where final good firms
are indifferent between using low- and medium-quality techniques and between medium-
and high-quality techniques, respectively. These conditions are given by
PL
PM
= ΛL(zL), (5.3)
PM
PH
= ΛH(zH), (5.4)
where ΛL(zL) ≡ ϕL(zL)ϕM (zL) and ΛH(zH) ≡
ϕM (zH)
ϕH(zH)
, and both are continuous and decreasing
in their arguments, see chapter 4 for formal details and discussion.
It follows that each technology mode is used to produce a distinct range of final goods
y(z) =

ϕL(z)XL for all z ∈ [0, zL],
ϕM (z)XM for all z ∈ (zL, zH),
ϕH(z)XH for all z ∈ [zH , 1].
(5.5)
where Xk is a composite of intermediate goods, for k = {L,M,H}. The respective price
schedule is given by
p(z) =

PLϕL(z)
−1 for all z ∈ [0, zL],
PMϕM (z)
−1 for all z ∈ (zL, zH),
PHϕH(z)
−1 for all z ∈ [zH , 1],
(5.6)
where Pk denotes the effective price index of final goods, i.e. the price per productive
technology k, which will be defined below.
Intermediate goods market
In contrast to the final goods market, the intermediate goods market is characterized by
monopolistic competition, where each intermediate, in turn, is manufactured by labor
of skill k, denoted by L˜k(j) for variety j. Moreover, each intermediate variety requires
a fixed cost (measured in terms of the numeraire good), where the size depends on the
adopted technology mode, such that fL < fM < fH . The production technology of the
composite good Xk is represented by a CES aggregator over a continuum of intermediate
varieties, indexed by j:
Xk =
(∫ Ak
0
xk(j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
, (5.7)
where xk(j) denotes the amount of intermediate variety j ∈ [0, Ak],  ≥ 1 captures the
elasticity of substitution between varieties, and Ak measures the mass of monopolists in
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technology mode k.8
By means of cost minimization subject to Eq. (5.7), the inverse demand function for
intermediate good j is given by:
pk(j) = ζkX
1

k xk(j)
− 1
 , ∀ k = {L,M,H}, (5.8)
where pk(j) is the price of intermediate variety j produced with technology mode k.
Combining (5.8) with (5.7) yields the marginal cost of composite intermediate goods
ζk =
(∫ Ak
0
pk(j)
1−dj
) 1
1−
. (5.9)
Under the constant elastic demand function (5.8) of degree  > 1, the profit maximizing
monopolist sets the price equal to a markup /(− 1) over the respective marginal cost,
i.e.
pk(j) =

− 1w˜k, (5.10)
where w˜k denotes the marginal cost of k-type factor labor, defined below.
5.3.2 Task allocation between immigrants and natives
As discussed above, recent empirical findings have highlighted the differential comparative
advantages in job task performance between immigrants and natives, where immigrants
tend to perform on average low communicative type of tasks and natives tend to specialize
in communication- and complexity-intensive tasks (Ottaviano et al., 2013; Peri, 2012;
Peri and Sparber, 2009). This has been put forth as the key rationale behind the
imperfect substitutability between immigrants and natives, inducing a productivity effect
for native workers associated with the efficient pattern of task specialization. Building
on Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), a task assignment model is designed that is
characterized by a continuum of tasks over the unit interval. While natives in each skill
group k are homogeneous in terms of their communication abilities, the task productivity
among immigrants is more heterogeneous, leading to specialization of immigrants in low
communicative tasks.
More precisely, the labor input L˜k(j) utilized by each intermediate variety xk(j), is now
characterized by composite of a continuum of tasks, indexed i ∈ [0, 1] in increasing order
of communication, inter-personal intensity. If a task i is assigned to immigrants (d = F ),
its input requirement is γk(i) ≥ 1, where γk(i) is continuously increasing in i. The
marginal cost associated with tasked performed by immigrants is denoted by wFk . The
input requirement using natives (d = D) is 1, with marginal cost wDk . Following the recent
empirical studies highlighting the increasing importance of interactive, communication-
intensive tasks in workplaces in the modern economy (cf. Borghans et al., 2008, 2013;
8For a discussion on the degree of external increasing returns to scales and the relationship between
composite intermediate good Xk and mass of monopolists Ak, see chapter 4.
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Spitz-Oener, 2006; Stasz, 1997), I assume that the compensation of communication-
intensive tasks is higher relative to non-communication tasks, i.e. wDk > w
F
k for all
k = {L,M,H}. An intermediate-goods producer j ∈ [0, Ak] will assign tasks to
immigrants up to an endogenously determined threshold Ik, where Ik ∈ (0, 1), so that
the composite labor input is produced according to the following CES technology:
L˜k(j) =
(∫ Ik
0
(
lFk (i)
γk(i)
)α−1
α
di+
∫ 1
Ik
(
lDk (i)
)α−1
α di
) α
α−1
, (5.11)
where α ≥ 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between tasks. The following lemma
establishes the optimal conditions regarding the fraction of tasks performed by immigrants
and natives
Lemma 5.1. Let LDk and L
F
k denote the amount of native and immigrant workers,
respectively, which are employed by intermediate-good firm j ∈ [0, Ak], for k = {L,M,H},
to perform a range of tasks. Then, the equilibrium unit factor labor is characterized by
L˜k(j) =
(
ϑk(Ik)
1
α
(
LFk
)α−1
α + [1− Ik] 1α
(
LDk
)α−1
α
) α
α−1
, (5.12)
where ϑk(Ik) ≡
(∫ Ik
0
γk(i)
1−αdi
)
, and the optimality condition for the marginal task Ik is
denoted by
wDk = w
F
k γk(Ik). (5.13)
Proof. See Appendix 5.A.1.
Having defined the structure of the economy and the optimality conditions, I proceed now
with the discussion of the characteristics of the equilibrium followed by the comparative
statics.
5.4 Characteristics of equilibrium
The characteristics of the equilibrium are similar to chapter 4, except for the labor
market clearing conditions and related variables, which require now the market clearing
for both immigrants and natives in every skill group. The equilibrium in intermediate
goods market is characterized by the standard symmetry assumption, where all firms are
identical in the sense that the varieties of the differentiated good Xk employ the same
amount of factor labor L˜k(j) = L˜k, are sold at the same price pk(j) = pk and are produced
in equal amount xk(j) = xk, for all k = {L,M,H}.
Free entry : Free entry ensures that each intermediate-good firm makes zero profits so
that the quantity for each variety is defined by
xk = (− 1)fk, ∀ k = {L,M,H}. (5.14)
Marginal costs of intermediate goods and price index : Next, using the monopolistic pricing
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behavior, Eq. (5.10), the marginal cost of the differentiated good ζk, defined in Eq. (5.9),
simplifies to
ζk = A
1
1−
k pk =

− 1A
1
1−
k w˜k, ∀ k = {L,M,H}, (5.15)
where the marginal cost is defined by w˜k =
(
ϑk(Ik)
(
wFk
)1−α
+ [1− Ik]
(
wDk
)1−α) 11−α
(see
Appendix 5.A.1 for a formal discussion).
The perfectly competitive nature of the final-goods market requires that any final good
producer makes zero profits, i.e. pk(z)yk(z) = ζkXk, for all k = {L,M,H}. Utilizing Eqs.
(5.5) and (5.6), it follows that the price index of technology k must equal the marginal
cost, i.e.
Pk = ζk. (5.16)
Resource constraint : Let the total amount of labor used in each set of technology [0, Ak]
be denoted by
∫ Ak
0
Ldkdj = n
d
k, for d = {F,D}, and the total resource constraint (i.e. over
the range of final goods produced with technology mode k) by
∫
z∈Sk n
d
kdz = N
d
k , where
SL = {0, zL}, SM = {zL, zH}, and SH = {zH , 1} and NdL, NdM , and NdH are the total
(exogenously given) endowments of labor. Then, by symmetry it follows
LFL =
NFL
zLAL
, LDL =
NDL
zLAL
, (5.17)
LFM =
NFM
(zH − zL)AM , L
D
M =
NDM
(zH − zL)AM , (5.18)
LFH =
NFH
(1− zH)AH , L
D
H =
NDH
(1− zH)AH . (5.19)
Composite intermediate output : Next, combining the labor market conditions (5.17),
(5.18), and (5.19), with Eq. (5.12) yields the equilibrium value of intermediate output
xL =
N˜L
zLAL
, xM =
N˜M
(zH − zL)AM , xH =
N˜H
(1− zH)AH , (5.20)
where N˜k ≡
(
ϑk(Ik)
1
α
(
NFk
)α−1
α + [1− Ik] 1α
(
NDk
)α−1
α
) α
α−1
, for all k = {L,M,H}.
Substituting the results from (5.20) into the composite intermediate goods function (5.7)
for the respective technology mode, we get
XL = A
1
−1
L
N˜L
zL
, XM = A
1
−1
M
N˜M
zH − zL , XH = A
1
−1
H
N˜H
1− zH . (5.21)
Mass of monopolists : Combining the budget constraint for any final good producer z,
p(z)y(z) = wFk
∫ Ak
0
LFk dj + w
D
k
∫ Ak
0
LDk dj,
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with Eqs. (5.5), (5.6), (5.7), (5.14) and the resource constraints (5.17) (5.18), and (5.19),
then the mass of monopolists in each technology mode k can be pinned down to the skill
endowment, fixed costs, the range of final goods, and the market power of monopolists
(see Appendix 5.B.1 for details of the formal derivation).
AL =
N˜L
fLzL
, AM =
N˜M
fM(zH − zL) , AH =
N˜H
fH(1− zH) . (5.22)
An inspection of eq. (5.22) reveals important properties of specialization and increasing
returns to scale. It is easily seen that for given values of zL and zH , changes in the
labor endowment N˜k leads to an increase in the mass of monopolists. This reflects the
direct market-size effect, capturing the notion of directed technological change elicited
by higher profitability of producing intermediate goods xk. This in turn raises the
comparative advantage of technology mode k, leading to an expansion in the range of
final goods produced by the complementing technology mode k and thus to changes in
zL and zH . This effect reflects the aforementioned technology adoption effect. However,
this latter effect counteracts the former one in the wake of a price effect, favoring the
competing technology modes. This interaction is analog to the idea of internal and
external increasing returns to scale forces in the context of international trade as in
Ethier (1982). Moreover, this pattern of specialization gives rise to increasing returns to
scale at aggregate industry level – similar to semi-endogenous growth models as in Romer
(1987).
Labor composite and marginal costs : There exists within-skill group heterogeneity due
to differential task productivity between immigrants and natives. The convenient block
recursive structure of the model allows to solve first for the equilibrium task margin Ik and
simplify the labor composite and the marginal cost of factor labor as expressions of the
task margin as well as of natives endowments and wages, respectively. In doing so, utilize
Lemma 5.1 and labor market clearing conditions (5.18) to rewrite the composite factor
labor and marginal cost of every intermediate-good producer using technology mode k.
Given the equilibrium task margin Ik > 0, it follows (see Appendix 5.A.2)
N˜k = Θk(Ik)
−α N
D
k
1− Ik , (5.23)
w˜k = Θk(Ik)w
D
k , (5.24)
where the generalized measure of marginal cost of tasks is denoted by
Θk(Ik) ≡
[
ϑk(Ik)γk(Ik)
α−1 + 1− Ik
] 1
1−α < 1. (5.25)
These results indicate the key feature of the task-based approach characterizing the
productivity gains due to task specialization patterns between immigrants and natives.
The following lemma summarizes this result.
Lemma 5.2. For Ik > 0, an increase in k-skill endowment of immigrants raises the task
margin, i.e.
d ln Ik
d lnNFk
> 0,
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which in turn induces a cost-efficiency enhancing effect, associated with lower marginal
costs, i.e.
d ln Θk(Ik)
d ln Ik
< 0,
and an increase in the composite labor, i.e.
d ln N˜k
d ln Ik
= −d ln [Θk(Ik)
α(1− Ik)]
d ln Ik
> 0
Proof. See Appendix 5.A.3.
Thus, the results in Lemma 5.2 highlight the important feature of the task-assignment
approach, whereby immigration gives rise to efficiency gains through specialization. This
is a crucial departure from models that account only implicitly for immigrants (in terms
of marginal changes in the endowment), or in a static manner through a CES-aggregator.
Instead, immigration is now associated with an endogenous response by native workers,
which has been put forth as the salient feature regarding the efficiency improvement, the
so-called productivity effect. This effect is captured by Θk(Ik) in Eq. (5.25).
Final goods : Utilizing Eqs. (5.5) and (5.21), the production function of final goods can
be then rewritten as
y(z) =

ϕL(z)XL = ϕL(z)A
1
−1
L
N˜L
zL
, for all z ∈ [0, zL],
ϕM (z)XM = ϕM (z)A
1
−1
M
N˜M
zH−zL , for all z ∈ (zL, zH),
ϕH(z)XH = ϕH(z)A
1
−1
H
N˜H
1−zH , for all z ∈ [zH , 1],
(5.26)
Aggregate output by technology modes : Finally, we derive the equilibrium aggregate levels
of output and expenditure for each technology mode k. Let the total cost using technology
k be
PkYk =
∫
z∈Sk
p(z)y(z)dz,
where Yk denotes the aggregate level of output of final goods using technology mode k.
Now, utilizing Eqs. (5.6) and (5.26) in the previously derived equation and manipulating
slightly, yields the aggregate level of output per technology mode k (see Appendix 5.B.2
for the formal derivation)
YL = A
1
−1
L N˜L, YM = A
1
−1
M N˜M , YH = A
1
−1
H N˜H , (5.27)
Relative expenditure on technology modes : As shown in chapter 4, it follows from Eq. (5.2)
that the expenditure on final goods must equal at the equilibrium technology margins,
zL and zH . Utilizing Eqs. (5.21), (5.22), and (5.23), then we obtain the expression for
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the relative price index of final goods produced with technology mode k = M
PL
PM
=
(
fL
fM
) 1
(−1)
(M(IM )
M(IL)
) 
(1−)
(
NDM
NDL
) 
(−1) ( zL
zH − zL
) 
(−1)
, (5.28)
PM
PH
=
(
fM
fH
) 1
(−1)
(MH(IH)
MM (IM )
) 
(1−)
(
NDH
NDM
) 
(−1) (zH − zL
1− zH
) 
(−1)
. (5.29)
The variable Mk(Ik) ≡ Θk(Ik)α(1 − Ik) measures for all k = {L,M,H} the impact of
migration associated with endogenous changes in the task margin, as shown in Lemma
5.2. It is decreasing in Ik, implying that the labor composite is increasing in Ik, i.e.
d ln N˜k
d ln Ik
= −d lnMk(Ik)
d ln Ik
> 0 (see again Appendix 5.A.3). It is worth mentioning the crucial
differences to the case of implicit immigration discussed in chapter 4. Evaluating the
functional properties ofMk(Ik), it can be shown that limIk→0 d ln N˜kd ln Ik = −
d lnMk(Ik)
d ln Ik
= 0 and
limIk→1
d ln N˜k
d ln Ik
= −d lnMk(Ik)
d ln Ik
=∞. This indicates the efficiency effect of immigration: an
increase in Ik induces an cost-efficiency enhancing effect through specialization, captured
by the reallocation of tasks between natives and immigrants.
To close the model, combine (5.28) and (5.29) with the efficient allocation of technology
modes, Eqs. (5.3) and (5.4), respectively. Now taking logs, multiplying through (−1)/,
and rearranging slightly, we obtain two implicit functions FL(·) and FH(·) that define
the equilibrium technology margins zL and zH as functions of parameters and variables
of the model.
FL(zL, zH , fL, fM , IL, IM ) ≡ 1

ln
(
fL
fM
)
+ ln
(MM (IM )
ML(IL)
)
+ ln
(
NDM
NDL
)
+ ln
(
zL
zH − zL
)
−(− 1)

ln ΛL(zL) = 0, (5.30)
FH(zL, zH , fH , fM , IH , IM ) ≡ 1

ln
(
fM
fH
)
+ ln
(MH(IH)
MM (IM )
)
+ ln
(
NDH
NDM
)
+ ln
(
zH − zL
1− zH
)
−(− 1)

ln ΛH(zH) = 0. (5.31)
This implicit system of equations can be used to compute basic comparative statics of
changes in factor endowment and fixed market entry costs and their implications for
technology adoption.
5.5 Comparative statics
5.5.1 Immigration and technology adoption
Recall from Lemma 5.2 that immigration is associated with a positive shift in the task
margin Ik. For the computation of the comparative statics it is therefore sufficient to
consider changes in the task margin. This implies that all the results derived here are akin
to those derived in chapter 4, except that now the relationship between the technology
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margins, zL and zH , and the task margin Ik is affected by the initial level of task margin.
To get a better idea, differentiate the implicit Eqs. (5.30) and (5.31) with respect to IM
and the margins (zL and zH) to obtain(
∂FL
∂zL
∂FL
∂zH
∂FH
∂zL
∂FH
∂zH
)(
d ln zL
d ln zH
)
=
(
−∂FL
∂IM
−∂FH
∂IM
)
× d ln IM ,
⇔
(
−1

ε˜LzL +
zH
zH−zL −
zH
zH−zL
− zL
zH−zL
−1

ε˜HzH +
zH(1−zL)
(1−zH)(zH−zL)
)(
d ln zL
d ln zH
)
=
(−ΨM
ΨM
)
× d ln IM ,
where ε˜k ≡ −∂ ln Λk(zk)∂ ln zk > 0, for k = {L,H} denotes the elasticity (in absolute value)
of relative efficiency schedules of technology modes k at the equilibrium margin zk and
ΨM ≡ −d lnMM (IM )d ln IM > 0. The inspection of the matrix verifies that the Jacobi has a
positive sign, i.e. DJ = ∂FL∂zL
∂FH
∂zH
− ∂FL
∂zH
∂FH
∂zL
> 0, and thus the solution to the above 2× 2
system is unique. Then, by Cramer’s rule, we obtain
d ln zL
d ln IM
=
d lnMM
d ln IM
d ln zL
d lnMM = −ΨM
zH
1−zH +
(−1)

ε˜HzH
DJ < 0, (5.32)
and
d ln zH
d ln IM
=
d lnMM
d ln IM
d ln zH
d lnMM = ΨM
1 + −1

ε˜LzL
DJ > 0. (5.33)
The results of the comparative statics in Eqs. (5.32) and (5.33) highlight the convenient
feature of the model. It allows to decompose immigration-induced changes in the
technology margins, zL and zH , into changes due to internal task reallocation between
immigrants and natives, captured by Ψk, and changes in the technology margins due to
endogenous technology adoption. The following proposition summarizes the main results.
Proposition 5.1. An exogenous increase in the skill endowment of immigrants and in
the fixed costs will affect the technology margins zL and zH in the following way:
• Immigration of high-skill workers and H-fixed cost{
dzL
d ln IH
,
dzH
d ln IH
}
< 0,
{
dzL
d ln fH
,
dzH
d ln fH
}
> 0,
• Immigration of medium-skilled workers, easier offshoring, and M-fixed cost{
dzL
d ln fM
,
dzH
d ln IM
}
> 0,
{
dzL
d ln IM
,
dzH
d ln fM
}
< 0,
• Immigration of low-skilled workers and L-fixed cost{
dzL
d ln IL
,
dzH
d ln IL
}
> 0,
{
dzL
d ln fL
,
dzH
d ln fL
}
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix 5.A.4 and the discussion in chapter 4.
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The intuition behind the marginal impact of task threshold Ik on thresholds zL and
zH differs from chapter 4 and deserves some discussions. As shown in Lemma 5.2,
immigration leads to a reallocation of tasks from natives to immigrants (i.e. increase
in Ik). This induces on the one hand an efficiency gains through specialization. On the
other hand, it increases effectively natives labor supply of similar skill level. Both effects
raise the skill endowment and thus lead to a larger factor market that allows to produce
more varieties. The Walrasian nature of the labor market indicates a negative relationship
between factor market size and factor prices. This in turn implies that firms are able to
produce varieties at lower unit costs. Consequently, the comparative advantage and thus
the adoption of the skill-complementing technology mode is increased.
Equipped with comparative statics for technology adoption effect, the next section
computes the comparative statics of different immigration scenarios and changes in native
wage structure.
5.5.2 Immigration and native wage structure
In equilibrium, the optimal demand condition for intermediate goods, Eq. (5.8), and the
monopolistic price-setting condition, Eq. (5.10), are

− 1w˜k = pk = ζkX
1/
k x
−1/
k , ∀ k = {L,M,H}. (5.34)
Utilizing the equilibrium conditions (5.16), (5.20), (5.21), (5.22), (5.24), (5.27), into Eq.
(5.34) and taking the ration between low- and medium-skilled and between medium- and
high-skilled wages we obtain (see Appendix 5.B.3 for a full formal discussion):
wDL
wDM
=
(
zL
zH − zL
) −σ
(−1)σ
( ML(IL)
MM(IM)
) (−σ)
(−1)σ
(
ΘL(IL)
ΘM(IM)
)−1
KLM (5.35)
wDM
wDH
=
(
zH − zL
1− zH
) −σ
(−1)σ
(MM(IM)
MH(IH)
) (−σ)
(−1)σ
(
ΘM(IM)
ΘH(IH)
)−1
KMH (5.36)
where KLM ≡
(
NDL
NDM
) (σ−)
(−1)σ
(
fL
fM
)− σ−1
(−1)σ
ΛL(z, z
′) and KMH ≡(
NDM
NDH
) (σ−)
(−1)σ
(
fM
fH
)− σ−1
(−1)σ
ΛH(z
′, z′′) summarize the other exogenous variables.
An inspection of Eqs. (5.35) and (5.36) allows to decompose the impact of immigration
on native wage structure into the following key channels: (i) a technology adoption effect,
captured by
(
zL
zH−zL
) −σ
(−1)σ
and
(
zH−zL
1−zH
) −σ
(−1)σ
, indicating changes in the relative range of
final goods; (ii) a market size effect , captured by
(
ML(IL)
MM (IM )
) (−σ)
(−1)σ
and
(
MM (IM )
MH(IH)
) (−σ)
(−1)σ
,
indicating changes in the skill endowment; and (iii) a productivity effect, captured by
(ΘL(IL)/ΘM(IM))
−1 and (ΘM(IM)/ΘH(IH))
−1, associated with changes in the unit cost
structure.
As highlighted in chapter 4, the technology adoption effect is interacting with the market
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size effect due to the the direct and indirect market size effects and the price effect induced
by the market externalities mentioned earlier. Moreover, the direction of each of these
effects depends on the strength of final goods demand elasticity, σ relative to the market
power of monopolists, . To see how these two effect interact, let Γ˜Ik ≡ d ln(zL/(zH−zL))d ln Ik
and ∆˜Ik ≡ d ln((zH−zL)/(1−zH))d ln Ik denote the marginal effect of immigration-induced changes
in task margin Ik. As shown in Appendix 5.B.4, the convenient structure of the model
allows to decompose this effect into the following terms:
Γ˜Ik = ΨkΓk and ∆˜Ik = Ψk∆k,
indicating a scalar product between the market size effect,
Ψk ≡ −d lnMk
d ln Ik
= −d ln [Θk(Ik)
α(1− Ik)]
d ln Ik
> 0,
and immigration-induced technology adoption effect, i.e.
Γk =
d ln (zL/(zH − zL))
d lnMk and ∆k =
d ln ((zH − zL)/(1− zH))
d lnMk .
The terms Γk and ∆k are akin to those computed in chapter 4, and as discussed there
changes in the neighborhood of the technology margins zL and zH , depend on the degree
of technology adoption, captured by the elasticity parameters ε˜L ≡ −d ln ΛL(zL)d ln zL > 0 and
ε˜H ≡ −d ln ΛH(zH)d ln zH > 0, so that it follows that {|Γk| , |∆k|} ∈ (0, 1), for 0 < {ε˜L, ε˜H} <∞.
The rest of this section examines how the relative strength and the determinants of these
different channels. In doing so, the impact of various skill immigration scenarios on
native wage structure are intuitively discussed, while the formal derivation are relegated
to Appendix 5.B.5. For ease of notation, let the relative wage of medium-skilled natives
be ωDLM ≡ (wDL /wDM) and ωDMH ≡ (wDM/wDH).
Low-skill immigration
Now taking logs in Eqs. (5.35) and (5.36) and differentiating totally with respect to
changes in the task margin IL, and manipulating yields
d lnωDLM
d ln IL
=
(
1− α(1− ΓL) (− σ)
(− 1)σ
)
Θ˜L(IL)− (1− ΓL) (− σ)
(− 1)σ
IL
1− IL (5.37)
d lnωDMH
d ln IL
=
− σ
(− 1)σ
(
Θ˜L(IL) +
IL
1− IL
)
∆L, (5.38)
where Θ˜L(IL) ≡ −d ln ΘL(IL)d ln IL > 0 denotes the productivity effect, and by Proposition 5.1
ΓL > 0 and ∆L < 0.
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Medium-skill immigration
Following the same steps, the impact of high-skill immigration can be computed, i.e.
taking logs in Eqs. (5.35) and (5.36) and differentiating totally with respect to changes
in the task margin IH , associated with high-skill immigration, yields
d lnωDLM
d ln IM
= −
(
1− α(1 + ΓM) (− σ)
(− 1)σ
)
Θ˜M(IM)
+(1 + ΓM)
(− σ)
(− 1)σ
IM
1− IM (5.39)
d lnωDMH
d ln IM
=
(
1− α(1−∆M) (− σ)
(− 1)σ
)
Θ˜M(IM)
−(1−∆M) (− σ)
(− 1)σ
IM
1− IM , (5.40)
where Θ˜M(IM) ≡ −d ln ΘM (IM )d ln IM > 0 denotes the productivity effect, by Proposition 5.1, we
get that ΓM < 0 and ∆M > 0.
High-skill immigration
Following the same steps, the impact of high-skill immigration can be computed, i.e.
taking logs in Eqs. (5.35) and (5.36) and differentiating totally with respect to changes
in the task margin IH yields
d lnωDLM
d ln IH
=
− σ
(− 1)σ
(
Θ˜H(IH) +
IH
1− IH
)
ΓH (5.41)
d lnωDMH
d ln IH
= −
(
1− α(1 + ∆H) (− σ)
(− 1)σ
)
Θ˜H(IH)
+(1 + ∆H)
(− σ)
(− 1)σ
IH
1− IH , (5.42)
where Θ˜H(IH) ≡ −d ln ΘH(IH)d ln IH > 0 denotes the productivity effect, and by Proposition 5.1
ΓH > 0 and ∆H < 0.
Examination of Eqs (5.37)–(5.42) reveals the following new insights. First, allowing for
internal adjustment of work organization, i.e. endogenous task specialization between
immigrants and natives, immigration is associated with a productivity effect, Θ˜k, and a
labor supply effect, Ik
1−Ik . Moreover, the relative strength between these two forces exhibits
now a dynamic nature, varying with the initial level of task margin. As elaborated below,
this novel feature of the model provides a rationale behind the ambiguity of the impact
of immigration on native wage structure found often in the empirical literature.
In addition, the direction of each channel is importantly shaped by the degree of
technology adoption between the different production modes, Γk and ∆k, as well as by
the relative strength between the final-goods demand elasticity (σ) and the market power
of monopolists (). However, it worth highlighting that the magnitude of the productivity
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effect depends additionally on the level of the elasticity of substitution between tasks, α.
The next proposition summarizes the first key result regarding the impact of immigration
on natives relative wage structure.
Proposition 5.2. Whenever σ >  and for a sufficiently positive finite degree of
technology adoption, i.e. 0 < {ε˜L, ε˜H} < ∞, then changes in native wage structure
are characterized as follows:
• Low-skill immigration induces a wage effect similar to an “unskill-bias”
technological change, i.e. an relative increase in wages between low- and medium-
skilled workers and between medium- and high-skilled workers;
• Medium-skill immigration generates a hump shaped relationship, i.e. medium-
skill wages rise relative to both low- and high-skill wages;
• High-skill immigration has a similar wage effect compared to a “skill-bias”
technological change, i.e. a monotonic increase in relative wages across the skill
groups.
Proof. See the discussion in the text.
From Eqs. (5.37), (5.39), (5.40), and (5.42) is readily seen that whenever the goods
demand elasticity is larger than the market power of monopolists, the direction of the
efficiency effect and the labor supply effect becomes independent from the extent of the
elasticity of substitution between tasks (α) and the initial value of the task margin.
The intuition behind this result, as highlighted by Acemoglu et al. (2012), turns on
two interacting forces: the market-size effect and the price effect. To illustrate these
price and market-size effects, consider the low-skill immigration scenario. First, the
internal reallocation of tasks between low-skilled immigrants and natives enhances the
cost-efficiency of firms hiring them, raising their profits and in turn the mass of those
monopolists, denoting the aforementioned direct market-size effect.
As a consequence the comparative advantages of technology mode L increases, leading
to an expansion of threshold margin zL and zH due to endogenous technology adoption
behavior – this can be also interpreted as the indirect market size effect. This latter effect
brings about a biased price effect, associated with an increase in the relative price index
of goods produced with technology modes M and H compared to L. This biased price
effect elicits an increase in the mass of monopolists AM and AH , while counteracting
the direct market size effect for technology mode L, i.e. a reduction in AL (see Eq.
(5.22)). Consequently, by the standard Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the relative wage
of M and H skilled workers rises. However, for the general equilibrium perspective,
consumer preferences work in opposite direction, and thus the relative strength between
these effects is ambiguous. For σ > , the goods demand effect will be the dominating
force, indicating the relative favorable shift in the demand for low-skill-intensive final
goods. The empirical literature provide a range of values for these elasticities. The range
of values for the elasticity of substitution across intermediates are usually estimated
above 3, while between skill groups are in the range [1.5, 2] (see Acemoglu et al., 2012,
for further details). This implies that the empirically plausible case is whenever σ < ,
which I elaborate next.
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Recalling Eqs. (5.37)–(5.42), the direction of immigration-induced changes in native wage
structure depends, on the one hand, the relative strength between the productivity effect
and the labor supply effect. On the other hand, it depends on the degree of the elasticity
of substitution between tasks and the degree of technology adoption. Thus, it follows
that for certain degree of task substitutability/complementarity the immigration-induced
efficiency enhancing effect will have a beneficial effect for native workers.
Lemma 5.3 (Tasks Complementarity). Given σ < , i.e. the goods demand
elasticity is lower than the elasticity of substitution between intermediates, it follows
that tasks performed by immigrants complement those performed by natives if and only
if α < min{α˜L, α˜H}, where α˜L ≡ (−1)σ(−σ)(1+∆H) , α˜H ≡
(−1)σ
(−σ)(1+ΓL) , and min{α˜L, α˜H} =
max{ε˜LzL(1− zL), ε˜HzH(1− zH)}.
Proof. See Appendix 5.A.5.
Lemma 5.3 characterizes two key properties. First, the efficiency gains accrued to natives
arise up to a certain level of the elasticity of substitution across tasks. The empirical
studies provide estimations that indicate the complementarity between tasks performed
by immigrants and by natives. For example, Peri and Sparber (2009) estimate the value
of the elasticity of substitution between manual and communicative, complex tasks in the
range [0.63, 1.43]. Now, for empirically plausible values it can be shown that the upper
boundary in Lemma 5.3 lies comfortably outside of this range.
Second, the extent of task complementarity/substitutability depends also on the degree
of technology adoption. Intuitively, easier adoption across various production modes
will mitigate the direct market size effect of immigration, and thus leaving the wage
structure independent from the elasticity α. More precisely, as elaborated in chapter
4, for the asymptotic case {ε˜L, ε˜H} → 0, i.e. when the adoption between the different
technology modes in the neighborhood of the margins, zL and zH , becomes extremely
easy, ΓL = −ΓM = −∆H = ∆M = 1, and −∆L = ΓH = 0. This implies that the market
size and the price effects will be asymptotically balanced. Utilizing these observations
into Eqs. (5.37)–(5.42), the second key result can be summarized as follows
Proposition 5.3. Whenever the adoption between different technology modes becomes
extremely easy, changes in native wage structure are asymptotically characterized by the
immigration-induced efficiency effect due to task specialization, such that
d lnωDLM
d ln IL
≈ Θ˜L(IL), d lnω
D
MH
d ln IH
≈ Θ˜H(IH), d lnω
D
LM
d ln IM
=
d lnωDMH
d ln IM
≈ Θ˜M (IM ),
while
d lnωDMH
d ln IL
=
d lnωDLM
d ln IH
≈ 0.
Proof. See the discussion in the text.
Proposition 5.3 highlights the key role of task-reallocation and technology adoption
mechanisms. The latter importantly mitigates the magnitude of initial direct competition
effects associated with the market size effect. However, the former indicates the novel
feature of efficiency gains through task specialization (the productivity effect), supporting
recent empirical evidence (cf. Ottaviano et al., 2013). The results of the analysis show that
accounting exclusively for aggregate effects of endogenous technology adoption effects, as
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in several studies (cf. Beaudry et al., 2010), might provide only a partial picture of the
implication of immigration-induced changes in native wage structure.
It is noteworthy that whenever the degree of technology adoption is positive and finite,
i.e. 0 < {ε˜L, ε˜H} < ∞ immigration-induced changes in native wage structure depend
crucially on the initial level of the task margin. This in turn determines the relative
magnitude between the productivity and labor supply effects. To obtain a better idea,
recall the impact of low-skill immigration on relative wage structure at the lower end of
the skill distribution, Eq. (5.37). Let the first term on the right hand side be HL(IL) ≡
(1− αδ(1− ΓL)) Θ˜L(IL), capturing the productivity effect, and the second term on the
right hand side be GL(IL) ≡ δ(1− ΓL) IL1−IL , where δ ≡ −σ(−1)σ , denoting the labor supply
effect. Now it can be shown that for IL → 0, HL = GL → 0, while as IL → 1, GL → ∞
and HL → (1− αδ(1− ΓL))µL, where µL = d ln γL(IL)d ln IL denotes the elasticity of task-
comparative advantage schedule of immigrants. Moreover, given that γL(i) is continuous
and monotonically increasing over the unit interval, there must exist a single crossing
between HL and GL, defining a threshold margin at which both effects are balanced.
Figure 5.2: Interaction between productivity and labor supply effects
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
IL
1
2
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HL
2HIL,GL2 L
GL
2 HIL,GL2 L
HL
1HIL,GL1 L
GL
1 HIL,GL1 L
Notes: The figure shows the relationship between productivity effect and labor
supply effect, for the case Γ1L = 0.4 (solid line) and Γ
2
L = 0.7 (dashed line),
see text for the remaining parameter values.
Figure 5.2 depicts this relationship for the case of a log-linear functional form of
γL(i) = exp[µLi], for empirically plausible values of  = 3.33 and σ = 1.6 (cf. Acemoglu
et al., 2012) and α = 1.2, which lies within the estimated range of values in Peri and
Sparber (2009). The same relationship can be also derived from Eqs. (5.39) and (5.40)
for a medium-skilled task margin, and from Eq. (5.42) for the high-skilled task margin.
Moreover, the graphical illustration highlights that for higher degree of technology
adoption (the dashed lines in Figure 5.2) the productivity effect becomes dominating
over the entire range of task interval. Thus, the next key result can be summarized as
follows.
Proposition 5.4. Given  > σ and a sufficient degree of task complementarity, defined by
Lemma 5.3, it follows that whenever the task margin is higher than a threshold Iˇk ∈ (0, 1),
the immigration-induced efficiency effect is dominated by the labor supply effect, so that
changes in native wage structure induced by
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• Low-skill immigration are like a “skill-bias” technological change, i.e. a relative
decline in low- and medium-skilled wages compared to medium- and high-skilled
wages, respectively.
• Medium-skill immigration are characterized by polarizing wage effect, i.e. a
relative decline in medium-skilled wages compared to low- and high-skilled wages.
• High-skill immigration are like a “unskill-bias” technological change, i.e. a
relative increase in low- and medium-skilled wages compared to medium- and high-
skilled wages, respectively.
Proof. See Appendix 5.A.6 and the discussion in the text.
Proposition 5.4 highlights the third key feature of the model, associated with a
non-monotonic relationship between immigration and the relative magnitude between
efficiency and labor supply effects. Moreover, the impact of immigration on native
wage structure contrasts now those derived in Proposition 5.2. Particularly, at high
initial levels of task margin, marginal increase in immigration induces a labor-saving
technological effect for similarly skilled native workers, lowering their wages compared to
other skill groups. However, it is worth mentioning the case when the initial level of task
Table 5.1: Immigration and native wage structure, if σ < 
Low-skill Medium-skill High-skill
IL < IˇL IL > IˇL IM < IˇM IM > IˇM IH < IˇH IH > IˇH
d lnωDLM + − − + + +
d lnωDMH − − + − − +
margin is lower than the threshold margin Iˇk, implying that the the productivity effect is
dominating the labor supply effect. In this case, both low-skill and high-skill immigration
scenarios induce a polarization of native wage structure, while medium-skill immigration
scenario induce an inverse U-shaped wage effect. Table 5.1 summarizes these results.
Moreover, these results highlight the importance of both macro- and microeconomic
structure of the model, i.e. endogenous choice production techniques at the industry
level and within-firm reorganization of work, which are crucial to gain insights behind
the determinants of and the interaction between various channels.
5.6 Offshoring of intermediate inputs
This section extends the framework with respect to the possibility of offshoring for
domestic firms. As discussed above, the empirical evidence has indicated that along
the value added chain jobs concentrated in the middle range of the skill distribution,
characterized by high intensity of routine content of tasks, are mostly prone to offshoring.
This has been put forth as the potential source of wage polarization due to offshoring (cf.
Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Thus, I assume that only intermediate goods utilized under
technology mode k = M are affect by offshoring.
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In doing so, I follow the exogenous offshoring approach, discussed in Acemoglu et al.
(2012), where offshoring occurs in the form of relocations of intermediate inputs, similar
to models of fragmentation along the value added chain (cf. Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001).
More precisely, offshoring is introduced in terms of relocation of a (exogenously given)
fraction of domestic jobs (intermediates), capturing changes at the extensive margin.
Yet, the key features of offshoring associated with the efficiency improvement due to
lower offshoring costs and the labor supply effect, reflecting the increased labor market
competition between offshore and domestic workers are preserved.9 To keep the analysis
tractable, the offshoring-receiving country is considered as an additional country that has
become integrated in the global economy. Thus, by assumption offshoring activities by
domestic firms have no impact on the mass of immigrants already existing in the home
country, leaving the internal work organization (i.e. task allocation between immigrants
and natives) unaffected. In the rest of this section, I describe the basic settings as well
as the equilibrium conditions of offshoring, followed by the comparative static analysis.
It is assumed that domestic firms can allocate and produce an exogenously given fraction
κ of all intermediate goods xM over the interval [0, AM ] abroad. However, due to implicit
trade costs, cost-savings from reallocation of domestic production are limited so that
0 < κ < κ˜ < 1, where at the threshold κ˜, there is no arbitrage from offshoring, i.e.
wages between the source and host countries of offshoring are equalized. It follows that in
equilibrium a measure κAM of monopolists produce abroad, while the remaining measure
(1− κ)AM of monopolists produce at home. In what follows the variables characterizing
the offshoring equilibrium are denoted by the hat-symbol “ˆ”.
Imposing labor market clearing for both medium-skilled and offshore workers and recalling
the symmetry assumption, then the equilibrium output values of firms producing at home
and abroad are characterized, respectively, by
xM =
N˜M
(1− κ)AM(zH − zL) , xO =
NO
κAM(zH − zL) , (5.43)
where NO denotes the total exogenously given endowments of offshore workers. Next,
similar to the pricing-behavior of domestic monopolists, Eq. (5.10), offshoring firms
charge a mark-up over the marginal cost, i.e. pO =

−1wO, where pO and wO denote
the price and wage of offshoring goods and workers, respectively. The optimal demand
condition for intermediate goods, Eq. (5.8), implies now the following demand conditions
for offshore and domestically-produced intermediates
pO = ζˆM
(
XˆM
xO
) 1

, (5.44)
pM = ζˆM
(
XˆM
xM
) 1

. (5.45)
9Alternatively, one could introduce offshoring following the task-based approach a` la Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008), which allows to account for changes at both extensive and intensive margins. See
for example, Ottaviano et al. (2013) who introduce offshoring as an intermediate range of tasks between
the range of tasks performed by immigrants and natives over the unit interval. However, this requires
further formal structure and thus would unnecessarily complicate the analysis.
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Then, from Eqs. (5.44) and (5.45) and the markup-pricing behavior, it follows that the
wage gap between offshore and domestic workers is given by
wO
w˜M
=
pO
pM
=
(
xO
xM
)− 1

=
(
NO
N˜M
1− κ
κ
)− 1

, (5.46)
where from Eq. (5.46) it is evident that w˜M > wO for κ < κ˜ ≡ NONO+N˜M . Moreover, in line
with recent empirical evidence, immigration of medium-skilled workers, i.e. d ln N˜M
d ln IM
> 0,
reduces the arbitrage from offshoring, indicating that offshoring and immigration are
substitutes (cf. Ottaviano et al., 2013). However, since for IM → 1, d ln N˜Md ln IM → ∞ and
thus κ˜ → 0, it is imposed that the task margin IM is sufficiently below unity so that
positive values of offshoring exits, i.e. 0 < κ < κ˜.
Next, substituting (5.43) into the composite intermediate goods functions (5.7) for k = M
yields
XˆM = A
1
−1
M
NˆM
zH − zL , (5.47)
where
NˆM =
(
κ
1
N
−1

O + (1− κ)
1
 N˜
−1

M
) 
−1
, (5.48)
denotes the weighted average, captured by the offshoring rate κ, of domestic medium-
skilled and offshore workers. Eq. (5.48) reveals now an interesting feature. For given
number of varieties, production is increasing in the extent of offshoring:
dNˆM
dκ
=
1
− 1Nˆ
1/
M
(NO
κ
) −1

−
(
N˜M
1− κ
) −1

 > 0,
where limκ→0 dNˆM/dκ = ∞ and limκ→κ˜ dNˆM/dκ = 0. This is referred to as the
offshoring-induced efficiency effect, associated with an efficient reallocation of production
towards countries where wages are lower (Acemoglu et al., 2012). Intuitively, at low
initial values of offshoring rate, the arbitrage from offshoring is very high, due to the high
offshore-domestic wage gap.
Similarly, by means of cost minimization, the equilibrium cost index of composite
intermediate goods is now given by10
ζˆM = A
1
1−
M
(
κp1−O + (1− κ)p1−M
) 1
1− . (5.49)
10More precisely, the optimization problem of a final-good producer is
characterized by
∫ κAM
0
pO(j)xO(j)d +
∫ (1−κ)AM
0
pM (j)xM (j)d subject to XˆM =(∫ κAM
0
xO(j)
−1
 d +
∫ (1−κ)AM
0
xM (j)
−1
 d
) 
−1
.
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Now, the zero profit condition for each final good producer z ∈ (zL, zH) implies
pM(z)yM(z) =
w˜MN˜M + wONO
zH − zL
Following the same steps discussed above, the mass of monopolists is now defined by (see
Appendix 5.B.6)
AˆM =
NˆM
fM(zH − zL) (5.50)
Equipped with these equilibrium conditions, the following section elaborates the
comparative statics of offshoring regarding technology adoption and changes in the native
wage structure.
5.6.1 Offshoring and technology adoption
First notice that the relative expenditure conditions defined by Eqs. (5.28) and (5.29) has
to be adjusted for offshoring. Thus, utilizing Eqs. (5.47) and (5.50) in YM and inserting
the results in PLYL/zL = PMYM/(zH − zL) and PMYM/(zH − zL) = PHYH/(1− zH) and
solving for the relative price indices yields
PL
PM
=
(
fL
fM
) 1
(−1)
(
NˆM
N˜L
) 
(−1) (
zL
zH − zL
) 
(−1)
, (5.28’)
PM
PH
=
(
fM
fH
) 1
(−1)
(
N˜H
NˆM
) 
(−1) (
zH − zL
1− zH
) 
(−1)
. (5.29’)
Combining Eqs. (5.28’) and (5.29’) with Eqs. (5.3) and (5.4) yields two implicit functions
adjusted for offshoring
FˆL(zL, zH , fL, fM , IL, IM , κ) ≡ 1

ln
(
fL
fM
)
+ ln
(
NˆM
N˜L
)
− (− 1)

ln ΛL(zL)
+ ln
(
zL
zH − zL
)
= 0, (5.30’)
FˆH(zL, zH , fH , fM , IH , IM , κ) ≡ 1

ln
(
fM
fH
)
+ ln
(
N˜H
NˆM
)
− (− 1)

ln ΛH(zH)
+ ln
(
zH − zL
1− zH
)
= 0. (5.31’)
from which the comparative statics for easier offshoring (dκ > 0) can be conducted.
Now, let Φκ ≡ d ln NˆMdκ , taking the total differentiation of the adjusted 2× 2 system, Eqs.
(5.30’) and (5.31’), with respect to offshoring rate κ yields
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(
∂FL
∂zL
∂FL
∂zH
∂FH
∂zL
∂FH
∂zH
)(
d ln zL
d ln zH
)
=
(−∂FL
∂κ
−∂FH
∂κ
)
× dκ,
⇔
(
−1

ε˜LzL +
zH
zH−zL −
zH
zH−zL
− zL
zH−zL
−1

ε˜HzH +
zH(1−zL)
(1−zH)(zH−zL)
)(
d ln zL
d ln zH
)
=
(−Φκ
Φκ
)
× dκ,
Then, by Cramer’s rule, we obtain
d ln zL
dκ
=
d ln NˆM
dκ
d ln zL
d ln NˆM
= −Φκ
zH
1−zH +
(−1)

ε˜HzH
DJ < 0, (5.53)
and
d ln zH
dκ
=
d ln NˆM
dκ
d ln zH
d ln NˆM
= Φκ
1 + −1

ε˜LzL
DJ > 0. (5.54)
Eqs. (5.53) and (5.54) reveal again the convenient structure of the model, allowing to
decompose changes in the technology margins into offshoring-induced efficiency effect
(Φκ) and changes at the extensive margins due to technology adoption behavior. The
next proposition summarizes the key result.
Proposition 5.5. An exogenous increase in the offshoring rate (dκ > 0) induces
an efficiency effect for products produced under the complementing technology mode
k = M , and thus raising the comparative advantages of adopting this technology mode.
Consequently the economy becomes proportionately more specialized in technology mode
M .
Proof. See the discussion in the text.
Thus, Propositions 5.1 and 5.5 show that both immigration of medium-skilled workers
and offshoring of intermediate goods induce a cost-efficiency improvement for firms
and industries employing these factors most intensively. This raises the comparative
advantages of production techniques complementing these two factors. Consequently,
final goods that have been produced under the technology modes L and H are now
produced by technology mode M .
5.6.2 Offshoring and native wage structure
As discussed earlier, the relative wage structure can be derived from the equilibrium
condition (5.34). Thus, following the same steps and utilizing the offshoring adjusted
equilibrium conditions (5.43), (5.45), (5.47), (5.48) together with previously derived
equilibrium variables (5.16), (5.20), (5.21), (5.22), (5.24), (5.27), into Eq. (5.34) and
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taking ratios with respect to medium-skilled wages, yields
ωDLM =
(
zL
zH − zL
) −σ
(−1)σ
(
N˜L
NˆM
)− −σ
(−1)σ
Nˆ
− 1

M
(
N˜M
1− κ
) 1
 (
ΘM
ΘL
)
KLM , (5.55)
ωDMH =
(
zH − zL
1− zH
) −σ
(−1)σ
(
NˆM
N˜H
)− −σ
(−1)σ
Nˆ
1

M
(
N˜M
1− κ
)− 1
 (
ΘH
ΘM
)
KMH , (5.56)
where KLM and KMH are defined as in Eqs. (5.35) and (5.36). Again Eqs. (5.55) and
(5.56) allow to decompose the effect of κ into (i) a market size effect, Nˆ
− −σ
(−1)σ
M , (ii) an
efficiency effect, Nˆ
1

M , (iii) a technology adoption effect,
(
zL
zH−zL
) −σ
(−1)σ
and
(
zH−zL
1−zH
) −σ
(−1)σ
,
and (iv) a labor supply effect,
(
N˜M
1−κ
) 1

. This latter channel is the result of the assumption
that offshoring accounts only the impact at the extensive margins, and thus neglecting the
beneficial effects of a reduction of offshoring costs on all intermediate inputs (intensive
margins). Notice that the terms
(
ΘM
ΘL
)
and
(
ΘH
ΘM
)
capture the immigration-induced
efficiency effects, which by contraction are insensitive to changes in offshoring κ.
I now discuss these channels in more detail. First, as mentioned above, the relative
strength between the labor supply effect and the efficiency effect depend on the extent
of offshoring rate. From Eq. (5.48), we get that for κ → 0, Φκ ≡ dN˜Mdκ → ∞, implying
that at low levels of offshoring, the efficiency effect will dominate the labor supply effect
induced by offshoring. Intuitively, at low values of offshoring rate the wage gap and thus
the arbitrage from offshoring will be very large for domestic firms (Acemoglu et al., 2012).
However, notice that this result differs from the non-monotonic relationship discussed in
Egger et al. (2013), where marginal gains from offshoring arise only at very low levels
of offshoring costs, i.e. when the initial fraction of offshoring firms is high, due to the
efficiency effect at the intensive margin. In this case, a decline of offshoring cost leads to
favorable shift of domestic workforce from low to high productive firms.
Second, as discussed in the case of medium-skill immigration, the direct market size effect
(N˜M) are interacting with the technology adoption effect (∆M and ΓM), where the relative
magnitude between these two effects depends again on the extent of technology adoption
in the neighborhood of the margins zL and zH , captured by the elasticity parameters ε˜L
and ε˜H . This is the crucial departure from Acemoglu et al. (2012), where this latter effect
is omitted. To see this more formally, take logs in Eqs. (5.55) and (5.56) differentiate
totally with respect to κ and make use of the comparative static results (5.53) and (5.54)
to obtain
d lnωDLM
dκ
=
− σ
(− 1)σ (1 + ΓM)Φκ −
1

(
Φκ − 1
1− κ
)
(5.57)
d lnωDMH
dκ
= − − σ
(− 1)σ (1−∆M)Φκ +
1

(
Φκ − 1
1− κ
)
(5.58)
In Eqs. (5.57) and (5.58), the first terms describe the interaction between the technology
adoption effect and the direct market size effect, while the second terms denote the
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interaction between the labor supply effect and the efficiency effect. It is readily seen
that the direction of the first term depends again on the relative magnitude between
the final-goods demand elasticity (σ) and the market power of monopolists (). Thus,
whenever  > σ, i.e. the elasticity of substitution between intermediates is larger than
the goods demand elasticity, the aforementioned price effect induced by specialization
in L and H technology modes becomes the dominating force, and thus raising low- and
high-skilled wages through the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
However, the strength of the first terms in Eqs. (5.57) and (5.58) is mitigated by
two forces. On the one hand, it depends on the degree of technology adoption in the
neighborhood of the margins zL and zH , denoted by ε˜L and ε˜H , respectively. On the
other hand, it depends on the level of offshoring rate κ. Thus, when either κ→ κ˜ (recall
that limκ→κ˜ Φκ = 0), or {ε˜L, ε˜H} → 0 (recall that lim{ε˜L,ε˜H}→0 ∆M = −ΓM = 1), the
first terms vanish. Therefore, for κ < κ˜ and a sufficient positive and finite degree of
technology adoption, it follows from Eqs. (5.57) and (5.58) that the offshoring-induced
efficiency effect will be the dominating force for a certain degree of technology adoption.
The next proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 5.6. Given a positive and finite degree of technology adoption, i.e.
{ε˜L, ε˜H} > 0, an exogenous increase in offshoring rate κ induces an efficiency effect
which is counteracting the technology adoption effect whenever  > σ. There exists a
threshold degree of technology adoption χ ≡ 2+σ−2σ
(−σ) , which determines a lower boundary
for changes in the relative range of final goods. Whenever min{|ΓM |,∆M} > χ, the
efficiency effect will be the dominating force. Moreover, for initial low values of offshoring
rate the efficiency effect will also dominate the labor supply effect.
Proof. See Appendix 5.A.7.
The results in Proposition 5.6 highlight again the importance of technology adoption
behavior and the rich pattern of interaction between various forces. Intuitively, the easier
the technology adoption is in the neighborhood of the margins zL and zH , the stronger
will be changes in the relative range of final goods, i.e. high values of |ΓM | and ∆M .
Thus, whenever the market power of monopolists is larger than the final-goods demand
elasticity ( > σ), technology adoption effect will mitigate the extent of the market size
effect. Now equipped with these results, the next proposition summarizes the main results
regarding the impact of offshoring on natives relative wage structure.
Proposition 5.7. Given the results in Proposition 5.6, changes in natives relative wage
structure due to an exogenous increase in offshoring rate (dκ > 0) are characterized by a
(i) Medium-skill-augmenting wage effect, associated with a relative increase of
medium-skilled wages compared to both low- and high-skilled wages – a hump shaped
relationship, whenever the offshoring rate is initially low.
(ii) Polarizing wage effect, associated with a relative decline of medium-skilled wages
compared to both low- and high-skilled wages – a U-shaped relationship, whenever
the offshoring rate is initially high.
Proof. See the discussion in the text.
Comparing the results in Proposition 5.7 with those of the case of medium-skill
immigration discussed in Proposition 5.2 and Proposition 5.4 it is readily seen that
163
5.7 Conclusion
both types of labor shock have a similar impact on natives relative wage structure,
but the adjustment mechanism is different. Medium-skill immigration leads to an
internal reorganization of work (i.e. task reallocation), where natives react endogenously
by specializing in communicative tasks, while offshoring of medium skill-intensive
jobs (intermediates) affects both immigrants and natives proportionately, leaving task
intensity unaffected. Although the latter is by construction, the results highlight that
the direction of distributional impact of both medium-skill immigration and offshoring
for native workers depends crucially on their initial share in the economy.
It is also worth noticing that the results in Propositions 5.2, 5.4, and 5.7 differ
substantially from those derived in Olney (2012) and Ottaviano et al. (2013), who
investigate jointly the impact of offshoring and immigration. The key arguments are
that implicit assumption of perfect substitutability between immigrants and natives,
e.g. as in Olney (2012), miss to capture important aspects of potential efficiency
improvements highlighted by the recent empirical evidence, and that accounting only for
partial equilibrium effects, e.g. as in Ottaviano et al. (2013), neglect important general
equilibrium implications.
5.7 Conclusion
Immigration and offshoring of domestic jobs are two phenomena that have considerably
shaped the public debate regarding their potential labor market effects in many advanced
countries. Thus, understanding the determinants of the impact of offshoring and
immigration is one of the key objectives of both policy makers and researchers. This
paper has analyzed jointly the impact of these two phenomena of globalized labor services
on native wage structure and how their effects are interlinked. In doing so, I develop an
integrated theoretical framework that features a richer structure of the economy consisting
of firm heterogeneity, endogenous technology adoption, monopolistic competition, and
skill heterogeneity. Moreover, the systematic framework allows to account for various
potential adjustment channels of the receiving economy to offshoring and immigration
shocks, and to investigate the determinants of and the interaction between these different
forces from a general equilibrium perspective. An important feature allows capture the
relationship between specialization in technology modes and increasing returns to scale.
The theoretical analysis provides several novel insights. First, immigration and offshoring
induce three main channels: (i) a market size effect, (ii) a technology adoption effect, and
(iii) an efficiency effect. More importantly, the relative magnitude between the first two
effects is crucially determined by the degree of technology adoption. In addition, the
direction of each of these two effects is importantly determined by the relative magnitude
between consumer preferences (i.e. final-goods demand elasticity) and the market
power of monopolists (i.e. the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods).
An interesting result of the analysis reveals that whenever the degree of technology
adoption between different production modes becomes very easy, the market size and
technology adoption effects are asymptotically balanced. Thus, the remaining channel
is the productivity effect, associated with the cost-efficiency enhancing. Third, the
magnitude of the productivity effect is stronger at low initial levels of task shares assigned
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to immigrants and of offshoring rate. The intuition is that at higher levels the labor
market competition among domestic workers, associated with the direct displacement
effect due to task reallocation in the case of immigration, or job relocation in the case of
offshoring, becomes dominating. These results highlight the rich pattern of interaction
between different forces. Nevertheless, the tractability of the framework permits to derive
clear conditions regarding when some forces dominate others, and thus enabling to make
clear predictions regarding the impacts on native wage structure.
The comparative statics reveal the following predictions regarding immigration-induced
changes in the relative wage structure of native workers. Whenever consumer preferences
react less elastic relative to the market power of monopolists, low- and high-skilled
immigration induce wage effects similar to “unskill-” and “skilled-biased” technological
changes, respectively. Medium-skilled immigration generates both a hump-shaped
relationship. The rationale behind these results is twofold. On the one hand, profit-
maximizing incentives elicits an endogenous increase in the mass of monopolists hit
by immigration shock – indicating the direct market size effect. On the other hand,
immigration raises the comparative advantages of the complementing technology mode by
lowering its cost index. Due to the endogenous choice for technology modes, the range of
final goods produced under the complementing technology mode is raised – indicating the
technology adoption effect. However, this latter effect induces, in addition, a price effect
favoring final goods produced under the competing technology modes as the economy
becomes more specialized in those production techniques. By the standard Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, this price effect is translated into wage effects of the respective
skill group. However, with strong elastic consumer preferences, the demand shifts in
favor of cheaper final goods and labor that were hit by the immigration shock, and thus
overcompensating the initial adverse effects.
More interestingly, in the empirically plausible case, i.e. when the market power of
monopolists is larger than the goods demand elasticity, the predictions of distributional
effects of immigration depends crucially on the level of task shares assigned to immigrants.
Thus, at low levels of task shares, low- and high-skilled immigration both generate a
polarizing wage effect, while medium-skilled immigration induces again a hump-shaped
wage effect. This is due to strong productivity effects at low initial task shares, and the
spill-over effects through the scale and price externalities mentioned above. In the case
of offshoring, changes in the wage structure of native workers is similar to those induced
by medium-skilled immigration. However, an interesting result is that even considering
the long-run scenario, i.e. when market size and technology adoption are balanced, the
remaining channel is the productivity effect induced by gains due to efficient reallocation
of tasks and jobs.
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5.A Proofs
5.A.1 Proof of Lemma 5.1
The proof of the optimal task assignment between immigrants and natives can be
conducted in two steps. First, I derive the optimal amount of composite factor labor
Lk for a given Ik, and then derive the optimal task margin Ik. If L
D
k and L
F
k are the
amounts of native and immigrant workers employed by any intermediate firm j ∈ [0, Ak],
it must satisfy ∫ Ik
0
lFk (i)di = L
F
k , (5.A.59)∫ 1
Ik
lDk (i)di = L
D
k . (5.A.60)
The optimal amount of workers across the respective range of tasks is obtained by
minimizing the cost
min
lFk (i),l
D
k (i)
∫ Ik
0
wFk l
F
k (i)di+
∫ 1
Ik
wDk l
D
k (i)di s.t. (5.11) (5.A.61)
The first-order conditions yield
wDk = w˜k
(
L˜k
lDk (i)
) 1
α
, (5.A.62)
wFk = w˜k
(
L˜k
lFk (i)
) 1
α
(γk(i))
1−α
α , (5.A.63)
where w˜k denotes the Lagrangian multiplier. It follows from the optimality conditions
(5.A.62) and (5.A.63)
lDk (i) = l
D
k (i
′), for i, i′ ∈ (Ik, 1] (5.A.64)
lFk (i) = l
F
k (i
′)
(
γk(i)
γk(i′)
)1−α
, for i, i′ ∈ [0, Ik] (5.A.65)
Thus, for the domestic labor it follows from equations (5.A.60) and (5.A.64) that
lDk (i) =
LDk
1− Ik (5.A.66)
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For the allocation of offshore workers, note that from Eq. (5.A.65), it must hold
lFk (i) = l
F
k (Ik)
(
γk(i)
γk(Ik)
)1−α
, for all i ∈ [0, Ik] (5.A.67)
Plugging Eq. (5.A.67) into Eq. (5.A.59), one can solve for lFk (Ik) and substituting this
expression back into Eq. (5.A.67) yields
lFk (i) =
(
γk(i)
1−α∫ Ik
0
γk(i)1−αdi
)
LFk (5.A.68)
Thus, substituting Eqs. (5.A.66) and (5.A.68) into Eq. (5.11) and recalling that labor is
the sole of production in the intermediate sector, i.e.xk = L˜, yields
xk = L˜k =
([∫ Ik
0
γk(i)
1−αdi
] 1
α (
LFk
)α−1
α + [1− Ik] 1α
(
LDk
)α−1
α
) α
α−1
. (5.A.69)
Now to prove that the optimal fraction of offshoring Ik is cost efficient, substitute the
first-order conditions (5.A.62) and (5.A.63) for lDk (i) and l
F
k (i), respectively, into Eq.
(5.11) and manipulate to obtain
w˜k =
((∫ Ik
0
γk(i)
1−αdi
)(
wFk
)1−α
+ [1− Ik]
(
wDk
)1−α) 11−α
(5.A.70)
Thus, Eq. (5.A.70) denotes the marginal cost of any differentiated-good producer j ∈
[0, Ak] employing immigrant and native workers. Now, the optimal choice of marginal
task Ik is obtained by minimizing w˜k with respect to Ik:
dw˜k
dIk
=
1
1− αw˜
α
k
(
γk(Ik)
1−α (wFk )1−α − (wDk )1−α) = 0.
Thus, we get that dw˜k
dIk
= 0 if and only if
γk(Ik)w
F
k = w
D
k ,
so that an intermediate-good producer allocates tasks to immigrants if and only if
γk(i)w
F
k ≤ wDk .
5.A.2 Derivation of equilibrium labor composite and marginal
costs
From (5.A.62) and (5.A.63) the inverse relative labor demand between offshore and
medium-skilled workers is defined by
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wFk
wDk
=
(
lFk (i)
lDk (i)
)− 1
α
[γk(i)]
1−α
α ,
and using Eqs. (5.A.66) and (5.A.68) yields
wFk
wDk
=
(
LFk
LDk
)− 1
α
[∫ Ik
0
γk(i)
1−αdi
] 1
α
(1− Ik)1/α .
Finally, utilizing the overall labor market clearing condition derived in Eqs. (5.17), (5.18),
and (5.19) the previous equation can be written as
wFk
wDk
=
(
NFk
NDk
)− 1
α
(
ϑk(Ik)
(1− I)
)1/α
, (5.A.71)
where ϑk(Ik) ≡
(∫ I
0
γk(i)
1−αdi
)
. Then, combining (5.A.71) with the cost-efficient
condition task allocation, Eq. (5.13), yields
1
γk(Ik)
=
(
NFk
NDk
)− 1
α
(
ϑk(Ik)
(1− I)
)1/α
(5.A.72)
Next, solving the previous derived equation for NFk and combining the result with the
labor market clearing conditions , Eqs. (5.17)–(5.19), to insert into Eq. (5.A.69), yields
xk =
N˜k
SkAk (5.A.73)
N˜k =
[∫ Ik
0
γk(i)
1−αdi
] 1
α (
NFk
)α−1
α + (1− Ik)
1
α
(
NDk
)α−1
α
 αα−1
=
(
ϑk(Ik)
1
α
(
NFk
)α−1
α + (1− Ik)
1
α
(
NDk
)α−1
α
) α
α−1
. (5.A.74)
Now, using Eq. (5.A.72) into the previous equation and manipulating slightly yields
N˜k =
(
ϑk(Ik)γk(Ik)
α−1 + (1− Ik)
) α
α−1 N
D
k
1− Ik =Mk(Θk, Ik)N
D
k , (5.A.75)
and from Eqs. (5.13) and (5.A.70) we obtain
w˜k =
(
ϑk(Ik)γk(Ik)
α−1 + 1− Ik
) 1
1−α wDk = Θk(Ik)w
D
k , (5.A.76)
where Θk(Ik) denotes the generalized measure of marginal cost of task production.
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5.A.3 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Notice, first, that Eq. (5.A.72) implies that task margin Ik depends only on the
endowments of immigrant and native workers. Rearranging Eq. (5.A.72) and taking
logs, yields ln
(
NFk
NDk
)
= α ln γk(Ik) + lnϑk(Ik)− ln(1− Ik) Now, recalling the property of
γ′k(i) > 0 and differentiating this expression with respect to N
F
k we get
d ln Ik
d lnNFk
=
(
αµγk +
γk(Ik)
1−αIk
ϑk(Ik)
+
Ik
1− Ik
)−1
> 0. (5.A.77)
From Eq. (5.A.76), we can compute the impact of changes in the task margin on the
marginal cost of monopolists. Differentiating (5.A.76) w.r.t. Ik yields
d ln Θk(Ik)
d ln Ik
= −Θk(Ik)α−1ϑk(Ik)γk(Ik)α−1µγk < 0, (5.A.78)
where µγk ≡ γ
′
k(Ik)Ik
γk(Ik)
> 0 denotes the elasticity of comparative advantage schedule of
immigrants with respect to task margin Ik. Moreover, utilizing the outcome in Eq.
(5.A.78), it follows from Eqs. (5.A.75) and (5.A.76) that, for Ik > 0, the labor composite
is increasing and the marginal cost of intermediate-good firm is decreasing in task margin
Ik, i.e.
d ln N˜k
d ln Ik
= −d lnMk
d ln Ik
= −αd ln Θk(Ik)
d ln Ik
+
Ik
1− Ik > 0 (5.A.79)
d ln w˜k
d ln Ik
=
d ln Θk(Ik)
d ln Ik
< 0 (5.A.80)
5.A.4 Proof of Proposition 5.1
The computation of the comparative statics for the other exogenous changes is similar
to the one conducted for changes in the task margin IM , associated with medium-skill
immigration, recall Eq. (5.A.77). Notice that by Eq. (5.A.72) task margin Ik depends
only on the endowments of skill type k. Recall the definition Ψk = −d lnMk(Ik)d ln Ik > 0 and
differentiate the implicit 2× 2 system, Eqs. (5.30) and (5.31) with respect to changes in
the task margins and the fixed costs, yields:
• Low-skill immigration and L-fixed costs:
d ln zL
d ln IL
=
d ln zL
d lnML
d lnML
d ln IL
= ΨL
−1

ε˜HzH +
zH(1−zL)
(1−zH)(zH−zL)
DJ > 0, (5.A.81)
d ln zL
d ln fL
= − 1
ΨL
d ln zL
d ln IL
< 0 (5.A.82)
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and
d ln zH
d ln IL
=
d ln zH
d lnML
d lnML
d ln IL
= ΨL
zL
(zH−zL)
DJ > 0. (5.A.83)
d ln zH
d ln fL
= − 1
ΨL
d ln zH
d ln IL
< 0 (5.A.84)
• High-skill immigration and H-fixed costs:
d ln zL
d ln IH
=
d ln zL
d lnMH
d lnMH
d ln IH
= −ΨH
zH
(zH−zL)
DJ < 0, (5.A.85)
d ln zL
d ln fH
= − 1
ΨH
d ln zL
d ln IH
> 0 (5.A.86)
and
d ln zH
d ln IH
=
d ln zH
d lnMH
d lnMH
d ln IH
= −ΨH
−1

ε˜LzL +
zH
(zH−zL)
DJ < 0. (5.A.87)
d ln zH
d ln fH
= − 1
ΨH
d ln zH
d ln IH
> 0 (5.A.88)
where the Jacobi is given by
DJ =
(
− 1

ε˜LzL +
1
zL
)(
− 1

ε˜HzH +
1− zL
(1− zH)(zH − zL)
)
+
1
zH − zL
(
− 1

ε˜HzH +
1
1− zH
)
> 0(5.A.89)
Moreover, from (5.A.81) and (5.A.83) it can be readily verified that
d ln zH − d ln zL
d ln IL
= −ΨLDJ
(
− 1

ε˜HzH +
1
(1− zH)
)
< 0 (5.A.90)
and similarly from (5.A.85) and (5.A.87)
d ln zH − d ln zL
d ln IH
= −ΨHDJ
(
− 1

ε˜LzL
)
< 0 (5.A.91)
Since Ψk(Ik) depends on the initial level of the task margin, it follows from Eq. (5.A.79)
that for any k = {L,M,H}
lim
Ik→0
Ψk = 0 ⇒ lim
Ik→0
∣∣∣∣d ln zLd ln Ik
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣d ln zHd ln Ik
∣∣∣∣ = 0
(5.A.92)
lim
Ik→1
Ψk =∞ ⇒ lim
Ik→1
∣∣∣∣d ln zLd ln Ik
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣d ln zHd ln Ik
∣∣∣∣ =∞
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5.A.5 Proof of Lemma 5.3
Recall the thresholds of the elasticity of substitution between tasks,
α˜L ≡ (− 1)σ
(− σ)(1− ΓL) ,
α˜H ≡ (− 1)σ
(− σ)(1 + ∆H) ,
Thus, for the relative strength between the two thresholds we obtain
α˜L Q α˜H
ΓL Q −∆H
Now substituting the definitions of ΓL and ∆H from Eqs. (5.B.107) and (5.B.112),
respectively, and manipulating yields
1
DJ
(
− 1

ε˜HzHzH
(zH − zL) +
zH
(1− zH)(zH − zL)
)
Q 1DJ
(
− 1

ε˜LzL(1− zL)
(1− zH)(zH − zL) +
zH
(zH − zL)(1− zH)
)
ε˜HzH(1− zH) Q ε˜LzL(1− zL) (5.A.93)
5.A.6 Proof of Proposition 5.4
The proof of the existent of threshold margins IˇL and IˇH can be straightforwardly verified
as follows. Given 0 < {ε˜L, ε˜H} <∞ and the functional properties of γk(i), it follows from
Eqs. (5.37) and (5.42), respectively,
d lnωLM
d ln IL
= HL(IˇL)− GL(IˇL) = 0, (5.A.94)
d lnωMH
d ln IH
= HH(IˇH)− GH(IˇH) = 0, (5.A.95)
so that
Hk(Ik) Q Gk(Ik), for Ik R Iˇk, k = {L,H}.
The proof of the existent of threshold margin IˇM needs further elaboration. From
Eqs. (5.39) and (5.40) two threshold task margins are obtained at which d lnωDLM = 0
and d lnωDMH = 0. Define these two thresholds, respectively, by the following implicit
functions
I1,M ≡ (1− αδ(1 + ΓM)) θ˜M(Iˇ1,M)− δ(1 + ΓM) Iˇ1,M
1− Iˇ1,M
= 0, (5.A.96)
I2,M ≡ (1− αδ(1−∆M)) θ˜M(Iˇ2,M)− δ(1−∆M) Iˇ2,M
1− Iˇ2,M
= 0. (5.A.97)
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Thus, it is readily seen from Eqs. (5.A.96) and (5.A.97) that if −ΓM = ∆M , we get that
Iˇ1,M = Iˇ2,M = IˇM . Moreover, using the definitions of ΓM and ∆M from Eqs. (5.B.109)
and (5.B.110), respectively, we get that
−ΓM Q ∆M
1
DJ
(
zH
(zH − zL)(1− zH)
+
− 1

(ε˜L + ε˜H)
zH
(zH − zL)
)
Q
1
DJ
(
zH
(1− zH)(zH − zL)
+
− 1

(
zH(1− zL)
(1− zH)(zH − zL)
ε˜L +
zL
zH − zL
ε˜H
))
,
which after some manipulation yields
ε˜H(1− zH) Q ε˜LzL. (5.A.98)
This in turn implies that
Iˇ1,M Q Iˇ2,M . (5.A.99)
To verify (5.A.99), it is sufficient to show that either from (5.A.96),
∂I1,M
∂ΓM
< 0, or from
(5.A.97),
∂I2,M
∂∆M
> 0. Thus, differentiating Eq. (5.A.97) with respect to ∆M , we obtain
dIˇ2,M
d∆M
=
αδΘ˜M(Iˇ2,M) + δIˇ2,M/(1− Iˇ2,M)
δ(1− ΓˇM) 1(1−Iˇ1,M )2 − (1− αδ(1− ΓˇM)
∂Θ˜M (Iˇ2,M )
∂Iˇ2,M
> 0
where by the functional properties discussed above the denominator is always positive.
Thus, for an asymmetric degree of technology adoption in the neighborhood of the
margins zL and zH , there exist two task margins, implying that the productivity (labor
supply) effect dominates unambiguously the labor supply (productivity) effect when ever
the task margin is lower (higher) than the minimum (maximum) of the two thresholds,
i.e. IM < min{Iˇ1,M , Iˇ2,M} (IM > max{Iˇ1,M , Iˇ2,M}). For all min{Iˇ1,M , Iˇ2,M} ≤ IM ≤
max{Iˇ1,M , Iˇ2,M}, the relationship between the two forces becomes ambiguous.
Moreover, comparing Eqs. (5.A.93) and (5.A.98) it is readily seen that the condition
min{α˜L, α˜H} defines the binding thresholds for elasticity of substitution between tasks.
5.A.7 Proof of Proposition 5.6
Recall Eqs. (5.57) and (5.58) and rearrange slightly to obtain
d lnωDLM
dκ
= −
(
1

− − σ
(− 1)σ (1 + ΓM)
)
Φκ +
1

1
1− κ
d lnωDMH
dκ
=
(
1

− − σ
(− 1)σ (1−∆M)
)
Φκ − 1

1
1− κ
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Now from the first terms on the right hand side, one obtains a threshold defined by
χ ≡ 
2 + σ − 2σ
(− σ) ,
which sets a lower boundary for changes in the relative range of final goods. Thus, it
follows that whenever
min{|ΓM |,∆M} > χ,
the efficiency effect will be dominating. As defined by condition (5.A.98) in Appendix
5.A.6 it follows that
min{|ΓM |,∆M} = min{ε˜H(1− zH), ε˜LzL}.
Moreover, since limκ→0 Φκ =∞, the efficiency effect will also dominate the labor supply
effect (the second term on the right hand side) at low initial values of offshoring rate.
5.B Derivation of equilibrium solutions
5.B.1 Derivation of equilibrium mass of monopolists Ak
The derivation of the mass of monopolists in every technology mode can be derived as
follows. First, notice that the perfectly competitive nature of the final goods market
requires zero profits, i.e.
pk(z)yk(z) = ζkXk, ∀ k = {L,M,H}
Using Eqs. (5.5) and (5.6), it follows that the price index of technology mode k has to
be equal to its marginal cost
Pk = ζk, (5.B.100)
a result that has to hold in any perfectly competitive market. Now, utilizing the
equilibrium value of ζk from Eq. (5.15), the equilibrium price index can be expressed
as
Pk = ζk =

− 1A
1
1−
k w˜k. (5.B.101)
From the total budget constraint for any final good producer z using technology mode k
requires
pk(z)yk(z) = w
F
k n
F
k + w
D
k n
D
k =
1
Sk
(
wFk N
F
k + w
D
k N
D
k
)
,
where the second equality follows from Eq. (5.23).
Utilize Eqs. (5.5) and (5.6) in the left hand side of the previous equation and manipulate
to obtain
PkA

−1
k xk =
wDk N
D
k
Sk
(
1 +
wFk
wDk
NFk
NDk
)
.
Next, use the FE condition (5.14), and Eq. (5.B.101) to substitute for xM and PM in the
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previous equation, respectively, so that after some manipulation we obtain
Akfkw˜k =
wDk N
D
k
Sk
(
1 +
wFk
wDk
NFk
NDk
)
.
Next, substitute Eq. (5.A.71) for wFk /w
D
k in the right hand side and after simple
manipulation we obtain
Akfkw˜k =
wDk N
D
k
Sk
(
1 +
(
ϑk(Ik)
(1− Ik)
)1/α(
NFk
NDk
)− 1
α NFk
NDk
)
Akfkw˜k =
1
Sk
wDk
(
NDk
) 1
α
(1− Ik)1/α
(
(1− Ik)1/α
(
NDk
)α−1
α + ϑk(Ik)
1
α
(
NFk
)α−1
α
)
(5.B.102)
Recall the first order condition (5.A.63) and utilize Eqs. (5.A.66), (5.A.68), and (5.A.69)
to obtain
wDk
(
lDk
)1/α
= w˜kx
1/α
k
wDk
(
Lk
1− Ik
)1/α
= w˜kL˜
1/α
k
where recall
L˜k =
(
ϑk(Ik)
(
LFk
)α−1
α + (1− Ik)1/α
(
LDk
)α−1
α
) α
α−1
ϑk(Ik) ≡
(∫ Ik
0
γk(i)
1−αdi
)1/α
Now, substituting the total resource constraint condition (5.18) for LM and LO, we obtain
wk
(
NDk
1− Ik
)1/α
= w˜kN˜
1/α
k . (5.B.103)
Then, substituting (5.B.103) for wDk
(
NDk
1−Ik
)1/α
in (5.B.102) and rearranging slightly yields
Ak =
N˜k
fkSk (5.B.104)
5.B.2 Derivation of aggregate sectoral output
The derivation of the aggregate sectoral output is illustrated for the low-tech goods. The
aggregation over the range of all final goods using the other two types of technology can
be derived similarly. Define the total revenue using low-quality technology as
PLYL =
∫ zL
0
p(z)y(z)dz.
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Utilizing Eqs. (5.5) and (5.6) yields
PLYL =
∫ zL
0
p(z)ϕL(z)XLdz,
=
∫ zL
0
PLXLdz,
= PLzLXL.
Then, by equilibrium condition (5.21), it follows
YL = A
1
−1
L N˜L.
Following the same steps, we obtain
YM = A
1
−1
M N˜M ,
YH = A
1
−1
H N˜H .
5.B.3 Derivation of relative wages
To derive the relative wages structure for native workers, we proceed as follows. Recall the
first order condition defining the final goods demand, Eq. (5.2). Now, multiplying both
sides by p(z) and noticing that from Eqs. (5.6), (5.26), and (5.27) it follows pL(z)yL(z) =
PLYL/zL and pM(z)yM(z) = PMYM/(zH−zL), and pH(z)yH(z) = PHYH/(1−zH), we get
PLYL
zL
= Y P 1−σL ϕL(z)
σ−1, ∀ z ∈ {0, zL}
PMYM
zH − zL = Y P
1−σ
M ϕM(z
′)σ−1, ∀ z′ ∈ {zL, zH}
PHYH
1− zH = Y P
1−σ
H ϕH(z
′′)σ−1, ∀ z′′ ∈ {zH , 1}
Rearranging and taking the ration with respect to k = M , we get the relative aggregate
demand for final goods
PL
PM
=
(
zL
zH − zL
) 1
σ
(
YL
YM
)− 1
σ
ΛL(z, z
′),
PM
PH
=
(
zH − zL
1− zH
) 1
σ
(
YM
YH
)− 1
σ
ΛH(z
′, z′′),
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where ΛL(z, z
′) ≡
(
ϕL(z
′)
ϕM (z′′)
)σ−1
and ΛH(z
′, z′′) ≡
(
ϕM (z
′)
ϕH(z′′)
)σ−1
.11 Next, use the
equilibrium outcomes (5.27) to substitute for Yk to obtain
PL
PM
=
(
zL
zH − zL
) 1
σ
[
N˜L
N˜M
(
AL
AM
) 1
−1
]− 1
σ
ΛL(z, z
′), (5.B.105)
PM
PH
=
(
zH − zL
1− zH
) 1
σ
[
N˜M
N˜H
(
AM
AH
) 1
−1
]− 1
σ
ΛH(z
′, z′′), (5.B.106)
Next, use the equilibrium condition (5.34) and take the ratio with respect to technology
mode k = M to obtain
w˜L
w˜M
=
ζL
ζM
(
XL
XM
)1/(
xL
xM
)−1/
w˜M
w˜H
=
ζM
ζH
(
XM
XH
)1/(
xM
xH
)−1/
Now, recalling the symmetry assumption and using Eq. (5.16) to substitute for ζk we get
w˜L
w˜M
=
PL
PM
(
AL
AM
)1/(−1)
w˜M
w˜H
=
PM
PH
(
AM
AH
)1/(−1)
Next, utilize Eqs. (5.B.105) and (5.B.106) in the previous equations to substitute for
PL/PM and PM/PH , respectively.
w˜L
w˜M
=
(
zL
zH − zL
) 1
σ
[
N˜L
N˜M
(
AL
AM
) 1
−1
]− 1
σ (
AL
AM
)1/(−1)
ΛL(z, z
′)
w˜M
w˜H
=
(
zH − zL
1− zH
) 1
σ
[
N˜M
N˜H
(
AM
AH
) 1
−1
]− 1
σ (
AM
AH
)1/(−1)
ΛH(z
′, z′′)
Now, using the equilibrium expression for Ak, Eq. (5.22) and manipulating slightly we
obtain
w˜L
w˜M
=
(
zL
zH − zL
) 1
σ
(
zL
zH − zL
)− σ−1
(−1)σ
(
N˜L
N˜M
) σ−
(−1)σ (
fL
fM
)− σ−1
(−1)σ
ΛL(z, z
′)
w˜M
w˜H
=
(
zH − zL
1− zH
) 1
σ
(
zH − zL
1− zH
)−(σ−1)
(−1)σ
(
N˜M
N˜H
) σ−
(−1)σ (
fM
fH
)− σ−1
(−1)σ
ΛH(z
′, z′′)
Finally using the Eqs. (5.23) and (5.24) to substitute for N˜k and w˜k, respectively, then we
11Notice that the relative final goods demand at the margins, zL and zH , is undefined since producers
are indifferent regarding the adoption of different production technology modes.
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can rewrite the previously derived equations in terms of relative wages of native workers,
i.e.
wDL
wDM
=
(
zL
zH − zL
) −σ
(−1)σ
(
ΘL(IL)
ΘM (IM )
)α(−σ)
(−1)σ −1( 1− IL
1− IM
) (−σ)
(−1)σ
(
NDL
NDM
) (σ−)
(−1)σ ( fL
fM
)− σ−1
(−1)σ
ΛL(z, z
′)
wDM
wDH
=
(
zH − zL
1− zH
) −σ
(−1)σ
(
ΘM (IM )
ΘH(IH)
)α(−σ)
(−1)σ −1(1− IM
1− IH
) (−σ)
(−1)σ
(
NDM
NDH
) (σ−)
(−1)σ (fM
fH
)− σ−1
(−1)σ
ΛH(z
′, z′′)
5.B.4 Derivation of immigration-induced changes in relative
range of final goods
Low-skill immigration
To obtain explicit solution for the terms Γ˜L ≡ d ln[zL/(zH−zL)]d ln IL =
d lnML
d ln IL
d ln[zL/(zH−zL)]
d lnML and
∆˜IL ≡ d ln[(zH−zL)/(1−zH)]d ln IL =
d lnML
d ln IL
d ln[(zH−zL)/(1−zH)]
d lnML , we can utilize the results of the
comparative statics in Eqs. (5.A.81) and (5.A.83) to obtain the following terms
Γ˜L =
zH
zH − zL
(
d ln zL − d ln zH
d ln IL
)
= ΨLΓL > 0, (5.B.107)
where ΓL =
1
DJ
(
−1

ε˜HzHzH
(zH−zL) +
zH
(1−zH)(zH−zL)
)
> 0, and
∆˜IL = −
(
zL
zH − zL
d ln zL
d ln IL
− zH(1− zL)
(1− zH)(zH − zL)
d ln zH
d ln IL
)
= ΨL∆L < 0, (5.B.108)
where ∆L = − 1DJ
(
−1

ε˜HzHzL
(zH−zL)
)
< 0. It is immediately evident that the size of ΓL and ∆L
depends, on the one hand, on the degrees of ε˜L and ε˜H . On the other hand, it depends
on the initial level of task margin IL, captured by ΨL. As shown in Appendix 4.A.3 of
chapter 4, it follows that 0 < ΓL < 1 and 0 < |∆L| < 1 for 0 < {ε˜L, ε˜H} <∞.
Moreover, both the labor supply effect, IL/(1−IL), and the productivity effect, d ln ΘL(IL)d ln IL ,
depend also on the initial level of the task margin. Thus, taking the limits and utilizing
Eq. (5.A.78), we get that
lim
IL→0
IL
1− IL = 0, and limIL→1
IL
1− IL =∞
lim
IL→0
d ln ΘL(IL)
d ln IL
= 0, and lim
IL→1
d ln ΘL(IL)
d ln IL
= −µγL
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Medium-skill immigration
Following the same steps, we can solve for an explicit solution of the terms Γ˜IM ≡
d ln[zL/(zH−zL)]
d ln IM
and ∆˜IM ≡ d ln[(zH−zL)/(1−zH)]d ln IM , we can utilize the results of the comparative
statics derived in the main text, Eqs. (5.32) and (5.33), to obtain the following terms
Γ˜M =
zH
zH − zL
(
d ln zL − d ln zH
d ln IM
)
= ΨMΓM < 0 (5.B.109)
where ΓM = − 1DJ
(
zH
(zH−zL)(1−zH) +
−1

(ε˜LzL + ε˜HzH)
zH
(zH−zL)
)
< 0, and
∆˜M =
(
zH(1− zL)
(1− zH)(zH − zL)
d ln zH
d ln IM
− zL
zH − zL
d ln zL
d ln IM
)
= ΨM∆M > 0 (5.B.110)
where ∆M =
1
DJ
(
zH
(1−zH)(zH−zL) +
−1

(
zH(1−zL)
(1−zH)(zH−zL) ε˜LzL +
zL
zH−zL ε˜HzH
))
> 0 Now,
utilizing the results in (5.A.92) for k = H and given 0 < {ε˜L, ε˜M} <∞, we get that
lim
IM→0
ΨM = 0 ⇒ lim
IM→0
∆˜M = −Γ˜M =∞
lim
IM→1
ΨM =∞ ⇒ lim
IM→1
∆˜M = Γ˜M = 0
Moreover, from Eqs. (5.B.109) and (5.B.110), we get that
∆M Q |ΓM |
ε˜L
1− zH Q
ε˜H
zH
implying that the magnitude of changes in the technology margin zL relative to (1− zH)
depends on the size of the elasticities at the respective margins. That is, if ε˜L
1−zH <
ε˜H
zH
the
adoption between L and M technology modes in the neighborhood of zL is easier relative
to that between M and H technology modes in the neighborhood of zH .
High-skill immigration
Following the same steps, we can solve for an explicit solution of the terms Γ˜H ≡
d ln[zL/(zH−zL)]
d ln IH
and ∆˜IH ≡ d ln[(zH−zL)/(1−zH)]d ln IH , we can utilize the results of the comparative
statics in Eqs. (5.A.85) and (5.A.87) to obtain the following terms
Γ˜H =
zH
zH − zL
(
d ln zL − d ln zH
d ln IH
)
= ΨHΓH > 0 (5.B.111)
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where ΓH =
1
DJ
(
−1

ε˜L
(zH−zL)zL
)
> 0, and
∆˜IH =
(
zH(1− zL)
(1− zH)(zH − zL)
d ln zH
d ln IH
− zL
zH − zL
d ln zL
d ln IH
)
= ΨH∆H < 0 (5.B.112)
where ∆H = − 1DJ
(
−1

ε˜LzL(1−zL)
(1−zH)(zH−zL) +
zH
(zH−zL)(1−zH)
)
< 0.
Similarly, utilizing Eq. (5.A.78) it follows that both the labor supply effect, IH/(1− IH),
and the productivity effect, d ln ΘH(IH)
d ln IH
converge to the following limits
lim
IH→0
IH
1− IH = 0, and limIH→1
IH
1− IH =∞
lim
IH→0
d ln ΘH(IH)
d ln IH
= 0, and lim
IH→1
d ln ΘH(IH)
d ln IH
= −µγH
5.B.5 Impact of immigration on native wage structure
Low-skill immigration and native wage structure
To compute the impact of low-skill immigration on the wage structure of native workers,
recall the Eqs. (5.35) and (5.36), take logs and differentiate with respect to task margin
IL to obtain
d ln(wDL /w
D
M )
d ln IL
=
− σ
(− 1)σ
(
d ln(zL/(zH − zL))
d ln IL
)
+
(
α(− σ)
(− 1)σ − 1
)(
d ln ΘL(IL)
d ln IL
)
−
(
(− σ)
(− 1)σ
)
IL
1− IL
d ln(wDM/w
D
H)
d ln IL
=
− σ
(− 1)σ
(
d ln((zH − zL)/(1− zH))
d ln IL
)
Utilizing now Eqs. (5.B.107) and (5.B.108) and making use of the definition of the terms
ΨL ≡ −d ln[ΩL(IL)α(1−IL)]d ln IL and Θ˜L(IL) ≡ −
d ln ΘL(IL)
d ln IL
we get(
d ln(zL/(zH − zL))
d ln IL
)
= ΨLΓL =
(
αΘ˜L(IL) +
IL
1− IL
)
ΓL > 0(
d ln((zH − zL)/(1− zH))
d ln IL
)
= ΨL∆L =
(
αΘ˜L(IL) +
IL
1− IL
)
∆L < 0
Now utilizing these results in the previously derived equations and rearranging yield Eqs.
(5.37) and (5.38) derived in the text.
High-skill immigration and native wage structure
Following the same steps we can compute the distributional impact of high-skill
immigration for native workers. More precisely, take logs in Eqs. (5.35) and (5.36)
179
5.B.5 Impact of immigration on native wage structure
and differentiate with respect to task margin IH to obtain
d ln(wDL /w
D
M )
d ln IH
=
− σ
(− 1)σ
(
d ln(zL/(zH − zL))
d ln IH
)
d ln(wDM/w
D
H)
d ln IL
=
− σ
(− 1)σ
(
d ln((zH − zL)/(1− zH))
d ln IH
)
−
(
α(− σ)
(− 1)σ − 1
)(
d ln ΘH(IH)
d ln IH
)
+
(
(− σ)
(− 1)σ
)
IH
1− IH
Now utilize Eqs. (5.B.111) and (5.B.112) and making use of the definition of the terms
ΨH ≡ −d ln[ΩH(IH)α(1−IH)]d ln IH and Θ˜H(IH) ≡ −
d ln ΘH(IH)
d ln IH
to obtain(
d ln(zL/(zH − zL))
d ln IH
)
= ΨHΓH =
(
αΘ˜H(IH) +
IH
1− IH
)
ΓH > 0(
d ln((zH − zL)/(1− zH))
d ln IH
)
= ΨH∆H =
(
αΘ˜H(IH) +
IH
1− IH
)
∆H < 0
Substituting these results in the previously derived equations and rearranging yield Eqs.
(5.41) and (5.42) derived in the text.
Medium-skill immigration and native wage structure
To obtain the distributional impact of medium-skill immigration for native workers, take
logs in Eqs. (5.35) and (5.36) and differentiate with respect to task margin IM to obtain
d ln(wDL /w
D
M )
d ln IM
=
− σ
(− 1)σ
(
d ln(zL/(zH − zL))
d ln IM
)
−
(
α(− σ)
(− 1)σ − 1
)(
d ln ΘM (IM )
d ln IM
)
+
(
(− σ)
(− 1)σ
)
IM
1− IM
d ln(wDM/w
D
H)
d ln IL
=
− σ
(− 1)σ
(
d ln((zH − zL)/(1− zH))
d ln IM
)
+
(
α(− σ)
(− 1)σ − 1
)(
d ln ΘM (IM )
d ln IM
)
−
(
(− σ)
(− 1)σ
)
IM
1− IM
Now utilize Eqs. (5.B.109) and (5.B.110) and making use of the definition of the terms
ΨM ≡ −d ln[ΩM (IM )α(1−IM )]d ln IM and Θ˜M(IM) ≡ −
d ln ΘM (IM )
d ln IM
to obtain(
d ln(zL/(zH − zL))
d ln IM
)
= ΨMΓM =
(
αΘ˜M(IM) +
IM
1− IM
)
ΓM < 0(
d ln((zH − zL)/(1− zH))
d ln IM
)
= ΨM∆M =
(
αΘ˜M(IM) +
IM
1− IM
)
∆M > 0
Substituting these results in the previously derived equations and rearranging yield Eqs.
(5.39) and (5.40) derived in the text.
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5.B.6 Derivation of AˆM
Recall the zero profit condition
pM(z)yM(z) =
w˜MN˜M + wONO
zH − zL
Utilizing Eq. (5.6) in the right hand side and manipulating the left hand side slightly
yields
PMXˆM =
w˜MN˜M
zH − zL
[
1 +
wO
w˜M
NO
N˜M
]
Now perfect competition in the final goods market requires PM = ζˆM and by symmetry
it follows that XˆM = A

−1
M
(
κx
−1

O + (1− κ)x
−1

M
) 
−1
. Since the extent of offshoring
is exogenously given, the FE condition (5.14) applies to both type of firms producing
intermediates at home and abroad. Substituting these observations together with Eq.
(5.49) and the markup-pricing in the left hand side of the previously derived equation
yields
AM wˆMfM =
w˜MN˜M
zH − zL
[
1 +
wO
w˜M
NO
N˜M
]
where wˆM denotes the marginal cost index of NˆM and is defined by
wˆM =
[
κw1−O + (1− κ)w˜1−M
] 1
1− .
Next substitute Eq. (5.46) for wO/w˜M in the left hand side and manipulate to obtain
ζˆMA

−1
M (− 1)fM =
w˜MN˜
1/
M
(zH − zL)(1− κ)1/
[
κ
1
N
−1

O + (−κ)
1
 N˜
−1

M
]
(5.B.113)
Now from the optimization problem
min
N˜M ,NO
w˜MN˜M + wONO s.t. NˆM =
(
κ
1
N
−1

O + (−κ)
1
 N˜
−1

M
) 
−1
the first order conditions imply
w˜M = wˆM
(
NˆM
N˜M
) 1

(1− κ)1/ (5.B.114)
wO = wˆM
(
NˆM
NO
) 1

κ1/, (5.B.115)
Utilizing the first-order condition (5.B.114) in the left hand side of (5.B.113),
manipulating and solving with respect to AˆM yields the solution derived in the text.
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Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Gedurende de laatste twee decennia zijn nationale arbeids- en goederenmarkten in steeds
sterkere mate ge¨ıntegreerd met de wereldmarkt. Twee factoren spelen bij deze nieuwe
globalisering een belangrijke rol. Enerzijds zorgen de vooruitgang in de informatie-
en communicatietechnologie, het toelaten van vrije kapitaalstromen en het opheffen
van handelsbelemmeringen ervoor dat productie- en arbeidsprocessen steeds minder
afhankelijk worden van tijd en plaats. Anderzijds hebben (drastische) institutionele
en economische hervormingen in opkomende markten – zoals die van de BRIC- en
voormalig Oostbloklanden – ertoe geleid dat deze landen zich ontwikkeld hebben tot
sterke economiee¨n, met groeiende investeringen in menselijk kapitaal, geavanceerde
technologie, en bedrijfsinfrastructuur.
De sterke globalisering van goederen- en arbeidsmarkten leidt ertoe dat de geavanceerde
economiee¨n steeds meer gebruik maken van de nieuwe arbeid, door gebruik te maken
van arbeidsmigranten of door gedeelten van het productieproces uit te besteden. Deze
ontwikkeling krijgt veel aandacht in de media en in het beleid, en wordt vaak gezien als een
bedreiging voor zittende werknemers, die hun banen zien verdwijnen naar het buitenland,
of die nu in eigen land moeten concurreren met arbeidsmigranten. Dit proefschrift
draagt bij aan deze discussie. Middels theoretische modellen wordt onderzocht hoe de
arbeidsmarkt en de economie de stroom arbeidsmigranten en offshoring absorberen en
hoe deze zich verder ontwikkelen.
Hoofdstuk 2
Hoofdstuk 2 biedt inzicht in mogelijke verdringingseffecten die arbeidsmigratie
met zich meebrengt voor zittende arbeiders die laaggeschoold werk verrichten,
aangezien de immigratie van laaggeschoolden leidt tot een verlaging van het algeheel
vaardigheidsniveau van de beroepsbevolking (skill-downgrading). Hiertoe wordt
een model ontwikkeld waarin de economie bestaat uit een dienstensector en een
industriesector. In deze sectoren werken, respectievelijk, alleen laaggeschoolde en
middelbaar geschoolde arbeiders. Hooggeschoolden zijn inzetbaar in beide sectoren.
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De analyses geven aan wat de gevolgen van immigratie zijn voor het aandeel
laaggeschoolden op de arbeidsmarkt, als ook voor de werkloosheid onder deze groep
arbeiders. Daarnaast wordt ook gekeken naar het belang van de structuur van de
arbeidsmarkt. Twee systemen worden vergeleken: de ene arbeidsmarkt is flexibel, in de
zin dat de werkloosheidsuitkeringen endogeen zijn, en be¨ınvloed worden door het beroep
op deze voorzieningen. In deze setting leidt een hoger beroep tot lagere uitkeringen. De
andere arbeidsmarkt is rigide, waarin de werkloosheidsuitkeringen als exogeen en niet-
veranderlijk beschouwd worden.
Uit de analyses komen twee interessante conclusies naar voren. Ten eerste, onder een
flexibele arbeidsmarkt, leidt de skill-downgrading door immigratie van arbeiders tot een
afname van de werkloosheid onder laaggeschoolde arbeiders. Ten tweede zien we dat de
recente trend van immigratie van hooggeschoolden leidt tot een 6 tot 10 procent hoger
BBP vergeleken met een situatie waarin deze immigratie niet had plaatsgevonden.
Hoofdstuk 3
Hoofdstuk 3 bespreekt de gevolgen van uitbesteding (offshoring) voor de
inkomensverdeling en werkgelegenheid in het thuisland. Het doel is tweeledig.
Ten eerste wordt gekeken naar de gevolgen voor de inkomensverdeling in een situatie
van uitbesteding, waarbij verschillende groepen arbeiders geraakt worden door de
uitbesteding van bepaalde taken. Ten tweede vallen door uitbesteding de banen
van veel middelbaar geschoolde arbeiders weg. Deze arbeiders vinden nieuw werk in
laaggeschoolde banen. Het is daarom van belang te kijken naar de indirecte effecten van
deze herindeling op de werkloosheid van laaggeschoolde arbeiders.
De resultaten zijn gebaseerd op een theoretisch model met een heterogene verdeling van
taken en vaardigheden (laag-, middelbaar-, en hooggeschoold), endogene uitbesteding van
taken en delen van het productieproces, en tot slot ook indirecte effecten als gevolg van
mobiliteit tussen taken en vaardigheidsgroepen. Hierbij wordt ook rekening gehouden met
twee bronnen van frictie op de arbeidsmarkt. Er wordt gestart met een situatie waarin
een minimumloon geldt, om vervolgens te komen tot een meer generiek verloop van
aanpassingen in de arbeidsmarkt door een endogeen aanbod van laaggeschoolde arbeid
toe te staan.
Uit de analyses komen verschillende nieuwe inzichten naar voren. Ten eerste zijn de
gevolgen van het uitbesteden van laaggeschoolde taken te vergelijken met die van “skill-
biased technological change” (cf. Acemoglu, 2002b). Worden middelbaargeschoolde taken
uitbesteed aan andere economiee¨n, dan ontstaat er een polarisatie in de lonen, waarbij
laag en hoog geschoolden in het thuisland er relatief op vooruit gaan in vergelijking met de
middelbaar geschoolden (zichtbaar in recente ontwikkelingen). Worden hooggeschoolde
taken uitbesteed, dan zijn de gevolgen vergelijkbaar met die van “unskilled-biased
technological change” (cf. Goldin and Katz, 2009).
Een andere bevinding is dat hoewel de uitbesteding leidt tot verdringing, de uitbesteding
ook leidt tot productiviteitswinsten, doordat er efficie¨nter en tegen lagere marginale
kosten geproduceerd kan worden. Het negatieve effect voor arbeiders die door verdringing
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op een lager niveau werken – en tegen een lager loon – wordt teniet gedaan door de winst
in efficie¨ntie en productiviteit.
Tot slot wordt aangetoond dat de mate waarin uitbesteding een effect heeft op de
werkloosheid onder laaggeschoolden sterk afhankelijk is van de mate van wederzijdse
substitutie van middelbaar- en laaggeschoold werk.
Hoofdstuk 4
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat in op de relatie tussen immigratie en de daarmee samenhangende
veranderingen in de structuur en inzet van technologie. Het doel is om te laten
zien hoe de inzet van technologie verandert als gevolg van de veranderende verdeling
van vaardigheden in de beroepsbevolking. Vervolgens wordt in beeld gebracht hoe
deze technologische aanpassingen weer van invloed zijn op de inkomensverdeling. Het
onderliggende theoretische model van de economie kenmerkt zich door heterogeniteit in
bedrijven als ook in vaardigheden (laag-, middelbaar-, en hooggeschoold) en een endogene
keuze voor technologie.
De analyses laten twee interessante resultaten zien. Ten eerste ontstaan veranderingen
in de inkomensverdeling door een samenspel van twee effecten. Aan de ene kant
ontstaat door immigratie een grotere potentie¨le beroepsbevolking. Een groeiend aandeel
van een bepaald type arbeider drukt de lonen voor deze groep arbeiders door grotere
onderlinge concurrentie. Anderzijds zorgt een instroom van arbeiders ervoor dat bedrijven
zich specialiseren in technologie die complementair is met die groep arbeiders, hetgeen
doorgaans een positief effect heeft op de lonen. Ten tweede laten de resultaten zien dat
het relatieve belang van deze – in tegengestelde richting werkende – krachten afhangt van
de mate van adoptie van nieuwe technologiee¨n. De richting van beide effecten afzonderlijk
wordt bepaald door de interactie tussen voorkeuren van consumenten en het niveau van
marktmacht van de monopolistische concurrenten.
Hoofdstuk 5
Naast veranderingen in technologie, kunnen bedrijven ook hun organisatiestructuur
aanpassen als gevolg van immigratie. Hoofdstuk 5 laat zien wat met de inkomens van de
zittende arbeiders gebeurt als deze organisatorische aanpassingen in beschouwing worden
genomen. Hiertoe wordt het economisch model van Hoofdstuk 4 op twee manieren
uitgebreid. Ten eerste vindt een herverdeling van taken plaats binnen bedrijven, waarbij
de aanname is dat zittende arbeiders relatief vaker worden ingezet op plekken waar
communicatieve vaardigheden van belang zijn en immigranten vaker worden ingezet
op handmatige klussen (cf. Peri and Sparber, 2009). Daarnaast wordt uitbesteding
ge¨ıntroduceerd, waarbij wordt aangenomen dat met name de taken van middelbaar
geschoolde arbeiders worden uitbesteed aan het buitenland (cf. Acemoglu and Autor,
2011).
De analyses leiden tot verschillende nieuwe inzichten. Ten eerste hebben immigratie
en uitbesteding een effect op zowel de efficie¨ntie als het aanbod van arbeid, twee
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zaken die op elkaar inwerken. Ten tweede is te zien dat de relatieve grootte van het
efficie¨ntie-effect door immigratie (door herverdeling van taken) en door uitbesteding
(door herverdeling van banen) sterk afhangt van de startwaarden voor wat betreft de
taken toebedeeld aan immigranten, als ook het aandeel van uitbesteding. Met lage
beginwaarden van de scholingsgraad van taken domineert het efficie¨ntie-effect, met als
gevolg hogere lonen voor de zittende arbeiders binnen eenzelfde vaardigheidsniveau. De
richting en relatieve verhoudingen tussen de effecten van een groeiende beroepsbevolking
en die van technologische aanpassingen zijn vergelijkbaar met die in Hoofdstuk 4, maar in
een situatie waarin het heel eenvoudig is te schakelen tussen verschillende technologiee¨n
– waarin de effecten van een groeiende beroepsbevolking en die van technologische
aanpassingen in evenwicht zijn – blijven de winsten in termen van efficie¨ntie – als gevolg
van een herverdeling van taken en een reductie in de marginale kosten van productie
– behouden. Dit laatste gegeven wijkt af van recente studies over de gevolgen van
immigratie en uitbesteding (cf. Acemoglu et al., 2012; Ottaviano et al., 2013).
De resultaten tonen aan dat er significante aanpassingen zijn op macro niveau, met
aanpassingen in technologie, als ook op micro niveau, met een herverdeling van taken
en banen.
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